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The subject of this thesis is the duty of loyalty in the Nordic law of contracts. This study is of comparative law, and it aims to com-
pare the definitions and explanations given for the duty of loyalty in the Nordic countries. The comparisons are made between 
Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. This study could also be described as partly legal dogmatic, since the purpose of the 
comparisons is to find out what the legal meaning and effect of the duty of loyalty are. Since the duty of loyalty is a broad and 
general norm which applies to a number legal spheres, such as consumer and insurance contracts, the subject of this study needs 
to be delimited in order to keep the discussion coherent and focused. Because of this, the study will only inspect the duty of loyalty 
in the context of commercial contracts. 
 
In all of the Nordic countries, the duty of loyalty is an unwritten legal norm and/or a principle. The duty is generally defined as a 
duty of the contracting parties to reasonably consider each other’s interests and expectations without unreasonably risking their 
own. Many authors in jurisprudence have criticised this definition as vague and impalpable. Yet, at the same time, many authors 
see it as a norm that has gained more significance and influence in the law of contract, especially during the last decades. In Fin-
land, there are many authors who have discussed the duty in articles and textbooks, but there is no doctoral thesis that focuses 
solely on the duty of loyalty. The situation is somewhat different in neighbouring countries, as several doctoral theses about the 
duty exist in Sweden and one in Norway. Aside from these theses, the academic discussion and debate has been vivid in all the 
Nordic countries. This study aims to gather and compile this discussion into a comparative analysis. Lastly, it presents a synthesis 
of these descriptions and discusses whether these descriptions could be merged into a notion of a Nordic duty of loyalty. 
 
The structure of this thesis consists of an introduction, followed by four chapters which concern the individual countries of this 
study. Each country is discussed in its own chapter. These chapters aim to describe the discussion and the debate in jurispru-
dence concerning the duty in the country in question. Each of these chapters consists of the following topics: 1.) the legal basis of 
the duty, 2.) the definitions given for the duty, 3.) how the duty has been defined in relation to other norms of contract law, 4.) the 
functions of the duty, 5.) its applications and lastly, 6.) the more specific elements attributed to the duty, such as its influence in 
different contracting phases and what specific obligations are thought to stem from it. The purpose of the first topic is to analyse 
the legal character of the duty. This will be done by inspecting the descriptions of the authors in jurisprudence and how the duty 
has been applied in court practice. The second topic describes the more specific definitions given for the duty in jurisprudence, and 
the third part seeks to find out how these definitions separate and define the duty in relation to the other norms of contract law, 
such as the bona fides, the principle of equity/reasonableness and the Contracts Act 36§. The fourth topic gives an account of the 
functions which authors have attributed to the duty, and the fifth one discusses the possible applications of the duty and what 
consequences disloyal conduct can give rise to. Examples of such consequences and legal remedies are the cancellation of con-
tract, liability for damages and the voidableness of contract. The sixth part concerns the opinions of legal authors as to what type of 
concrete obligations the duty could generate and how it can actually supplement a contract.  
 
After the chapters discussing the individual countries, the sixth chapter will give a comparative analysis of the opinions and discus-
sions mentioned in the aforementioned chapters. The sixth chapter consists of the same subtopics as chapters 2.-5. First and 
foremost, the author will analyse definitions and elements of the duty and discuss whether individual authors agree or disagree 
about them. Besides this, the author will also deliberate whether it is possible to find differences on national levels.  
 
The last chapter discusses the conclusions of the comparisons. The first part of this chapter will seek to give an illustration of what 
is, or could be, the broadest and the most comprehensive definition given for the duty in the Nordic countries. The author will also 
comment on the applicability of the duty in commercial contracts. As a counterweight to the first, the second part highlights the 
more critical and disinclined views towards the duty and seeks to summarize the debate. 
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KöpL (köplagen) =  Köplag (1990:931) (Sale of Goods Act) 
Lag [1991:351] om handelsagentur (Act on Commercial Representatives and Salesmen) 
Lag [1990:409] om skydd för företagshemligheter (Act on the Protection of Trade Secrets) 
Lov om handelsagenter og handelsreisende (agenturloven) (LOV-1992-06-19-56) (Act on 
Commercial Representatives and Salesmen) 
Lov om handelsagenter og handelsrejsende (handelsagenturloven) (LOV nr 272 af 
02/05/1990) (Act on Commercial Representatives and Salesmen) 
OikTL (oikeustoimilaki) = Laki varallisuusoikeudellisista oikeustoimista (13.6.1929/228) 
(Contracts Act) 
XIII 
 
Työsopimuslaki (26.1.2001/55) (Employment Contracts Act) 
Vakuutussopimuslaki (28.6.1994/543) (Insurance Contracts Act) 
Vahingonkorvauslaki (31.5.1974/412) (Tort Liability Act) 
Velkakirjalaki (31.7.1947/622) (Promissory Notes Act) 
 
Individual laws are referred to with their national names. When discussing all of the Nor-
dic Contract Acts as a whole (OikTL, AvtL, AvtLo, AftL), the term Contract Act(s) will be 
used. The term Trade Act(s) will be used for the trade laws (KBL, KL, KjøpsL, KöpL). 
 
Other documents 
 
HE 241/2006 Hallituksen esitys luottotietolaiksi  
SOU 1979:36: Konsumenttjänstlag. Betänkande av konsumenttjänstutredningen  
Regeringens proposition: 1984:85 110 Om konsumenttjänstlag 
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1. Introduction 
 
De nordiska avtalslagarna bygger på en presumtion som ofta är felaktig, nämligen den att av-
talet är en samverkan mellan två jämställda parter – L.E. Taxell.1  
  The traditional outlook of civil law is somewhat straight-forward: the main rule is the 
private autonomy of contracting parties and the parties are obliged only by what has been 
explicitly stated in the contract provisions. The contract provisions are the rules of a con-
tractual relationship, and alongside statutory norms they define how contracting parties 
must act. Still, in the recent decades, authors in jurisprudence have also debated about the 
possibility of applying principles and unwritten norms in order to alter contractual relation-
ships.
2
 Although this discussion is not the main focus of this study, it indirectly affects its 
progression. The question of how much the duty of loyalty can influence a contractual rela-
tionship is linked to this broader debate. 
  The aim of this study is to compare the notion of the duty of loyalty between the follow-
ing four Nordic countries: Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The duty of loyalty is 
usually defined as a duty of the contracting parties to reasonably consider each other’s in-
terests and expectations without unreasonably risking their own. What does it mean to con-
sider the contracting partners interests? What kind of acts does this require, and how does 
this oblige the contracting parties? These questions form the core of this study, and alt-
hough giving an unambiguous answer to them might be impossible, it is possible to illus-
trate and compare the answers given to these questions.  Still, it would be impossible to 
describe all mentions of the duty, since the notion existed (in some form) already in Roman 
law. This study is delimited to only the last decades. 
  The next concept one might have to define further is that of Nordic law. Generally, the 
Nordic countries are seen as culturally and socially alike countries with roughly similar 
legal systems. Nordic (or Scandinavian) law is seen either as a subgroup of civil law or as 
an independent legal family. Its most common characteristics are the lack of a civil code, 
although statutory law acts as a basis for most fields of law, and (at least earlier) legislative 
co-operation. Especially the similar Contract and Trade Acts of the Nordic countries are 
                                                          
1
 Taxell JFT 1979 p.493. 
2
 Häyhä 1998 pp.123, 129, 140-141. 
2 
 
important for this study, since they form a mostly uniform basis of the Nordic law of con-
tracts.
3
  
 
1.1. Nordic law and the method of comparison  
 
  The Nordic countries form their own legal culture also in contract law. The specific char-
acteristics of the Nordic law of contracts are its specific emphases on principles in the in-
terpretation of contracts, trust, and the intention of contracting parties, and substance over 
form.
4
 Nordic authors in jurisprudence often refer to each other’s texts regardless of which 
of the countries they originate from. Because of these similarities and correspondences, 
one might ask if it is necessary to speak of a comparative study rather than a legal dogmat-
ic one. While this might be true, this study takes the outlook that even though the coun-
tries’ legal cultures are similar, it is possible to find individual differences and aberrations 
between the countries. It is also easier to systematize the material by country.
5
 On the 
whole, one could say that the opinions and texts of the authors presented in this study can 
usually be regarded as valid material for jurisprudence in all of the Nordic countries, but 
one must bear in mind that the histories of the countries and their jurisprudences differ, and 
their authors emphasize various doctrines and norms dissimilarly.
6
 
  Comparative law is said to mean observing and explaining similarities and differences 
between legal systems and cultures, and it can be practiced with a wide range of different 
methods and styles. To start with, this study focuses on a single notion: the duty of loyalty 
in contract law. Points of interest of this study are to find similarities and especially differ-
ences in the concept of the duty. Therefore, using Jaakko Husa’s term, this analysis could 
be defined as a micro comparison. A micro comparison focuses on single norms or legal 
institutions. It is also partially a functional comparison, which means it studies how a par-
ticular problem has been solved in different legal systems.
7
 Besides these aspects, this 
study is mostly legal dogmatic in its approach to the duty of loyalty. This means that the 
                                                          
3
 Bernitz Sc.St.L vol.50 2007 p.15. 
4
 Lindholm NJM 2008 pp.271-272, Bernitz Sc.St.L vol.50 2007 p.21. 
5
 Bernitz Sc.St.L vol.50 2007 p.21: "[..] Scandinavian law often has its special features when it comes to the 
solutions chosen and the substantive rules. However, it is practically never uniform. When looking for the 
details, always necessary in the application of the law, there are quite notable differences between the 
exact position of the law on a specific point in the five Nordic countries.” 
6
 For examples of this see: Björne 2005, Wilhelmsson 1978. 
7
 Husa 2013 pp.25-27, 126,145 
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aim is to find out how the duty of loyalty has been defined and how it can be applied in 
legal disputes. As a starting point, one can state that the general concept of the duty of loy-
alty is more or less similar in all of the Nordic countries. Since the legal cultures and the 
societies of the Nordic countries are similar and in some areas nearly uniform, it is neces-
sary to dig rather deeply into the layers of legal doctrine to find individual differences. 
 
1.2. The subject, sphere and structure of this study 
 
  Because the duty of loyalty is a broad concept that runs through most areas of contract 
law, ranging from consumer to commercial affairs, it would be a rather taxing effort to 
compare the concept in all possible situations and fields. Therefore, some delimitations and 
specifications for the subject matter are essential. First and foremost, this study will focus 
on commercial contracts, with emphasis on the sale of goods. Other contract types, such as 
construction, franchising, joint venture, and other co-operation contracts will be discussed 
in conjunction with certain elements of loyalty, but mostly as examples and without delv-
ing too deeply into the details.  
  Due to the above-mentioned, the following areas of law and contract types will be ex-
cluded: 1.) Consumer contracts 2.) Labor contracts 3.) Contracts concerning fiduciaries, 
such as agency, commissions and estate agents etc. 4.) Insurance contracts and 5.) Corpo-
rate law. Although the duty is relevant in all of the aforementioned areas, which at times 
overlap and influence each other, the aim is to give a more focused, general, and universal 
description about notion of the duty without cluttering the text with profuse details and 
individual peculiarities. This does present a certain challenge, however, as great part of the 
source material discusses the duty on a very general level without specifically referring to 
commercial context, or then vice versa, discussing a very specific contract type. Due to 
this, it is important to note that the citations from the presented authors are usually describ-
ing the duty in general and references to commercial context will be specified individually.  
  The structure of this study aims to give a general description of the duty of loyalty in 
each of the countries examined. First, the countries will be discussed individually. It is 
common for writers to refer to other authors and court cases from other Nordic countries as 
source material, which sometimes causes similarity in argumentation. After the introduc-
tion, this study is divided into four chapters discussing the individual countries in the fol-
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lowing order: Finland, Sweden, Norway and lastly Denmark. Each of these chapters is di-
vided into 6 parts. The first part will focus on the legal basis of the duty. A brief descrip-
tion of the duty’s history in legislation and jurisprudence will be given, followed by men-
tions of the statutes, court cases and law-drafting documents that are associated with duty 
in the country in question. The second part illustrates how the duty has been defined in 
jurisprudence. The presentation will include different classifications, descriptions and ex-
planations of how the duty is to be understood in contract law. After this, the question of 
the function(s) of the duty and its relation to other norms and principles of contract law 
will be discussed in parts three and four. The goal is to find out how authors in legal sci-
ence perceive the duty and how much dissent there is concerning its composition. The fifth 
part of the analyses describes the applications of the duty (e.g. interpretation of contract) 
and consequences that breaching the duty may give rise to (e.g. liability for damages). Af-
ter this, some of the more specific elements of the duty will be discussed in part six. These 
include its influence in different phases of contract (pre-, post- and non-contractual), what 
kind of contract types are especially sensitive to (dis)loyalty and more specific obligations 
that are (at least by some authors) said to derive from the duty. After describing the afore-
mentioned countries, the sixth chapter of this study moves on to comparing the countries. 
The main query is: what is similar, what is different? Is it possible to speak of a common 
Nordic concept of duty of loyalty? Finally, the last chapter draws the conclusions and 
analyses the material in two perspectives: one that takes a broad and accepting view to the 
notion of the duty and another that is more critical towards it. 
  The material used in this study consists mostly of monographs and articles. The publish-
ing time-period of these texts is not sternly delimited, but the author tries to focus on more 
recent texts and analyze how the duty of loyalty is viewed at present. Most of the material 
is from the 90´s and time after that. Some court cases are mentioned, but the interest of this 
study is focused on how these cases are analyzed in jurisprudence. These cases are mostly 
used as examples, although they have an important role in defining the legal basis of the 
duty. 
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1.3. Terminology 
 
  One of the main issues in conducting a study consisting of multiple countries and judicial 
systems is defining the used terminology. As this study consists of four different countries, 
and thus four different languages translated into English, one might say there is a lot of 
room for confusion. Because of this, the author has settled on translating certain recurrent 
terms and otherwise just giving an approximate translation with the original term men-
tioned in brackets. This is due to the fact that a lot of the source material consists of doc-
toral theses in which authors often name and suggested new terms which usually only 
(completely) work in the source language.  
  The paramount term of this study is of course the duty of loyalty. In comparing the Nordic 
countries, it is obvious that the term is quite identical by its common phrasing and mean-
ing: lojaliteettivelvollisuus (fin), lojalitetsplikt (swe/no), loyalitetspligt (dk). Some authors 
also use the term principle of loyalty often with hardly any definition in relation to the duty 
of loyalty. It seems that these terms are mostly used as synonyms, which is also the case in 
this study unless stated otherwise. The factually equivalent term for the duty in Anglo-
American law is good faith. Some writers use the term good faith as a synonym or a coun-
terpart for above mentioned national terms of the duty of loyalty.
8
 Mähönen states that the 
term lojaliteettivelvollisuus (duty of loyalty) is somewhat problematic because it is easily 
confused with fiduciary loyalty of an authorized representative or agents. He claims that in 
these fiduciary institutions the loyalty is one-sided (agent → principal) whereas good faith 
is reciprocal. He suggests that using the term hyvä usko (good faith) should be preferred in 
Finland. Also, the term vilpitön mieli would be a suitable translation if it was not already 
used to refer to the bona fides-term (discussed in more detail in part 2.3.).
9
  
  In this study the author has nevertheless chosen to use the term duty of loyalty as opposed 
to good faith. The fact that Mähönen sees the term loyalty as easily confused with fiduciary 
relationships is in itself interesting, as some authors describe the duty of loyalty as a com-
prehensive rule that includes fiduciary relationships along with other areas of law, such as 
                                                          
8
 Nysten Haarala 1998 pp.32–33, See also Munukka 2007 pp.125–126, Holm 2004 p.179. 
9
 Mähönen 2000 pp.218–219, Saarnilehto 2000 p.130: ”Selkeintä olisikin puhua lojaliteettivelvollisuudesta 
(esim. Muukkonen 1975) tai yksinkertaisesti lojaliteetista (Mähönen 1998, s.232). Paras termi olisi kuitenkin 
”hyvän uskon vaatimus”. ibid p.143. See also Ämmälä 1994 p.4: ”Oikeuskirjallisuudessa on katsottu, että 
lojaliteettiperiaatteen mukainen lojaliteettivelvollisuus koskisi sopimuspuolia sopimustyypistä riippumatta.” 
She does not define the difference between the principle of loyalty and the duty of loyalty any further. 
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labor and insurance law. It would seem that the terms have at least in some sense merged 
together.
10
 As the study will later point out, the concept of the duty of loyalty has for the 
most part very similar definitions in the Nordic countries. This prompts to ask whether 
switching from the term of loyalty to good faith in the national or Nordic context is the 
best alternative. In any case, this justifies the use of the term loyalty in the study at hand.  
  Another question is the dichotomy between the terms loyal/disloyal (lojaali/epälojaali, 
lojal/illojal). There seems to be some ambiguity concerning these terms. In this study, the 
author uses them as counterparts. Actions that are not done according to, or are against, the 
duty of loyalty are disloyal. This is done also to create distance to the term bona fides 
which is also somewhat blurry in relation to good faith. The term bad faith (mala fides) is 
neither to be confused with disloyalty. Lastly, in order to create a distinction to the Anglo-
American concept of “good faith” the term duty of loyalty will be used here to refer to the 
Nordic legal doctrine.  
  Other terms used for in this study are the more specific loyalty obligations (lojalitetsför-
pliktelse). These obligations and their definition vary between countries and authors. Ra-
ther than discussing these duties individually in their own categories, the author has chosen 
to divide them into two categories: 1.) specific obligations to contribute and 2.) the duty to 
disclose. Such divisions do not as such exist in all of the examined countries, and more 
specific categorizations will be discussed individually. The term of specific obligations to 
contribute is used among others to describe: the duty to co-operate, the duty to mitigate 
damages, the prohibition to compete etc. The common denominator for these duties is that 
they aim to support the effectuation of contract and they have a co-operational character. 
The second category is used to more specifically describe the duty to disclose that is prob-
ably the most discussed aspect of the duty of loyalty in jurisprudence.  
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 For exmples see Munukka 2007 and Nazarian 2007. 
7 
 
2. Finland 
 
2.1. The legal basis of the duty of loyalty 
  
  In Finnish jurisprudence, it has been said that the duty of loyalty and the idea of contracts 
as a co-operation of the contracting parties first got a central role in the works of Lars Erik 
Taxell.
11
 Taxell discussed the duty in his textbook Avtal och rättskydd from 1972 and later 
in an article “Om lojalitet i avtalsförhållanden” from 1977. Also, in his article concerning 
contracting ethics from 1979 he makes an observation that there is a tendency to give more 
room for moral based evaluations in the law of contracts, and because of the ever increas-
ing complexity of the modern society the legislator has to give the courts more room for 
assessment inside the boundaries set by statutory law. A contract is no longer solely seen 
as a conflict of interests and a way to promote individual gains but rather as a collabora-
tion of the contracting parties. The duty can also promote the (mostly informational) 
equality between parties. Because of the aforementioned facts, Taxell sees room for an 
ethical dimension in contracts. In itself the duty of loyalty is said to promote the fundamen-
tal values of equality, collaboration, and reciprocity in contracts.
12
 
  There is no unequivocal legal definition for the duty of loyalty in Finnish law. Some stat-
utes contain specific provisions that are associated with the duty, but they usually refer to 
certain specific situations such as an employee’s obligations towards an employer in the 
Employment Contracts Act (Työsopimuslaki, TSL) 13§. Contracting parties also some-
times write contract clauses to include the duty into their contract.
13
 Still, even when there 
are no such specific provisions, there exists a somewhat uniform consensus in jurispru-
dence that it is in some situations possible to apply an unwritten general rule of the duty of 
loyalty. This duty is non-discretionary, which means that contracting parties must abide to 
the duty of loyalty regardless of contract type and whether it is mentioned in contract’s 
                                                          
11
 Munukka NJM 2011 p.89 and Muukkonen LM 7/1993 p.1032, Saarnilehto 2000 p.62: a text from Portin is 
also mentioned. Other Nordic authors also mention Taxell’s works i.a. Evald 2001 pp.276-277, Munukka 
2007 pp.62-63, Holm 2004 p.30, 81, see also Nazarian 2007 p.313. Cf. Votinius 2004, Wilhelmsson Wil-
helmsson SvJT 4/2005 p.443. 
12
 Taxell JFT 1979 pp.488-489, 498 and Taxell DL 1977 pp.148 – 149, also later Muukkonen states in ibid LM 
7/1993 p.1040: “Nykyaikainen sopimusoikeus rakentuu käsitykselle, jonka mukaan sopimus on osapuolten 
yhteinen yritys”, Saarnilehto 2000 pp.69, 84, 129, 165-167. Häyhä DL 3/1996 p.319, Wilhelmsson 1999 
p.182. Pöyhönen 2000 p.136 
13
 Muukkonen LM 7/1993 p.1035, Tieva LM 6/2009 p.952. 
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terms. It is also general in a sense that it can apply to all types of contracts, and as men-
tioned it “transcends” different legal spheres ranging from consumer relations to immateri-
al law.
14
 The statutory norms of the Contracts Act (Oikeustoimilaki OikTL) 33§ and 36§ 
are often mentioned in conjunction with the duty, although there is no consensus on 
whether they can be used as a normative basis for the duty (more detailed description of 
this discussion in 2.3.). In his doctoral thesis about commercial contracts, Tuomas Lehtinen 
seems to dismiss the question of the legal basis of the duty altogether, justifying its exist-
ence with practical necessity. He states: 
Teoreettinen kysymyksenasettelu siitä, kyetäänkö tai halutaanko lojaalisuus esittää 
toimintavelvollisuutena tai lainsäädökseen tai periaatteeseen perustuvana itsenäisenä tai 
epäitsenäisenä velvoitteena, ei ole kovin hedelmällinen. Lojaalisuus on yleinen sopi-
musoikeudellinen ja varsinkin liikesopimustoimintaan liittyvä toimintatapa.
15
 
  Since the duty of loyalty is not statutorily defined, its legal validity is mostly based on its 
uniform recognition in the legal doctrine and due to it being mentioned in some law-
drafting documents and court cases.
16
 It has been discussed in numerous articles and text 
books but, unlike in Sweden and Norway, no doctrinal thesis exists that would focus solely 
on the duty of loyalty. Still, many writers have discussed it in detail in conjunction with 
other themes such as construction contracts.
17
 The Supreme Court has explicitly used the 
term “duty of loyalty” in cases KKO 1993:130, 2007:72 and 2008:91. Ari Saarnilehto has 
stated that with the case 2008:91 the “breakthrough” of the duty of loyalty has become 
apparent and court practice has therefore acknowledged the duty.
18
 According to Soili Nys-
tén-Haarala, also the courts of first instance and appellate courts have begun applying the 
duty.
19
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 Muukkonen LM 7/1993 p.1032, Saarnilehto 2000 p.59, 139, 141, 182, Ämmälä 1994 p.4. Korhonen JFT 
4/2006 p.346, Häyhä DL 3/1996 p.320. 
15
 Lehtinen 2006 p.82. 
16
 Muukkonen LM 7/1993 p.1032, see also p.1033 where he lists writers who advocate the duty of loyalty as 
a general principle of contract law. He states that the writers in jurisprudence in general accept the princi-
ple. Saarnilehto 2000 p.130, Nystén-Haarala 1998 p.34. 
17
 See for instance: Rudanko 1989, Halila 1981, Huhtamäki 1993, Lehtinen 2006 
18
 Saarnilehto oikeustieto 5/2008 p.4: ”[..] lojaliteettivelvollisuuden tai -periaatteen läpimurto 
sopimusoikeudellisissa ratkaisuissa on nyt totta. Käytännössä on tunnustettu se, mitä kirjallisuudessa on 
esitetty jo pitkään.” 
19
 Nystén-Haarala 2005 p.445. 
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2.2. Definitions for the duty of loyalty 
 
  As stated above, there is no exhaustive and/or concrete definition for the duty of loyalty. 
It is usually defined as: a duty of the contracting parties to reasonably consider each other’s 
interests and expectations without unreasonably risking their own. The duty acts mostly as 
a guideline, and it is an element to consider in most contracts. The most important aspects 
of loyalty come from the ideas of common goal, trust and co-operation. Since the duty re-
strains contracting parties from one-sidedly promoting their own gains, it therefore limits 
the parties’ freedom of contract.20 Lehtinen divides Taxell’s definition of loyalty into a 
passive (one may not solely promote his/her own interests) and an active (one must in cer-
tain boundaries consider his/her contracting partners interests) forms of loyalty. He also 
describes it as a neutral duty (see chapter 2.6.1 duty in contracting phases for details).
21
 
Petteri Korhonen describes the duty by stating that the duty of loyalty means loyalty to-
wards the contracts goal, contractual balance, and risk distribution.
22
 However, the duty is 
not without boundaries. Lehtinen points out that loyalty means loyalty within and inside 
the boundaries of a contract. The parties don´t have an unrestricted obligation to help each 
other e.g. in case of economic difficulties.
23
  
  At first glance, the Finnish doctrine does not seem to view the duty of loyalty as an espe-
cially strong and/or independent principle. It is described as appearing through other prin-
ciples that are close to it. Such closely related or parallel principles include: the protection 
of trust (luottamuksensuoja), reasonableness (kohtuus) and the parity of contracting par-
ties.
24
 Juha Karhu suggests that the duty is growing towards to being one of the fundamen-
tal values of contract law, although as such it does not hold as much weight in the system 
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 Saarilehto 2000 p.88 and 129, 166 Saarnilehto et al. 2012 p.76 and pp.123-125, Taxell 1972 pp.81-82, 
Taxell DL 1977 p.149, Pöyhönen 1988 p.19: The duty of loyalty means that when planning and realizing 
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his/her contracting partner, Nystén-Haarala 1998 p.34: “The interests of the contracting party must be 
respected. Loyalty between contracting parties should exist at least to this extent in all commercial con-
tracts, even without any special feature of co-operational relationship.” Lehtinen 2006 p.79, Mäenpää JFT 
4/2010 p.327: “Therefore, the principle of good faith can be seen as a counter principle to the principle of 
freedom of contract.” 
21
 Lehtinen 2006 p.211. 
22
 Korhonen JFT 1/2006 p.41. 
23
 Lehtinen 2006 pp.81–83. 
24
 Ämmälä 1994 pp.16–17, Lehtinen 2006 p.197: ”Lojaliteettiperiaate ja lojaliteettivelvollisuus ovat 
käytännössä vilpittömän mielen ”apuinstrumentteja.”, See also Korhonen JFT 1/2006 p.40. 
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of contract law as the principle of the freedom of contract, the interest of trade (vaihdannan 
intressi), reasonableness, and the protection of a weaker/disadvantaged party.
25
 Marko 
Mononen defines the duty of loyalty solely as a descriptive principle that is used to sys-
tematize norms. Thus it cannot be seen as independent grounds for court decisions.
26
  
  On the other side, there are authors who perceive the duty of loyalty as a broader and 
more potent principle. Taxell describes it very broadly as a general principle of law 
(allmän rättsprincip) that can directly affect a contractual relationship.
27
 Similarly, Juha 
Häyhä seems to place more emphasis on the independence of the duty, stating that it 
should guide the actions of the parties as wells as serve as grounds for resolutions in 
courts.
28
 Also Hannu Tolonen seems to consider it as an independent principle.
29
 Other 
descriptions mention it as a contributory principle or a general principle in contract law.
30
  
The concept of the duty also has its critics who disapprove of it. The duty has, with good 
reason, been criticized as being vague and problematic, especially in relation to the aspect 
of predictability. Erkki Aurejärvi states that this vagueness reduces its utility value. Due to 
its vagueness, it could be seen as applying to any situation, and therefore it lacks definitive 
meaning. It could also be merged with the terms “honest” or “lawful.” 31 
  Lastly, Lars Björne makes a distinction between the concrete and the general levels of the 
duty loyalty. By the concrete level of loyalty, he means an obligation to actively pay atten-
tion to the other party’s interests, which gives rise to certain specific duties such as an ob-
ligation to give notice of defects (reklamaatio) and disclosing. This concrete level appears 
to be a legal dogmatic perspective on the duty loyalty, with its emphasis on the obligations 
of the parties. By the general level, he means a requirement of honesty and that the parties’ 
actions may not be dishonorable and unworthy, in other words, they must adhere to the 
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 Karhu 2008 p.103, Pöyhönen 1988 p.79. 
26
 Mononen 2001 p.164: ” Lojaliteetin aseman tunnustaminen merkitsee sitä, että todetaan joidenkin 
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Nykyään yli kymmenen vuotta [hovioikeuden] ratkaisujen jälkeen on ehkä oletettava lojaliteettiperiaatteen 
itsenäistyneen kohtuusperiaatteesta. Nykyään on luontevaa ajatella, että samaa juttua voidaan tutkia sekä 
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 Nystén-Haarala 1998 pp.125, 134–135. Taxell 1972 p.82. 
31
 Aurejärvi LM 7/1993 p.1102 and Aurejärvi LM 8/1989 p.1173: ”«Lojaliteetti», tarkoittaa sananmukaisesti 
«lainkuuliaisuutta», lojaali henkilö noudattaa lakia eli tekee ”oikein.” See also Häyhä DL 3/1996 p.321, 
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requirements ethically acceptable behavior. This general level seems to emphasize con-
tracts as co-operation of contracting parties.
32
 Björne’s view seems therefore divide the 
idea of the duty of loyalty into the perspective of concrete legal dogmatics and a more gen-
eral philosophy of law perspective. 
 
2.3. The duty of loyalty in relation to other principles and norms 
 
  As mentioned, Oikeustoimilaki contains no explicit paragraph(s) of the duty, although 
some writers such as Tuula Ämmälä, Ari Huhtamäki and Hannu von Hertzen consider the 
paragraph 33§ as an indirect statutory basis for the duty. However, this sentiment is not 
shared by all authors.
33
 Jukka Mähönen states that one cannot identify 33§ with the duty of 
loyalty, since 33§ is a normative basis for voidableness, unlike the duty of loyalty that de-
fines the contracting parties obligations during a contractual relationship. Regardless of 
this, in some cases of the courts of appeal the disloyal conduct of a contracting party has 
been considered a reason to apply the OikTL 31§ and 33§.
34
 Interestingly, Tolonen sees a 
change in an earlier perception of the legal doctrine that the duty of loyalty is above all 
based on the concept of good conduct (33§), since nowadays the outlook on the duty has 
shifted more towards an assessment that contractual relationships are co-operation of con-
tracting parties.
35
 This could be interpreted as a statement that 33§ is no longer so fitting 
point of reference for the duty as it was before.  
  In order to apply the duty of loyalty, one is required to assess the reasonableness of the 
parties conduct. Because of this, the relationship between the duty of loyalty and the prin-
ciple of reasonableness is difficult to precisely define. Exercising contractual rights in a 
way that one-sidedly alters the equivalence of contract can be considered unreasonable, 
and in addition also disloyal. Reasonableness has its most recognizable expression in the 
                                                          
32
 Björne 1994 p.6. 
33
 For example Rudanko 1989 p.35, von Hertzen 1983 p.176, Huhtamäki 1993 p.41,65, Pohjonen 1994 
p.148, also HE 241/2006 2.1 ”Lainsäädäntö: Oikeustoimilain 33 §:n on katsottu olevan ilmaisu yleisemmästä 
lojaliteettiperiaatteesta.” For dissenting opinions see: Muukkonen LM 7/1993 p.1041 and Saarnilehto 2000 
p.132. For other writers who support the view see: Muukkonen ibid. Nystén-Haarala 1998 p.127: “In the 
Nordic countries §33 is too narrow a general clause to function as a basis for general loyalty duty.” Never-
theless, 33§ is seen as an expression of a general principle that makes it possible to void contracts on the 
basis of acts contrary to good conduct and good faith, see Wilhelmsson 1978. 
34
 Saarnilehto 2000 p.132. 
35
 Saarnilehto 2000 p.165. 
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OikTL 36§ which is said to be the normative basis for the principle of reasonableness (or 
fairness, equity). Mähönen seeks to separate the two principles by defining the principle of 
reasonableness as being about adjusting uneven contractual balance caused by differences 
in the economic power and information between the parties. In comparison to this, the duty 
of loyalty constitutes specific obligations to act in order to assure an adequate considera-
tion of the other party’s interests.36 Mononen points out that although contract equity is not 
the foremost emphasized aspect of loyalty, it does set some requirements for the duty. This 
view seems to be somewhat similar as the one stated by Karhu that the duty affects 36§, 
but mostly as a “background” norm.37 Tolonen notes that earlier in the 80´s the duty might 
have been viewed alongside the principle of reasonableness, but it can nowadays be con-
sidered as an independent principle of law.
38
 Muukkonen also considers 36§ and the duty 
as having influenced the development of the law of contracts in the last decades. Neverthe-
less, he explicitly states that the duty cannot be linked to any specific statutory norms.
39
    
  How to distinguish the duty of loyalty from the bona fides type of good faith (vilpitön 
mieli/god tro) has also been one of the topics discussed by several authors. Bona fides is 
usually defined as honest conduct and/or good faith. Judging whether a person acts in bona 
fides is usually done by assessing if he/she knew or should have known of a fact or circum-
stances that are relevant to the case in question. Lehtinen separates the duty of loyalty from 
the bona fides by defining the duty of loyalty as something that demands a degree of loyal 
activity or conduct towards the other party and the bona fides as something that evaluates a 
person’s knowledge and “mental state.” Loyalty also means active conduct, not just ab-
staining from disloyal activity. He suggests that in order for a person to claim to have acted 
in bona fides, the person giving an expression of intent must show a certain degree of loy-
alty in his/her actions, but for a person receiving an expression of intent to make such 
claim loyalty towards the giver is not so particularly relevant. Here the bona fides evalua-
                                                          
36
 Saarnilehto 2000 p.111 and Mähönen 2000 p.226, Although the contract balance may also be evaluated 
on the basis of loyalty, see Mähönen 2000 p.228: ”Kohtuusperiaate ja sen mukainen sovittelu merkitsee 
taloudellisesti ja tiedollisesti erivertaisen osapuolten aseman ja suoritteiden tapauskohtaista arviointia. 
Hyvän uskon vaatimus on olennainen osa tätä punnintaa.” See also Ämmälä 1994 p.7: ”Sopimus ei 
myöskään saa olla sisällöltään kohtuuton eikä hyvän tavan vastainen. [..] Edellä esitetyn kaltaisissa 
yhteyksissä ei yleensä ole puhuttu lojaliteettiperiaatteesta.” 
37
 Mononen 2001 p.294, Karhu 2008 p.104: ”[..] pohjoismaisiin sopimuslakeihin sisältyvän yleisen 
sovittelusäännöksen, lakien 36§, taustalla vaikuttaa näkemys sopimuspuolten lojaliteettivelvollisuuksista 
toisiaan kohtaan.” 
38
 Saarnilehto 2000 pp.185–186, see footnote 21. 
39
 Muukkonen LM 7/1993 p.1040: ”Toisin on asian laita sopimusoikeuden yleisen lojaalisuusvelvollisuuden 
osalta. Sen voimassaoloa ei voida perustaa eikä tässä tarkoituksessa edes viitata yksittäisiin lainsäännöksiin” 
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tion shows dissimilarity between the giver and the receiver. He also views the duty of loy-
alty as an auxiliary principle of the bona fides; loyal conduct implies bona fides to some 
extent.
40
 Mähönen states, that the common denominator between the bona fides and the 
duty of loyalty (good faith) is the protection of justified expectations (luottamuksen suoja), 
but the bona fides is nevertheless a “technical term” that is to be kept separate from loyal-
ty.
41
 
 Another principle related to the duty is the protection of a weaker party. Ämmälä states 
that certain norms that aim to protect a weaker party also have a loyalty aspect. Neverthe-
less, the duty of loyalty could be stretched too far if it is viewed to be implied in all the 
norms intended for protecting a weaker party.
42
 Although Lehtinen is generally skeptical 
towards applying protection of the weaker party to commercial contracts, he states that the 
protection might have an indirect influence through the duty of loyalty. Since disloyal con-
duct may lead a contracting party to a weaker position than he/she was in the beginning of 
the contractual relationship, the protection of the weaker may be realized through the ad-
justment of contract done on the basis of disloyal conduct. He further states that the duty of 
loyalty and the protection of a weaker party must still be kept separate from each other. 
The parties must strive to achieve a common goal, but this does not mean that they should 
assess each other’s weaknesses in order to remove them, for which there is no room in 
commercial contracts.
43
 Tolonen seems to have a broader interpretation of loyalty, as he 
considers it possible to apply the duty when there is no applicable statutory norm for the 
protection of a weaker party.
44
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40
 Lehtinen 2006 p.183, 197, Mähönen 2000 pp.219–221 
41
 Mähönen 2000 pp.222. 
42
 Pohjonen 1994 p.148. Ämmälä 1994 pp.21–22. 
43
 Lehtinen 2006 p. 245, 249, ibid. p.248: if the protection of a weaker party becomes a legal principle, the 
concept of the prevailing duty of loyalty must also be expanded. Also p.257: in international trade the duty 
of loyalty is emphasized instead of the protection of a weaker party.  See also Mononen 2001 p.165: ” 
Lojaliteettiperiaatteeseen ei yleisesti sisällytetä erityistä heikomman suojan näkökulmaa. Heikomman 
suojan yhteydessä lojaalisuus onkin ymmärrettävä hieman eri tavalla. [..] Lojaalisuuden sijaan painotetaan 
solidaarisuutta. Kyse on vahvemman sopijapuolen velvollisuudesta olla solidaarinen (lojaali) heikompaa 
vastapuolta kohtaan.” and Karhu 2008 p.104. 
44
 Saarnilehto 2000 p.182: ”Jos lainsäännöstä ei ole, voi yleinen lojaliteettiperiaate tulla sovellettavaksi.” 
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2.4. Functions of the duty of loyalty 
 
   Taxell’s idea of the duty of loyalty as an ethic principle that incites parties to co-operate, 
as mentioned in part 2.1, is not the only function attributed to the duty. The way the func-
tions of a legal norm are understood affects its application and interpretation practice. This 
fact makes it relevant to inspect the functions of the duty of loyalty. Karhu states that the 
duty of loyalty enables one to analyze the norms of the law of contracts. Therefore, it can 
be used to justify a resolution or used descriptively to group together various norms in or-
der to give them a common background. This common background can then be used to 
define and analyze norms, for instance whether a norm should be interpreted restrictively 
or not. Karhu also describes the duty of loyalty as being on one side connected to the inter-
ests of trade through the protection of trust and justified expectations, and on the other, to 
looking after the contracting partners’ interests, and because of this, it is also linked to the 
notions of contractual balance and equity. He further defines it as a complex principle that 
contains elements from value oriented principles (arvoperiaate) and goal oriented princi-
ples (tavoiteperiaate). Further, it can be illustrated as a “bilateral” principle that connects 
the contracting parties. The duty supplements and strengthens other principles, such as 
protection of justified expectations and protection of a weaker contracting party. He also 
claims that the duty of loyalty is growing towards to becoming one of the constituting 
principles of contract law.
45
 
  Another important function attributed to the duty is the protection of trust in trade by pre-
venting opportunistic behavior. In order to make especially long-term co-operation con-
tracts work, it is essential that contracting parties consider each other’s interests when mak-
ing decisions and acting. If contracting parties do not trust each other, this usually leads to 
needs for more detailed contracts and more supervision of one’s own rights, which then 
increase transaction costs. Mononen describes loyalty as solidarity towards one’s contract-
ing partner. The goal is to maximize the benefits of a contract for both parties.
46
 In this 
                                                          
45
 Pöyhönen 1988 p.19, 184. See also ibid p.79: Karhu describes the duty of loyalty to be less independent 
than the other principles of the law of contracts, such as freedom, equity, commercial interests and the 
protection of a disadvantaged party. The duty of loyalty can be interpreted and defined through and in 
accordance with the principles of commercial interests and equity. Karhu 2008 p.103, 105. Mäenpää JFT 
4/2010 s. 327 
46
 Mähönen 2000 pp.213–214, Mononen 2001 p.161, Ämmälä 1994 p.27. 
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ways, the duty has effects “outside of the court room,” in that it guides the parties’ decision 
making. The parties themselves should seek ways to consider and take into account each 
other’s interests, so that the contract bears fruit for both of them.47 According to Lehtinen, 
loyalty as a rule: 1.) improves a contracting party’s position during negotiations 2.) in-
creases trust between the parties 3.) supports the fulfillment of contracts and 4.) acts as a 
repair mechanism for contractual problems.
48
 
 Häyhä points out that aside from systematizing norms, the duty broadens and steers the 
perspective of the contractual relationship away from contract provisions. From the per-
spective of the predictability of contracts, the evaluation of a contractual relationship 
should encompass not only contract provisions but also the justified expectations of con-
tracting parties. Without the inclusion of the expectations, the parties trust towards each 
other would be less protected and they would have to write overly elaborate contracts to 
compensate this. A contract in itself does not always provide necessary means for predict-
ability. Perceiving the duty of loyalty as being based on the expectations of contracting 
parties would allow adjusting contracts when their provisions don´t match the contracting 
parties’ expectations, and when the provisions are no longer feasible.49 
Sopimusta ympäröivä tila ei olekaan ennakoinnin kannalta aivan tyhjä. Ennakoinnin perusta 
ei olisikaan yksin sopimuksessa, myös sen ympärillä oleva, lojaliteettiperiaatteen kattama 
alue, voisi olla perustana sopimusoikeudellisesti suojatuille odotuksille.
50
 Lojaliteettiperiaate 
on tullut otetuksi käyttöön tilanteissa, joissa sopimusoikeuden ideaali ei ole 
sopimustoiminnan todellisuutta. Sopimusoppi on ottanut käyttöön välineen, jonka avulla 
oikeustila pyritään saamaan todellisuutta vastaavaksi. Todellisuudessa sopimuksen merkitys 
ennakoitavuuden perustana on vähentynyt. 
51
 
   
 
 
 
                                                          
47
 Häyhä DL 3/1996 pp.315, 319, 326–327 
48
 Lehtinen 2006 pp.86–87. 
49
 Häyhä DL 3/1996 pp.320–325. 
50
 Häyhä DL 3/1996 p.319. 
51
 Häyhä DL 3/1996 p.323. 
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2.5. Application in contracts and consequences of disloyal conduct 
 
   Moving away from the general-level functions the duty may have, this section discusses 
the specific questions of in what ways a court can concretely apply the duty and to what 
type of contracts. The specific applications and consequences of the duty must be assessed 
in casu. It has been suggested that the duty could be divided into various more specific 
obligations or elements, such as the duty to disclose (more about this in section 2.6.2.2). 
The influence of these elements also varies in casu, which makes it difficult to give a uni-
form definition of how the duty can be applied. During a contractual relationship the duty 
can give rise to, or create, obligations which were not at all or at least not explicitly men-
tioned in the contract. This means that due to the requirements of loyalty the obligations 
the parties have towards each other go beyond the written terms of contract and contract 
terms do not solely define the way contracting parties are expected to act. In other words, 
the duty can be applied to supplement a contract. For example, contract interpretation in 
court may lead to a credit agreement being supplemented with an obligation for the debtor 
to give relevant information about his/her financial state to the creditor on his/her own ini-
tiative.
52
  
  It can be said that the more the parties’ interests are entwined the more weight the duty of 
loyalty has in assessing the parties’ actions.53 On the other side, as Lehtinen points out, 
obligations stemming from loyalty should not be contrary to those explicitly mentioned in 
contracts.
54
 Ämmälä notes that the duty does not affect all contract types and contractual 
phases equally, and its concrete meaning and importance varies.
55
 One could say that the 
duty of loyalty is viewed through a contract, rather than the other way around. 
  Taxell states that the courts have at least three possible ways of applying the duty of loy-
alty. Taxell’s description is quite comprehensive, since these three aspects are generally 
mentioned by most of the other authors. The first way of implementing the duty is contract 
                                                          
52
 Muukkonen LM 7/1993 p.1048, Saarnilehto 2000 p. 129, 167, Saarnilehto et al. p.1166 (an example of the 
debtors duty to inform). Häyhä DL 3/1996 p.314, Nystén-Haarala 1998 p.128, Pöyhönen 1988 p.19. Taxell 
DL 1977 p.155 and Taxell 1972 p.82, Ämmälä 1994 p.5, 15 and 24: Especially in the case of a co-
operation/joint venture contract the duty of loyalty is seen as an essential part of the contract, even when it 
is not mentioned in the contract terms 
53
 Korhonen JFT 1/2006 p.50. 
54
 Lehtinen 2006 p.85: Lehtinen bases this on the rigor commercialis-principle that is characteristic for 
commercial contracts. 
55
 Ämmälä 1994 p.8. 
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interpretation, for instance in a case of obscure contract terms. This way a court may re-
store the contract balance between the parties and their interests. Second, the other norms 
applied to the case may present the court possibilities for consideration on how to restore 
the balance, for instance in the case of OikTL 33§. Thus, a contract may be declared void 
according to 31§ or 33§, or adjusted according to the OikTL 36§. The third implementation 
is the aforementioned supplementing in a “gap situation” or a hard case, where there are 
no written norms to be found. In this case the court may come to a resolution by assessing 
the elements and circumstances of the case and reflect whether the parties have adhered to 
the duty of loyalty. This way the duty can be used to supplement gaps in legislation and 
contracts. It ensures that the parties’ interests are taken into consideration in unexpected 
situations, for example in a legally unclear dispute.
56
 In Mähönen’s view the duty of loyal-
ty attains its foremost influence through interpretation of contracts. A neglect from a party 
to inform the contracting partner of relevant facts may cause the neglecting party to lose 
his/her right to invoke a (in itself valid) misinterpreted term.
57
 
  The duty of loyalty has no precisely defined consequence. This means that there is no 
defined sanction for the party breaching the duty of loyalty. Instead, one must consider the 
actions that constituted a breach of contract and the situation as a whole. Violation of the 
duty can at times mean a breach of contract and even fraud (OikTL 33§ & 31§). When a 
contract is breached because of disloyal conduct, the consequences are the same that a 
breach of contract generally can have, such as: the cancellation of contract, the reduction of 
price, the liability for damages (KKO 1993:130) and some contract terms may be consid-
ered non-binding and voidable. In some cases the breach of the duty could be considered as 
a breach of contract in itself, although Mähönen considers this disputed (see also Mo-
nonens view in chapter 2.2). This would mean a possibility to effectively invoke the duty 
for e.g. voidableness of contract, even without invoking one of the OikTL’s norms of void-
ableness. Since there is no direct consequence for breaching the duty, its effects appear 
indirectly for example through the application of the OikTL 33§.
58
 Whether the duty could 
constitute an independent basis for voidableness of contracts is therefore unclear. 
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 Taxell DL 1977 p.154, see also Saarnilehto p.141, Häyhä DL 3/1996 p.327. 
57
 Saarnilehto 2000 p.141, Nystén-Haarala 1998 p.165, 171. 
58
 Pöyhönen 1988 p.19, Saarnilehto 2000 pp.141–143: ”Periaatteiden [European contract law] mukaan sekä 
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Taxell 1972 p.82, Taxell DL 1977 p.155. 
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    All of the Finnish writers emphasize the duty of loyalty in long-term contracts, and con-
tracts that emphasize co-operation (such as licensing or franchising), and contracts of per-
sonal nature (such as a publishing contract). In such contracts, the parties can be seen as 
dependent on each other, which heightens the need for loyalty. Since long-term contracts 
are based on mutual trust, a breach of loyalty may often be valid grounds for cancellation 
of contract, since the breach usually tends to make future co-operation impossible.
59
 It is 
argued that the pacta sunt servanda-principle is somewhat inadequate to fulfill the practi-
cal needs of long-term contracts. Reasons for this are the need for flexibility in commercial 
practice and the need to promote co-operation of the contracting parties. The principle of 
loyalty could be seen as a solution for these problems.
60
 Nystén-Haarala suggests that: “in 
long-term contracting good faith is perhaps the most important principle of all” and that 
“good faith in LTCs [long-term contracts] can be described as mutual loyalty or trust.” 
Also, in LTCs mutual trust is a more significant and more flexible principle than the gen-
eral contract law’s dogmatic, abstract and standardized principle.61 Tolonen states that the 
basic form of the duty may be the one attributed to the fundamental obligations of mostly 
equal parties or unequal professional actors (such as in franschising).
62
 Lehtinen point out 
that loyalty creates a counterweight for strict liability and the sharing of risks in commer-
cial contracts.
63
 
  Nystén-Haarala sees a distinction between the general contract law’s outlook on contracts 
and the outlook required in long-term contracts that emphasize co-operation. Her view 
shows a division between the situations where co-operation is considered part of the fun-
daments of contract, and in other situations where it is considered as a secondary, supple-
menting duty. She states that: “In general contract law thinking, co-operation is treated as a 
duty. In LTC practice it is more like a prerequisite, which is not based on duty (italiciza-
tion here). In connection with occasional market contracts, the duty to co-operate means 
merely the duty to inform the other party of a risk of harm. [..] However, mutual loyalty in 
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 Muukkonen LM 7/1993 p.1039, see also footnote 49, Muukkonen 1975 p.358, 364. Hemmo 2003 p.53, 
Saarnilehto 2000 p.88, 131. Ämmälä 1994 p.18, 23. Häyhä DL 3/1996 p.317. Nystén-Haarala p.28 For 
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 Häyhä DL 3/1996 p.317  
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co-operational long term contracts works at a considerable different level than in occasion-
al trade contracts.”64  
  The authors have also discussed whether there exists a common criterion in accordance to 
which the duty of loyalty should be assessed. This common criterion could reduce unpre-
dictability in applying the duty. Muukkonen considers reasonableness (kohtuus) a fitting 
criterion, meaning that parties should consider each other’s interests within reason and 
reasonably contribute to the fulfillment of contract.
65
 Häyhä regards loyalty as an aspect of 
assessing what the contracting parties expect from their contract. Because of this, he sug-
gests that loyalty should be estimated according to what is normal in similar situations and 
thus predictable. This way it would be possible to mend the otherwise problematic unpre-
dictability caused by the vagueness of the duty of loyalty. It would actually make predicta-
bility the main criterion of assessing loyalty and parties’ interests.66 Korhonen seems also 
to support this view, stating that: “the protection of trust and its effects on the contracting 
positions of the parties has a fundamental role in assessing the duty of loyalty. [..] This 
way, the duty aims to guarantee the fulfillment of the contract’s goal by protecting the trust 
of the contracting parties.”67 Lehtinen evaluates the question of the common criterion in 
relation to a network of contracts (sopimusverkko). He suggests that the criterion for the 
degree of loyalty required should be the importance which a party’s conduct or actions 
have for attaining the goal of the contract network. Thus loyal conduct should not, on one 
hand, cause an unreasonable burden for the contracting parties of the network, and on the 
other, neither unbalance the network.
68
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 Nystén-Haarala pp.34–35. 
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 Muukkonen LM 7/1993 p.1046 and ibid 1975 p.359.  
66
 Häyhä DL 3/1996 pp.324–327. ibid p.324: ”Lojaliteettiperiaatteen soveltamista tarkoittavissa ratkaisuissa 
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68
 Lehtinen 2006 p.215. See also ibid p.86, where Lehtinen states that there is no exhaustive answer. He 
mentions the golden rule of the bible as an example of a criterion.      
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2.6. Elements of the duty of loyalty 
 
2.6.1. The duty of loyalty in different phases of a contractual relationship 
 
  The duty of loyalty encompasses contractual relationship as a whole and has various ef-
fects in different contracting phases, from negotiations to the actual execution of contract 
and possible breach of contract. Because of this, the duty of loyalty is usually divided into 
a pre-contractual or negotiations-phase loyalty and a later contractual loyalty.
69
 Negotia-
tion loyalty is closely related to the concept of culpa in contrahendo that is defined as lia-
bility due to negligence under contract negotiations. Culpa in contrahendo usually leads to 
a liability for negative interest, although the concept is not clearly defined in Finnish law.
70
 
Huhtamäki states that the duty of loyalty can be seen as continuation of the culpa in con-
trahendo, in considering liabilities of parties. He also points out that one of the duty of 
loyalty’s purposes is to prevent contracts ending up being adjusted or void, and this pre-
vention happens already during negotiations.
71
 
  Loyalty in negotiations is nevertheless seen apart from later contractual or performance 
loyalty, since during negotiations contracting parties’ interests are more conflicting and 
there is no clearly agreed mutual goal yet. The main rule is that the parties are only respon-
sible for their own costs and risks during the negotiations. Negotiation liability may arise 
when one party unduly breaks off long-lasting negotiations, since the demand for loyalty 
for other party grows as the negotiations advance. This is due to the fact that long lasting 
negotiations usually create justified expectations of closing a contract. The parties should 
also share relevant information on their own initiative.
72
 Lehtinen suggests that during ne-
gotiations the duty of loyalty is focused on the contracting partner, whereas during the ac-
tual performance phase the loyalty is more focused on the contract itself (and on the other 
party through the contract). Because of this focus, he calls the latter a neutral duty which is 
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 Saarnilehto 2000 p.136, 141, Nystén-Haarala 1998 pp.121–123. 
71
 Huhtamäki 1993 pp.39, 65–66: ”Lojaliteettiperiaatetta on käytetty samassa tarkoituksessa kuin culpa in 
contrahendoa ja edellistä voidaan ainakin sopimusneuvottelujen vastuukysymyksiä ajatellen pitää 
jälkimmäisen jatkeena.” 
72
 Saarnilehto et al. 2012 p.389, Halila 1981 p.47, Nystén-Haarala 1998 p.122, 127, Ämmälä 1994 p.5, 
Hemmo 2003 p.211, Halila 1981 p.47: ”Sopimusoikeudessa ei voida sivuuttaa roomalaisoikeudellista caveat 
emptor-kantaa. Lojaalisuusvelvoitteen tarkastelussa on erotettava ne tilanteet, joissa osapuolten edut ovat 
selvästi ristiriitaiset ja ne, joissa sopimuksen tekemisen jälkeen kummankin tulee myös valvoa toisen etua, 
jotta molemminpuolista etua vasten sovittu sopimus voitaisiin asianmukaisesti täyttää.”  
21 
 
seen as loyalty to the contract. In case of contract networks, the duty of loyalty may oblige 
a party to act loyally towards others than just one, or the most direct, contracting partner. 
For instance, a mandatee may have obligations towards the other parties of the net than just 
the mandator (see KKO 1999:19).This is due to the fact that the parties must act loyally to 
fulfill the goal of the contract network, which can include more than just performing the 
obligations explicitly mentioned in the contract.
73
 
  The duty of loyalty protects the justified expectations of contracting parties already before 
the closing of contract. In this way it closes the gap between the state of a non-binding con-
tract, in which there are no contract terms to protect the expectations of the parties, and the 
state of the actual contractual relationship. Häyhä suggests that this way the duty also pre-
vents the kind of thinking that expects all possible things to be regulated in the contract 
terms.
74
 Although the division between pre-contractual and actual contacting-phase loyalty 
seems to be generally acknowledged, Nystén-Haarala suggests that the division between 
these phases is not absolutely necessary, since loyalty should have a broader interpreta-
tion.
75
 Tieva suggests that in long-term contracts the duty can also extend to the moment 
the contractual relation ends and even after that time. This would mean that the parties 
should consider each other’s interests even after the contractual relationship e.g. concern-
ing confidential facts that they were not allowed to express during the contractual relation-
ship.
76
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 Lehtinen 2006 p. 83 See also ibid. pp.211-212 Lehtinen describes loyalty in a net of contracts (sopi-
musverkko) as loyalty towards the contract. This way, the participants of the net do not need to ponder on 
the object or the subject to whom the loyalty is directed. The object of loyalty is the contract itself. ibid. 
p.332. KKO 1999:19: ”Toimeksisaajalla voi kuitenkin olla toimimis- tai tiedonantovelvollisuus myös 
toimeksiantajan sopimuskumppania kohtaan esimerkiksi oman menettelynsä tai tehtävän sisällön 
perusteella taikka muutoin tehtävän suorittamiseen liittyvistä olosuhteista johtuen.” See also KKO 
1992:165. 
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 Häyhä DL 3/1996 p.322. 
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 Nystén-Haarala 1998 p.128:”The division into preliminary and performance phases can only have a guid-
ing effect. Loyalty does not necessarily have to be different during different phases. It has to be interpreted 
as a complex constructed on various principles.” cf. Halila 1981 p.47: “[..] on tärkeää tehdä ero 
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 Tieva LM 6/2009 p.951, see also Tieva DL 2/2006 p.248. Tieva also compares loyalty with the “trust-
principle” (luottamusperiaate), stating that in contract law the duty of loyalty is more binding than the 
trust-principle, ibid pp.249-250. What this actually means is nebulous, as the meaning of the trust-principle 
is left somewhat unclear, see p.245. 
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2.6.2. Obligations stemming from the duty of loyalty: two perspectives 
 
  There are two dissenting views about the more specific categorizations and elements of 
the duty of loyalty. One can either: 1.) see the duty to disclose and other specific obliga-
tions as being part of the duty of loyalty or as its subcategory etc. or 2.) as separate and 
independent duties and obligations. The first option means therefore that the notion of the 
duty of loyalty means, and refers to, not only the “general” duty of loyalty (a duty for con-
tracting parties to consider each other’s reasonable interests) but also to a wider group of 
more specific obligations. This would make the duty a superordinate term for more specif-
ic obligations, and in addition the duty could be divided into more specific obligations. The 
second option means a division between the “general” definition of loyalty and the inde-
pendent specific obligations, so that the concept of the duty loyalty would only denote a 
duty for contracting parties to consider each other’s reasonable interests. Other obligations, 
such as mitigating damages and the duty to disclose, would therefore be separated from its 
concept. A third way to define the concept of the duty presented in jurisprudence is to sep-
arate the general aspect of the duty from specific duties on the basis of whether the norm is 
based on statutory legislation (specific) or the non-statutory principle of loyalty (general).
77
 
This seems to be one of the most blurred aspects in the Finnish discussion concerning the 
duty. 
 At any rate, Taxell, Ämmälä, Korhonen and Nysten-Haarala (possibly also Björne, 
Huhtamäki and Tolonen among others) form the group of authors who consider loyalty as 
a common term for all of the duties the parties have towards each other. The duty has dif-
ferent effects in various situations, and it can appear in multiple ways, such as the duty to 
disclose (tiedonantovelvollisuus), the duty to co-operate, or the duty to contribute 
(myötävaikutusvelvollisuus) etc. Thus, the duty to disclose and the duty co-operate are 
only different parts or forms of loyalty.
78
 Nevertheless, Ämmälä also states that the specif-
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 Saarnilehto 2000 p.131, 165. 
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 Saarnilehto 2000 pp.88-89, 131. Taxell 1979 pp.81-82, ibid 1977 pp.149-153. Ämmälä 1994 p. 9: 
”Lojaliteettivelvollisuutta voidaan pitää yleisnimityksenä erilaisille velvollisuuksille, joita sopijapuolella on 
vastapuoltaan kohtaan. Velvollisuus ilmenee eri tilanteissa ja eri sopimustyyppien osalta jonkin verran 
toisistaan poikkeavalla tavalla kuten tiedonanto- tai ilmoitusvelvollisuutena.” ibid pp.10–12, 45. Nystén-
Haarala 1998 p.33: “the duty to co-operate strengthens good faith.” ibid p.128, and p.134: “The main point 
in legal dogmatics is that the principle of loyalty is transformed into duties, the breaking of which is sanc-
tioned.” See also Pohjonen 1994 p.148 and Björne 1994 p.6: ”Joskus on suljettu tiedonanto-, reklamointi- ja 
myötävaikutusvelvollisuus lojaliteettiperiaatteen ulkopuolelle, jolloin periaatteesta on jäänyt jäljelle yleinen 
vaatimus siitä, että sopimuspuolen on kohtuullisessa määrin otettava huomioon toisen sopimuspuolen 
edut. Tulen tässä kuitenkin käyttämään yleisesti hyväksyttyä määritelmää, joka sisällyttää myös tiedonanto- 
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ic duties close to loyalty cannot be merged with loyalty in all situations, and when it is pos-
sible to refer to a more specific duty one should do so, as they describe the situation better 
than the vague loyalty. Regardless, in her view the duty to co-operate cannot be wholly 
separated from the concept of loyalty or disclosing, since it can in some cases be synony-
mous with the latter two concepts.
79
 Korhonen seems to uphold a similar view and take it 
somewhat further. He criticizes the idea of separating the duty of loyalty from other sec-
ondary duties, since defining these duties before assessing a concrete case is not possible. 
He sees trust (tillit) as a common basis and background for the different duties of loyalty, 
such as informing and co-operation. Because of this common basis, he views it impossible 
or unfeasible to separate the duty of loyalty from the duty to disclose.
80
 
  Lehtinen does not state a univocal opinion on the matter, although he also seems to con-
sider the duty as giving rise for some specific obligations. Nevertheless, in concerning the 
duty to disclose, he makes a division between statutory norms requiring disclosure and 
norms which “purely” arise from the duty of loyalty. On one side, he states that some spe-
cific obligations are derived from the duty of loyalty. The general concept of loyalty would 
consist of the duty to consider the contracting partner’s interests. The duty to disclose that 
is purely based on the general duty of loyalty should be kept separate from statutory, con-
tractual or other norms requiring disclosure. If a party has a duty to give or sell information 
based on a contract provision, then it is to be viewed as an obligation based solely on the 
contract and not as something derived from the general principle of loyalty. Still, the fun-
dament for evaluating the duty to disclose in a commercial contract is based on the general 
duty of loyalty.
81
 He suggests that the practical relevance of the notion of the duty of loyal-
                                                                                                                                                                                
ym. velvollisuudet lojaliteettiperiaatteen piiriin.” (italicization here), Huhtamäki 1993 p.39: 
”Lojaliteettivelvollisuuden konkreettinen sisältö ilmenee ainakin kahdella tavalla: tiedonantovelvollisuutena 
ja huolenpitovelvollisuutena.” See also Häyhä DL 3/1996 p.318, Wilhelmsson 1999 p.168, 182, Pöyhönen 
2000 p.136, Mäenpää JFT 4/2010 p.327, 347.  
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 Ämmälä 1994 p.10, 45: ”Kaikkia oikeudellisia ilmiöitä ei voida eikä ole tarpeenkaan selittää 
lojaliteettiperiaatteen avulla. Useimmiten niistä periaatteista, jotka sisältyvät osana 
lojaliteettiperiaatteeseen, voidaan käyttää omaa nimitystä tarvitsematta turvautua 
lojaliteettiperiaatteeseen.” 
80
 Korhonen JFT 1/2006 p.51: ”Den allmänna lojalitetsprincipen kan därför vid sidan av den allmänna om-
sorgsplikten åstadkomma olika biförpliktelser som är nödvändiga för att avtaletssyften och avtalsparternas 
berättigade avtalsgrundade intressen och förväntningar skall kunna realiseras. Därför är det inte nödvändigt 
och inte ens möjligt att separera lojalitetsplikter från upplysningsplikter, ty upplysnings-, undersöknings- 
och lojalitetspliktelser grundar sig på samma tillitsrelaterade synpunkter.” 
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 Lehtinen 2006 p.117: ”Tässä esityksessä lojaliteettiperiaate ja siitä johdettava lojaliteettivelvollisuus eri 
ilmenemismuodoissaan (tiedonantovelvollisuus jne.) ovat osa toimivaa sopimusverkkoa” (italicization here) 
This could be interpreted so that loyalty is a general term for more specific obligations. Ibid p.120: 
”Lojaliteettivelvollisuudet, jotka voidaan johtaa lojaliteettiperiaatteesta, ovat määräytyvät pääsääntöisesti 
tapauskohtaisesti. Yleisellä tasolla lojaliteettivelvollisuus kattaa sopimusosapuolten velvollisuuden ottaa 
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ty is more substantial, if it is not mixed with specific, statutory loyalty-obligations. View-
ing loyalty as a principle rather than a statutory norm would give it a greater significance, 
especially in commercial contracts. If loyalty is only considered a statutory norm, it will 
not be sufficiently assessed and applied in casu, but rather as something within the bounda-
ries of “minimum and maximum.”82 
  The dissenting outlook represented by Muukkonen, Mähönen and possibly Hemmo, 
among others, perceives the duty as being separate from other obligations which can rea-
sonably be independently defined, such as the duty to disclose. These remaining duties and 
obligations must be considered as individual contractual duties that are to be kept separate 
from the duty of loyalty. Muukkonen states that not all occasions where a party is obligated 
to consider the other party’s interests should be brought under the concept of loyalty. In 
any case, the duties to disclose (tiedonantovelvollisuus), contribute (myötävaikutusvelvol-
lisuus) and notify of damages (reklamaatio) should be kept separate from the duty of loyal-
ty. He further divides the concept of loyalty into a general duty of loyalty and a specific 
duty of loyalty. The general duty is a “common principle” in civil law, and its validity is 
constituted on its above-mentioned uniform acceptance in legal doctrine and law-drafting 
documents. The term specific duty consists of the written, statutory norms that constitute 
the duty in certain situations (e.g. TSL 13§).
83
 Mähönen agrees with Muukkonen and states 
that unless the duty is separated from other norms, its independent meaning in itself would 
become too narrow and its utility value diminished. In addition, speaking of loyalty when 
there are more specifically defined obligations would blur its concept (e.g. Kauppalaki 
17:2.2 is to be separated from loyalty). What remains after these specific obligations are 
                                                                                                                                                                                
huomioon myös toisen neuvottelu ja sopimuskumppanin etu. Tiedonanto- ja selonottovelvollisuutta on 
kuitenkin syytä tarkastella itsenäisinä velvollisuuksinaan.” p.121: ”Lojaliteettiperiaatteeseen perustuva 
tiedonantovelvollisuus tulee siis erottaa säädökseen, sovellettavaan sääntöön tai ohjeeseen taikka 
sopimusehtoon perustuvasta tiedonantovelvollisuudesta. [..] Kuitenkin liikesopimussuhteessa perustan 
tiedonantovelvollisuuden arvioinnille luo yleinen lojaliteettiperiaate; tietoa antaessaan liikesopimuksen 
sopimuskumppani toimii lojaalisti ottamalla huomioon myös toisen sopimuskumppanin tai osapuolen 
edusta.” 
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 Lehtinen 2006 p.86. 
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 Muukkonen LM 7/1993 pp.1045 – 1046: ”Lojaliteettivaatimuksella tarkoitan siis sopijakumppanin 
velvollisuutta ottaa huomioon toisen sopijapuolen intressi ja myös valvoa sitä. Lojaalisuusvelvollisuus on 
itsenäinen sopimusoikeudellinen velvollisuus eikä sitä saa sotkea sopimusoikeudelliseen 
tiedonantovelvollisuuteen, myötävaikutusvelvollisuuteen tai reklamaatiovelvollisuuteen, joista 
oikeudellisina ilmiöinä on omat periaatteet ja ”teoriansa”. Lojaalisuusvelvollisuudessa on vielä erotettava 
kontrahoimislojaliteetti ja yleinen lojaalisuusvelvollisuus sekä viimeksi mainitusta erityinen 
lojaliteettivelvollisuus.” Contra Nystén-Haarala 1998 s.125 footnote 298:”In spite of Muukkonen´s opinion, 
the development in Finnish private law seems to be heading towards a broader understanding of loyalty.” 
Karhu 2008 p.104: ”Lojaliteetille onkin luonteenomaista, että se ei eriydy muista sopimusoikeuden 
periaatteista tarkkarajaisesti tai yksiselitteisesti.” 
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separated would then constitute the duty of loyalty.
84
 Paradoxically, Ämmälä uses a similar 
argument to express the opposite view, that is, that if the duty is separated from other prox-
imate obligations its contents and concept could become too narrow.
85
 Hemmo criticizes 
the idea of viewing statutory obligations, such as informing and notifying, as based on the 
duty of loyalty. One should differentiate between norms that have been statutorily defined 
and refer to the duty of loyalty only when the source of the obligation is not definite.
86
  
  The duty of loyalty usually manifests concretely in more specific obligations, such as 
disclosing and mitigating damages. Although as Korhonen mentions, it may also modify 
the parties’ primary contractual obligations.87 Though there is no univocal view on whether 
the duty of loyalty and other obligations, such as mitigating damages and contributing to 
contract, should be discussed under the concept of loyalty, the next part of the study aims 
to discuss the more specific duties that the authors in jurisprudence link with the duty of 
loyalty, in detail. Even the distinction between the duty to disclose and the duty to co-
operate (myötävaikutusvelvollisuus) is not clear, and what the duty to contribute consists 
of is also somewhat blurry. Halila states that (at least in the context of construction con-
tracts) the duty of loyalty and the duty to co-operate can often be used as synonyms. The 
duty to disclose may also be considered an aspect of the duty to co-operate.
88
 The follow-
ing discussion will proceed as follows: first, the obligations that generally aim to aid the 
fulfillment of contracts’ goal and promote the parties’ co-operation are discussed under the 
subtitle specific obligations requiring contribution to contract. The contents of the chapter 
consist mostly of obligations described in Finnish as myötävaikutusvelvollisuus. The sec-
ond part discusses the duty to disclose. It consists mostly of obligations that deal with the 
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 Saarnilehto 2000 pp.131–132: ”Ensiksi mainitun käsityksen omaksuminen [laajempi määritelmä] johtaisi 
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 Hemmo 2003 p.55. 
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 Korhonen JFT 1/2006 p.52. 
88
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käsitteet ymmärretään Taxellin tavoin laajassa merkityksessä.” see also Mähönen 2000 pp.223–225, 
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flow of information between the parties (tiedonantovelvollisuus). The obligation to notify 
of defects (reklamaatio) is sometimes discussed separately from the duty to disclose, but 
here notifying is mentioned under the duty to disclose. What Ämmälä discusses as the duty 
of fidelity (uskollisuusvelvollisuus) will not be specifically discussed here, since it has 
more to do with company law and labor law.
89
 
 
2.6.2.1. Specific obligations requiring contribution to contract 
 
  The duty to co-operate is defined as an obligation to contribute towards effectuating the 
contract’s goal. It aids the attaining of the necessary conditions required for the parties’ 
performances.
90
 Regardless whether one views the duty to co-operate as being separate 
from the duty of loyalty or not, most writes discuss it in conjunction with the general duty 
of loyalty.
91
 Because of this, it is clear that co-operation is at least closely related to loyal-
ty, even if one does not accept them as being a unitary duty. Mähönen, who views them as 
separate, defines the difference between the concepts of the duty to co-operate (or contrib-
ute - myötävaikutusvelvollisuus) and the duty of loyalty in that co-operation is primarily 
about protecting the party’s own interests, whereas loyalty aims to protecting the contract-
ing partner.
92
 
  The narrowest form of loyalty is said to be the prohibition of chicanery. Contracting par-
ties are never allowed to (ab)use their rights solely to harm the contracting partner.
93
 In a 
way, this creates a link between the duty of loyalty and the prohibition of the abuse of 
rights, as Hemmo describes the prohibition of abusing rights as being similar or “parallel” 
with the duty of loyalty.
94
 Another broader example of an obligation to co-operate is men-
tioned in KL 50§ (buyers’ obligation to contribute to contract).95 Parties must also abstain 
from resorting to exaggerated means when problems arise and abstain from speculating on 
the cost of their contracting partner. A minor disturbance does not entitle a party to cancel 
the contract and one must also consider the interests of the party responsible for the breach 
                                                          
89
 Ämmälä 1994 pp.15–16. 
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27 
 
of contract.
96
 The flipside of contribution, namely passivity, may also be considered a 
breach of the duty. The doctrine of creditors delay represents such thinking, since creditor 
has an obligation to ensure that the debtor can adequately fulfill his/her obligation (such as 
in the Promissory Notes Act, Velkakirjalaki, 3.3). Another example of passivity is a situa-
tion where a party has legitimate reasons to assume that the other party has approved of 
his/her performance or action. Such legitimate expectations gain protection from the duty 
of loyalty. This may, for example, apply in the context of construction contacts to an al-
teration work that has not been refused.
97
 Furthermore, contracting parties must abstain 
from causing damages and strive to mitigate possible damages, including situations where 
such damages solely befall the other party. In consequence, liability for damages due to a 
violation of loyalty is usually extended up to the damages that could have been avoided, if 
the responsible party had acted accordingly. A statutory statement of this rule concerning 
delicts can be found in the Tort Liability Act (Vahingonkorvauslaki) 6:1.
98
  
 
2.6.2.2. The duty to disclose and inform 
 
  The duty to disclose can be described as an obligation to adequately inform the contract-
ing partner in a situation where one party has information that is of importance for the 
common goal of the parties. The aim is to restore the informational equality and equivalen-
cy of contracting parties. Not only must a party give relevant information when actually 
asked to, he/she may also be obliged to give such information on his/her own initiative (see 
e.g. KKO 2007:72). The existence of this obligation is dependent on whether a contracting 
party could reasonably achieve this information him/herself and whether the party has 
more/less expertise on the matter. When one side has an advantage in expertise compared 
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to the other, this may in consequence increase the requirement to inform the other side. 
Therefore, the duty may fall upon a party that has more information due to his/her profes-
sional or specialist capabilities or because certain information is more easily available to 
him/her. Standard terms are also to be assessed in accordance to the duty of loyalty. This 
becomes most evident in an obligation to point out possibly surprising and harsh contract 
terms. Hence, the terms of standard contracts are put aside in favor of the justified expecta-
tions of contracting parties.
99
  
  The extent of the duty to disclose varies in different situations, but information that is to 
be kept secret due to law or a contract provision is naturally not part of the duty. The duty 
not to express confidential information can also be seen as part of loyal conduct. As a 
counterweight, in some cases neglecting to inform is not considered disloyal if the other 
party has neglected his/her duty to investigate e.g. the object of purchase (selonottovelvol-
lisuus). On the flipside, one party’s duty to disclose means that the other party is exempted 
from investigating to a certain degree, since his/her reasonable expectations are protected 
in a situation where the duty to disclose has been neglected. The requirements for the duty 
to investigate are also considered be to higher for professionals and experts. In some situa-
tions and contract types, it is possible that there is very little or no duty to disclose unless 
there is a statutory obligation requiring it.
100
  
  Lehtinen considers international commercial contracts to have such high expectations for 
expertise that one has to presume that the contracting parties are experts on their fields of 
trade. If this is not the case, a loyal party could have a duty to inform the other about 
his/her lack of expertise or knowledge of the trade in question. Aside from this, he men-
tions that a party should still inform another of legal facts which are essential for the con-
tract, in a situation where the contract is governed by his/her national law that is not famil-
iar to the contracting partner. To be relieved of this duty a party should prove that the con-
tracting partner shows intention to find the required information him/herself, e.g. by con-
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sulting a local lawyer. Concerning the limits of disclosing in international trade, he re-
marks that there is no loyalty for sale price, meaning that contracting parties are not 
obliged to inform how and on what grounds their price is or was defined.
101
 
  Taxell includes the obligation to give notice of defects (reklamation) as a part of the duty 
of loyalty.
102
 Aside from the unwritten general duty to disclose, the duty exists also in stat-
utory provisions, such as in the Insurance Contract Act, and it may also be incorporated 
into the terms of contract.
103
 According to Rudanko, the duty of loyalty becomes evident in 
building contracts in a form of an obligation of parties to notify each other. This is usually 
done to limit damages that befall the contracting partner. If an injured party does not notify 
his/her counter-party who is responsible for the damages about them, this limits the latter 
party’s liability for damages. The said obligation may lapse, if the party has caused the 
breach of contract intentionally or with gross negligence. Negligence may also be evaluat-
ed in accordance with the 30§ of the Contracts Act (deceitful use of misinformation) or 
33§ as exploitation of the other party’s lack of information, and thus rendering the contract 
voidable.
104
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3. Sweden 
 
3.1. The legal basis of the duty of loyalty 
 
  The thought that contracts should be based on co-operation of contracting parties has 
been discussed in Sweden as well. Generally this means that contracting parties should 
strive to attain a common goal through their contract. This has been described as being 
somewhat equivalent to the “golden rule.” In a way, this changes the tradition formal view 
of contracts considering what and how a party must perform to a more contextual view: 
what is to be done in order to fulfill the shared goal of a contract. Aside from this, the duty 
of loyalty can be seen as protecting contracting parties against unexpected situations and 
results.
105
 The idea behind the duty is that both parties are required to help each other to-
wards gaining as much as possible from their contractual relationship. The goal should be a 
win-win situation for both and therefore the parties’ co-operation gains a strong empha-
sis.
106
 
  The earlier Scandinavian legal realism movement had mostly negative sentiments towards 
the duty of loyalty and in effect, all rules based on abstract justice. The Swedish legal doc-
trine and practice was skeptic towards the duty of loyalty for most of the 20
th
 century. The 
duty had been a topic of discussion earlier in Finland than in Sweden, being acknowledged 
to a degree already in 1970s. Not until later towards the end of the century did it start be-
coming increasingly acknowledged in Sweden as well. Although previously viewed 
somewhat unfavorably, the duty has gained support in recent years, and Jori Munukka con-
siders the amount of supporters to be quite considerable at present. He views it clear that 
Swedish law acknowledges the existence of the duty of loyalty during contractual relation-
ships and also before and after them.
107
 Nevertheless, the duty is not usually mentioned 
explicitly in court cases.
108
 Munukka considers the reasons for the growing importance of 
the duty of loyalty to lie in an increasing tendency to regulate contract types and enact laws 
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with general clauses. Also, the sphere of contractual liability has grown broader and more 
norms are seen as being based on the duty of loyalty. Because of the latter tendency, even 
older statutory norms are being viewed in a new light.
109
 
  Unlike in Finland, the duty has been the subject of several doctoral theses in recent years. 
The most comprehensive one is probably the thesis of Munukka that discusses the duty in a 
wide array of situations. Erika Björkdahl has discussed it in conjunction with pre-
contractual and contract-external situations. Anders Holm covers the duty on a more gen-
eral level with more emphasis on its philosophical aspects. Holm mostly uses the term 
principle of loyalty. Also Sacharias Votinius assesses the duty mostly from a philosophical 
perspective, as a (central) part of the concept of friendship-based contract-paradigm.
110
 
Aside from these doctoral theses, the duty is mentioned in most legal textbooks, although 
not in all. Of course, in this kind of study it is impossible to describe all the aforemen-
tioned doctoral theses in the level of detail they would deserve, and some of their aspects 
have to be condensed in the following discussion.
111
  
  As in Finland, there is no general statutory legal definition for the duty of loyalty in Swe-
dish law, although mentions of it exist in some law-drafting documents and court cases. 
The Supreme Court has been somewhat guarded to expressly use the term duty of loyalty 
(although it is used in case NJA 1990 p.264).
112
 More specific statutory norms about the 
duty of loyalty exist, especially for fiduciary and consumer relationships. These more spe-
cific obligations are said to be an expression of the broader, more general duty of loyalty. 
Some writers also seem to consider them as statutory norms of loyalty.
113
 The Avtalslagen 
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33§ (Contracts Act, AvtL, Lag (1915:218) om avtal och andra rättshandlingar på 
förmögenhetsrättens område) is also mentioned to have a close connection with the duty of 
loyalty, although according to Munukka it is usually applied more restrictively than its 
wording would allow.
114
  
  The established definition for the duty of loyalty is usually that the parties must consider 
each other’s interests. Although this does not mean that the parties would in all cases have 
to diminish their own interests. Further, the duty is a non-codified legal principle and can 
be considered as a reciprocal duty of the contracting parties.
115
 Holm further describes it as 
an ethic principle of law (rättsetisk princip).
116
 Munukka describes it as a semi-dispositive 
duty. The parties may in some cases further define and restrict obligations (e.g. that there is 
no obligation to disclose in certain situations), although this may not apply to all obliga-
tions (e.g. to completely free oneself of the obligation to mitigate damages).
117
  
  The applicability of the duty in commercial contracts varies due to their heterogeneity. In 
commercial context the duty is described as an obligation to consider the counterparty’s 
interests but without requiring them to be set before one’s own (unlike in fiduciary rela-
tionships), and thus allowing the parties to further their own goals. Still, provisions that 
entitle the other party to too one-sided powers might be in a risk of being considered dis-
loyal (e.g. a right to choose all arbitrators or adjust performance, see NJA 1983 p.332). 
Munukka states that certain law-drafting documents and the legal doctrine speak for the 
duty’s applicability to the sale of goods, and its existence in building contracts (entrepre-
nadavtal) is definite, although it may not be as flexible as in general contract law. As such, 
the duty of loyalty has gained more influence in commercial contracts and holds a broader 
function than before.
118
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3.2. Definitions for the duty of loyalty 
 
  In his doctoral thesis, Munukka gives the duty several definitions which aim to give it a 
more definite meaning. He describes the duty of loyalty as a norm of exception (un-
dantagsnorm) and a fundamental principle.
119
 He further divides the duty into five more 
specific definitions: 1.) a safeguard definition (tillvaratagandedefinition), which contains 
an obligation to actively and attentively safeguard/guarantee/secure (tillvarata) the other 
party’s interest in the best way available (an example being the duty to warn).  2.) a control 
definition (kontrolldefinition), which requires lower activity and consideration of the other 
party’s interests than the guarantee definition. It forms an obligation to protect, which then 
sets a demand for certain exercise of control done in the interests of the other party. 3.) a 
co-operation definition (Samverkansdefinitionen) that defines loyalty as a duty to act in 
order to effectuate the contract. The parties have an obligation to contribute and advance 
the fulfillment of contract. 4.) a diligence definition (aktsamhetsdefinitionen) that requires 
the parties to abstain from activities or neglect that could cause harm for the contracting 
partner (obligations such as mitigating damages, confidentiality and prohibition to com-
pete). 5.) an abuse definition (missbruksdefinitionen) which constitutes a prohibition of 
abusing law, expertise or economic superiority to further one´s own gains.
120
  
  None of the aforementioned definitions exclude the others, which means that they are 
parallel. Their emphasis, importance and effects vary within different contract types. The 
definitions 1-3 are defined as positive obligations to act and 4-5 as negative obligations to 
(abstain from an) act, although this does not mean that the positive definitions could not 
produce obligations with negative effects (e.g. to abstain from an act) or the other way 
around. How far-reaching obligations these definitions produce cannot be specifically stat-
ed. Nevertheless, Munukka considers it possible to give a general ranking of the defini-
tions, in the order mentioned above, with the guarantee definition being the most far-
reaching. An exception is the control definition that is a milder variant of the guarantee 
definition and can´t be defined in relation to the co-operation definition.
121
   
 Munukka also discusses possible formal criteria for further defining the duty of loyalty. 
These could be 1.) it is a legal duty (not a purely moral obligation) 2.) It is a contractual 
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obligation. This would define a contract as a necessary prerequisite for applying the duty. 
He criticizes this definition, since the duty is also perceived to apply already during con-
tract negotiations. Munukka suggest that this problem could be solved by defining non-
contractual loyalty as its own category or as an analogical application of the contractual 
duty of loyalty. 3.) Indivisibility which means a party cannot have the duty towards several 
parties at the same time, meaning that loyalty cannot be divided. This interpretation is 
based on an idea of loyalty defined as debtors’ duty to act for the creditors’ benefit. 
Munukka questions this view, stating that it is too narrow of a definition, since it would 
contain only employment and other fiduciary relationships, and it would exclude the pre-
contractual loyalty. 4.) Reserve rule criterion (reserveregelskriteriet): the duty of loyalty is 
not codified, so the notion is to be used for referring to non-statutory and other non-
established norms. This criterion is also criticized, since it would isolate the already estab-
lished norms from their loyalty-based evaluation and value background. Viewing the duty 
as non-codified could also lead to it becoming peripheral. It would also make it difficult to 
define loyalty as a principle or a comprehensive norm. 5.) Vagueness criterion, the duty of 
loyalty is a vague norm. Already well defined and concrete obligations would not need 
referring to the vague notion of loyalty, and they should be viewed as independent duties. 
As with the reserve rule criterion, this criterion can also be criticized since it would lead to 
the duty becoming peripheral, because the more norms become concrete, the less meaning 
would be given for the duty of loyalty (“ju mer kontretion, desto mindre lojalitetsplikt”). It 
would also lead to problems in defining when a norm is well-defined, and separating these 
norms from their value-oriented loyalty-background could be unwise. The ideas of vague-
ness and reserve rule criterion should rather be used to define the duty but not as its crite-
ria.
122
 It would seem that only the first criterion is fully accepted to describe the duty.  
  Munukka has further defined three models for various applications of the duty of loyalty. 
The first one is the entrustment model (anförtroendemodel) which applies to fiduciary and 
employment situations. The advocating party (i.e. agent) must actively work to further the 
principals’ interests and adapt his/her own interests accordingly. The second one is the 
receiver model (mottagendemodel) which applies to consumer relations. In this model a 
party must consider the other contracting party’s interests when effectuating his/her inten-
tions and goals. Unlike in the anförtroendemodel, one party has no command over the oth-
er, and they both guard their own interests. Still, the consumer is the receiver of the entre-
                                                          
122
 Munukka 2007 pp.86, 198–201, citation from p.201. 
35 
 
preneurs’ loyal conduct. These two models are mostly based on the codified norms of the 
duty of loyalty. The third model of participation (deltagandemodel) consists of other con-
tract types, such as the sale of goods, insurance and construction contracts (entreprenad). In 
comparison to the previous two, it is a party neutral model. In this model, the general duty 
of loyalty is not as explicit as in the two aforementioned ones, and the duty appears 
through more specific obligations.
123
 Since the two aforementioned models are mostly ex-
cluded from the subject of this study, only the deltagandemodel will be examined in more 
detail. It has also been discussed whether the duty of loyalty should be defined as loyalty to 
the contract or loyalty to the contracting partner. Munukka deliberates these views and 
seems to emphasize the latter option: 
Lojalitetsplikten I svensk rätt skyddar avtalsintresset men detta är inte den yttersta gränsen. 
Den svenska lojalitetsplikten förefaller ändå bäst beskrivas ha motpartsintresset som skydds-
ändamål.
124
 
 
3.3. The duty of loyalty in relation to other principles and norms 
 
  Munukka has sought to define the duty of loyalty in relation to other principles of con-
tract law. In order to explain these relations, he speaks of the requirement of loyalty 
(lojalitetskravet) as a systematical, general-term above and consisting of: 1.) the duty of 
loyalty, 2.) the prohibition of the abuse of rights (rättsmissbruksförbudet) and 3.) norms of 
reasonableness/fairness (skälighetskrav, manifested through norms such as the AvtL 36§ or 
The Sale of Goods Act (Köplag) 45§). The aforementioned aspects overlap each other and 
are difficult to exactly define. Loyalty is not solely bound to the contracting parties’ wishes 
or expectations for certain conduct. Rather, it calls for all-around, comprehensive loyal 
behavior in interpreting and effectuating the contract.
125
  
  According to Munukka, the prohibition of the abuse of rights is not as a concept so com-
monly acknowledged in Sweden as in Denmark and Norway. Although known, it has not 
gained a significant position in contract law. The prohibition of chicanery is a form of the 
abuse of rights, but Munukka states that the latter is an even broader concept. Chicanery 
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means the (ab)use of right to harm others or illegitimate use of rights. The prohibition of 
the abuse of rights also encompasses a use of right even when it would otherwise be legit-
imate but not in proportion to the needs of the party. Because both chicanery and abuse are 
fundamentally considered disloyal, the prohibition of the abuse of rights can be viewed as 
a part of the duty of loyalty or the other way around. But since the duty of loyalty has a 
broader applicability and definition than the doctrine of the abuse of rights, Munukka sees 
it systematically better to speak of them both under the general term of lojalitetskravet. The 
prohibition of the abuse of rights can on one side be seen as an individual legal institution 
and on the other side as a vehicle of expression for the duty of loyalty.
126
 
  As with the abuse of rights, the requirement of reasonableness/proportionality 
(skälightskrav) that is usually implemented through the general clause of Avtalslagen 36§, 
is difficult to unambiguously separate from loyalty. Munukka suggests that the duty of 
loyalty does not have the same restrictions in its application as the general clause (i.e. rea-
sonable/unreasonable) and that the reasonableness-assessment serves a correcting function 
(korrigerande funktion), whereas loyalty has a complementary (kompletterande) function. 
He also suggests that viewing reasonableness through the requirement of loyalty could 
clarify it as a concept. His view is that loyalty obligations are a complex of norms, which 
are parallel to the principle of reasonableness in that they both aim to protect the propor-
tionality in contracts. Because of above-mentioned facts, he sees it justified to view the 
skäligetskrav as a sub-concept under the general term of lojalitetskrav.
127
  
  Holm has also discussed the AvtL 36§ and the abuse of rights in relation to the duty of 
loyalty. He too views them linked to each other, since the AvtL 36§ is linked to loyalty 
through the perspectives of reasonableness, equivalence and justified expectation. On one 
side, 36§ could be understood as a part of the principle of loyalty and on the other, it con-
stitutes a codified legitimation basis (legitimitetsbas) for the principle. Holm also agrees 
that the prohibition of the abuse of rights is connected to the duty, especially through the 
prohibition of chicanery. In this respect, the duty works to prevent speculation on the coun-
terparts cost and abuse of formal rights. Incidentally, although Holm frequently uses the 
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term lojalitetskrav, he does not at any rate explicitly describe it as systematic term like 
Munukka, nor as being categorically above the two aforementioned elements.
128
   
  Norlén views the principle of loyalty (and the virtue of loyalty, lojalitetsdygd) as one of 
the fundamental values (värdegrund) upon which the the AvtL 36§ is constituted (along 
with the principles of equivalency, vigilance, trust, will and the prohibition of contracts 
against law and good conduct). In some cases, it can be difficult to state whether a norm or 
a resolution is based on the will (intent/volition) principle (viljeprincip) or the principle of 
loyalty or both (Norlén mentions NJA 1997 p.524 as an example). Since the principle of 
loyalty is mostly oriented towards guiding the actions of the parties in relation to each oth-
er (handlingsinriktad), he sees it difficult to view contract terms as unreasonable solely 
based on loyalty-assessment. Similarly, assessing the proportionality of the parties’ per-
formances must be done in accordance to the principle of equivalency, not loyalty, alt-
hough crass disproportionality might be an indication of disloyalty.
129
 
  The normal consequences for breaching the duty of loyalty in a contract are the ones at-
tributed to a breach of contract in general, such as cancellation of contract or liability for 
damages. That is to say, a breach of loyalty does not necessarily invoke the AvtL 36§. A 
long-term contract might be an example of a case, where a breach of the principle of loyal-
ty would be assessed under 36§. In such case, the parties may not be willing to cancel a 
long-term contract that they still deem salvageable, but it would be unreasonable to expect 
the party harmed by disloyal conduct to uphold the contact as such.
130
      
  Munukka states that even though adjusting a contract according to the AvtL 36§ is con-
sidered to have a higher threshold in commercial cases than in consumer cases, this does 
not in itself mean that the same threshold should apply to the other two elements of the 
lojalitetskravet, since adjusting a contract is the utmost interference to the freedom of con-
tract. 
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Oskälighetströskeln för jämkning är betydligt högre för kommersiella parter än konsumenter. 
Riktigt samma nivåskillnad kan inte avläsas beträffande övriga uttryck för lojalitetskravet, 
vilket kan motiveras med att avtalsrevision är det mest långtgående ingreppet i avtalsfrihet-
en, och därför ett instrument som bör tillgripas med urskilling.
131
 
  The distinction problem with the term bona fides (god tro: to not know or shouldn´t have 
known of a relevant fact) is also mentioned in Swedish jurisprudence. Munukka suggest 
that this term should be reserved as a technical (tekniskt) concept in relation to a material 
fact, that is to say, to assess the type of care a subject must exercise in order to gain infor-
mation of relevant facts, meaning either awareness or “should have known” awareness of a 
fact.
132
  The definition of good conduct/manners (goda seder) in Swedish law is usually 
used in conjunction with the concept of a contract that is against law or good manners 
(pactum turpe). Munukka states that the duty of loyalty is not seen as the same as the pac-
tum turpe, since the former’s goal is to prevent misdemeanor by one of the parties, rather 
than to assess actions taken by the parties together. Neither is the concept of good customs 
(god sed), which is usually used to describe trade customs and practice, to be confused 
with loyalty. Good customs have a more collectivistic nature as professional standards than 
the duty of loyalty. However, the duty of loyalty and commercial ethics are connected to 
each other and in commercial branches, where the emphasis on the ethicality of actions is 
high, loyalty should be assessed accordingly.
133
 
 
3.4. Functions of the duty of loyalty 
 
  Holm discusses the functions of the duty of loyalty by stating that on one side, some obli-
gations aim to assist parties in achieving their contract’s purpose, such as obligations that 
emphasize co-operation. On the other side, the duty acts as a basis for protective obliga-
tions (skyddsförpliktelser) which are not directly related to the purpose of the contract, but 
rather aim to guide the parties’ actions by taking into consideration the whole contractual 
relationship (such as the duty of care). Its third function is to work against the abuse of 
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rights and correcting (korrigering) unsatisfactory results. Aside from these functions, the 
duty can also promote dynamicity of the legal system.
134
   
  Munukka divides the functions of the duty of loyalty in an even more detailed-fashion 
into: a category or “title” function (rubrikfunktion), a flexibility and correction function 
(flexibilitets- och korrigerinsfunktion), a materialization function (materialiseringfunktion), 
a concretization and supplementing function (konkretiserings- och uttfyllningsfunktion), a 
linking function (sammanbindande function), restricting opportunism (opportunismbägrän-
sande function),  restricting conflicts (konfliktsbegränsande function) and restricting dam-
ages (skadebegränsande function), an activity promoting function (aktivitetsfrämjande 
funktion), a trust creating function (tillitskapande function) and lastly a (possible) function 
of promoting trade.
135
  
  The concretization and supplementing function assures that contracts are seen as contain-
ing obligations that require consideration for the other party, since writing all-inclusive 
contracts is impossible. The flexibility function makes it possible to apply loyalty-based 
rules in situations which the parties’ have not beforehand taken into account. This way it 
also makes it possible to overcome the formal requirements and the wording of a contract 
with a more “materially” justified result. Correcting function makes it possible to deviate 
from an otherwise established solution when it would lead to an unbalanced result. 
Through the linking function, the duty helps to systematize and ensure the coherence of the 
legal system and its interpretation. The title function enables one to assess norms with a 
similar purpose under the concise concept of loyalty. Further, the materialization function 
makes it possible for certain obligations, e.g. dispositive statutory norms, to be seen as loy-
alty obligations (lojalitetsförpliktelser). The trust creating aspect ensures protection for the 
shared intent or trust of the parties, even when such intent is not specifically expressed 
during the formation of the contract.
136
  
  Munukka points out that the problems of the duty of loyalty come from the fact that it 
usually goes against form. Jurisprudence requires (at least to some degree) division be-
tween legal and moral norms. Such division is usually realized through form and formal 
rules. Nevertheless, he points out that it is not necessary for a norm to be thoroughly de-
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fined in order for it to be part of contract law. The broader the consensus on the definition 
of the duty of loyalty is, the more it becomes integrated into contract law. He also mentions 
that legal rules are susceptible to a risk of vulgarization. When a legal rule that was earlier 
based on loyalty-assessment becomes formalized (e.g. reklamation), this can lead to the 
norm becoming “petrified” in that it loses its contact with its original loyalty-based per-
spective.
137
 Munukka states that the requirement of loyalty (lojalitetskrav, see section 3.3) 
and the duty of loyalty both act as limits and restrictions to such formalization and the rule 
of the supremacy of contract. Since the duty can be invoked against explicit contract terms, 
it can be viewed as being an antagonist and an exception to the rule of the supremacy of 
contract.
138
 
Lojalitetspliktens rättfärdigande kan på ett abstract plan hävdas ligga I sin korrigering av av-
talsfriheten när friheten leder till oönskade, i något avseende samhällsskadliga effekter.
139
 
 
3.5. Application in contracts and consequences of disloyal conduct 
 
 A contract can be supplemented through the application of the duty of loyalty (utfyllning). 
Munukka considers the supplementing the duty’s most notable function. Supplementing a 
contract can done on the basis of dispositive norms (statutes, customs and principles) or in 
accordance with an individual cases typical premises or on in casu assessment.
140
 Munuk-
ka states that many of the aforementioned dispositive norms contain obligations which can 
be perceived as being based on loyalty (lojalitetsförpliktelser). As a consequence of sup-
plementing contracts on the grounds of the duty of loyalty, contracting parties may find 
themselves bound by obligations that were not explicitly written in their contract. Supple-
menting gives rise to a certain amount of secondary obligations that complement the pri-
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140
 Munukka 2007 p.74, 92, Holm 2004 p.56, 110, 180: Holm mentions a comparison to the ergänzende 
Vertragsauslegung of German law. 
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mary obligations of the parties. One could see the purpose of these obligations in protect-
ing contracting parties, even when contract provisions lack such protection.
141
    
  At the same time this can lead to problems due to the fact that such supplementing is usu-
ally unpredictable. Munukka suggests that this could be avoided by considering the sup-
plementing that is based on the duty of loyalty as a way to bring unspoken (but neverthe-
less intended) obligations to a contract. This would mean an obligation to act as if the obli-
gations were agreed upon, and to interpret the contract and perform by taking account an-
other party’s legitimate expectations for certain conduct. Despite certain unpredictability in 
the loyalty-based supplementing, applying the lojalitetskrav also has the benefit that to 
avoid unfitting consequences judges do not have to stretch the wording of provisions or 
attempt to construe the will of the parties to fix gaps or to avoid unfitting consequences in 
litigation. This might be seen as increase in predictability, since the other two aforemen-
tioned methods are more in casu and therefore unpredictable than the loyalty-based as-
sessment.
142
 Holm adds that the supplementing should be linked to the typical expectations 
that the parties can be assumed to have with a certain (type of) contract.
143
 
  Votinius discusses the unpredictability aspect by comparing a traditional promise-based 
principle of contracts (löftesprincip, the contract only obliges to do that which the parties 
have explicitly promised, focus on textual interpretation) and an equitability-based princi-
ple which the duty of loyalty is part of (rättviseprincip, equitability of contracts, all circum-
stances are to be assessed in contract interpretation). The promise-based view may be the 
more predictable one when contracts provisions are clear and simply worded, but then 
again, it is always more or less uncertain how courts judge the wording of contracts. The 
equity-based interpretation may lead to a different conclusion than the promise-based, but 
it is not necessarily a more unpredictable one. It is neither possible for contracting parties 
to describe all conceivable situations that could arise in their contracts, especially in long-
term contracts. There is always bound to be some level of uncertainty.
144
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  The duty also affects contractual relationships through interpretation and an obligation to 
interpret the contract loyally can be seen as an individual obligation based on the duty of 
loyalty.
145
 The duty to interpret a contract loyally has many forms and variations. Foremost 
this means that the parties must carry out and interpret their contractual obligations loyally. 
One aspect of this is the presumption that a contract is interpreted consistently and neutral-
ly for both parties. It also affects interpretation of opportunistic or inconsistent actions of a 
party and Munukka suggest that the interpretation of ambiguous terms against the drafts-
man (contra stipulatorem) could likewise be considered as an application of the duty of 
loyalty. Further, when considering a contracting party’s breach of contract, the other part 
must measure the reasonableness of his/her actions in relation to the breach. This means 
that the assessment should not be too one-sided. This can be understood as being based on 
the idea of co-operation within contract and that parties must stay loyal to the goal of the 
contract. Parties may explicitly include the duty of loyalty into their contract terms, but 
sometimes contract terms may also indirectly give an expression of a particular demand for 
loyalty in the contractual relationship. The demand for loyal interpretation of contract can 
be applied e.g. when a party’s interpretation is misleading the other party about facts. Fur-
ther, if the contractual relationship is explicitly based on the trust between contracting par-
ties, this could then give a party a right to cancel the contract due to a breach of trust. 
Aside from contract terms, the duty may also affect the interpretation of legal rules.
146
 
Holm points out that the duty could adjust the interpretation of the pacta sunt servanda-
principle into a more goal-oriented direction.
147
 
  There are no generally defined consequences for a breach of the duty of loyalty. They 
may be defined in contract terms e.g. in case of prohibition to compete. Examples for ef-
fects a breach may give rise to, are: liability for damages, cancellation of contract, and 
voidableness. The liability type of the duty of loyalty can be defined as culpa-liability. The 
parties must have reasonable consideration for the contracting partners’ interests.148 Simi-
lar assessment applies to actions taken due to a breach of contract (cancellation or price 
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reduction).
149
 The consequences for breaching the obligation to disclose vary, except in 
case of fraud (AvtL 30§). The usual consequence is a liability for damages, but a reduction 
of selling price may also be possible.
150
 Concerning the burden of proof, Munukka men-
tions a presumption of loyalty which means that the party who is claimed to have acted 
disloyally does not have the burden of proof that his/her actions were in accordance with 
the duty. The loyalty of a party is presumed, but this does not mean that one could avoid 
his/her obligations by claiming to have acted loyally. Loyalty does not expunge other obli-
gations.
151
 
  So as mentioned before, the consequences must be evaluated in casu. The type of contract 
mainly defines the exact obligations arising from the duty of loyalty. By knowing what 
type of elements a contract type contains, one can also determine how the duty of loyalty 
affects the contract in question.
152
 The duty acts as a guideline or a standard for the parties 
and in defining more specific obligations.
153
 Ramberg suggests that it usually does not 
have much weight as an independent claim in legal disputes; instead it usually gains most 
of its influence in legal and contractual interpretation.
154
 Munukka discusses this further 
and states that in cases where a party’s obligations are clearly defined by law or contract 
terms the duty of loyalty appears mostly as lacking of independence. Nevertheless, when 
this is not the case, the duty may as an independent principle give rise to specific obliga-
tions, and thus have an independent influence. It may also indirectly affect regular contract 
terms by defining them via interpretation and by influencing the type of consequences at-
tributed to them.
155
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  Certain types of facts attributed to a contract may increase the influence the duty of loyal-
ty has upon it. As usual, it is seen to have an especially important role in long-term con-
tracts.
156
 These contracts usually demand more co-operation than just a simple momentary 
transaction. Yet, Munukka seems to be more or less sceptic on how much meaning the 
element of longevity in itself should have. Longevity by itself may lead to stagnation and 
inefficiency. He seems to put more emphasis on inspecting the complexity of contracts, 
along with its intensity and closeness of the parties (e.g. in co-operation contracts, joint 
venture, franchising) when assessing loyalty. The costs of the acts required by loyalty may 
also play some role in this assessment, in comparing the proportionality of benefits to 
costs.
157
 Longevity should rather be viewed alongside other loyalty factors:  
Långvarighet bör däremot inte tillmätas något värde I sig, utan det är det regelmässiga sam-
manträffandet av andra erkända faktorer I lånvariga förhållanden som medför skydds-
värde.
158
   
  Holm emphasizes loyalty in long-term contracts and states that when something relevant 
happens during the contracting period, it would be disloyal for a party not to work towards 
adjusting the contract accordingly. He sees the AvtL 36§ as strongly linked to loyalty when 
it comes to adjusting long-term contracts due to the trust that characterizes the co-operation 
in long-term contracts. Since a long-term contract is also meant to promote future co-
operation, it is not realistic to expect that the parties could extensively define all perfor-
mances required during the contracting period.
159
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3.6. Elements of the duty of loyalty 
 
3.6.1. The duty of loyalty in different phases of a contractual relationship 
3.6.1.1. Pre-contractual phase  
 
  As in the other Nordic legal systems, the duty of loyalty has effects during the pre-
contractual and the actual contracting phases in Swedish law. Generally, the pre-
contractual relationship is not as definite as the actual and realized contractual-phase. Alt-
hough it may be invoked as independent grounds for liability, the duty of loyalty is consid-
ered to be somewhat weaker during the pre-contractual phase.
160
 Holm states that the pre-
contractual requirement of loyalty contains mostly activity or diligence obligations that 
work towards attaining a certain goal.
161
  
  It is thought that a party may be liable for damages, if he/she disloyally starts, continues 
or breaks off negotiations (culpa in contrahendo). It is also considered disloyal to start or 
continue negotiations without an intention of forming a contract. A similar evaluation 
would probably apply if one starts negotiations only to delay the counterparty’s business or 
to discover trade secrets. The responsible party is liable for the negotiation costs of the 
other party (negative interest).
162
 According to Hellner such liability has been interpreted 
restrictively in Sweden and to arise, it generally requires that a party has acted disloyal-
ly.
163
 Björkdahl considers bad faith (ond tro) of a party as a requisite for liability.
164
 
  It is also possible that a party becomes bound to a contract because of his/her passivity in 
contract negotiations. The general rule is that passivity in negotiations does not lead to a 
party becoming bound by the contract. Still, the fact that a party has a reason to trust that 
the contract has been established and this false impression is not corrected due to the pas-
sivity of the other party who should have understood that his/her contracting partner is mis-
taken, may exceptionally lead to the contract being considered binding. This type of obli-
gation to notify the counterparty can be found in Avtalslagen 4.2, 6.2 and 9§. Holm states 
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that these paragraphs can be seen as expressions of loyalty obligations that apply during 
contract negotiations. The sanction for going against these norms is that one becomes un-
willingly bound to a contract. Also the liability for negative interests is possible.
165
 There 
are also mentions of cases concerning a post-contractual duty of loyalty. Such duty is statu-
torily defined for commercial agents according to the lag (1991:351) om handelsagentur 
32§ (Act on Commercial Representatives and Salesmen).
166
 Other examples of a require-
ment to act loyally could be situations where an item has been left to a party´s possession 
and needs to be returned, or a party has obtained trade secrets during the contractual rela-
tionship.
167
  
  The negotiating parties are generally allowed to break off negotiations when they wish to 
do so. Nevertheless, the duty of loyalty may set a demand for the parties to work towards 
the realization of the contract. This may mean e.g. that a party may be liable for damages 
in a case where the realization of the contract is dependent on the party needing an ac-
ceptance from a third party (e.g. committee or a board of trustees). Although this generally 
means that contracting parties should not hold for sure that the contract will be realized, in 
some cases a party’s justified trust may be considered as grounds for liability for the other 
party. The prerequisites for the liability are that a party to acts in a way that constitutes a 
factual trust for the other party and that in the light of these actions the other party’s trust is 
justified. Lengthy and well proceeded negotiations are one of the factors in considering 
loyalty, as the obligation to consider the counterparty’s interests increases the further the 
negotiations advance.
168
 An obligation to inform the other part of one’s weakened econom-
ic state has also been discussed in Sweden. Generally such obligation does not exist. Still, 
according to Munukka there is a tendency in the doctrine to approve of it in some situa-
tions, e.g. near bankruptcy situation.
169
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  Björkdahl describes the pre-contractual liability in negotiations (two-party situations) as 
being dependent on whether the negotiations have proceeded so far, that one could expect 
that the contract will be established, if nothing unexpected happens during the negotiations. 
The parties are no longer in contact just to explore potential contracting partners and in-
stead aim to establish a contract, and therefore they can rely on that the counterpart does 
not create unfounded expectations for the contracting. In this situation, the relationship of 
the parties could be described as contract-like (kontraktsliknande), which means that the 
negotiations are no longer completely non-binding, in that the parties now have an obliga-
tion to consider each other’s interests, i.e. the duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty acts as a 
prerequisite for the liability.
170
 Thus one could also view the duty of loyalty as a threshold 
for liability.   
 
3.6.1.2. Contract-external liability? 
 
  The duty of loyalty has also been discussed in non-contractual or contract-external situa-
tions. Of course, the general rule is that a third person is not bound by a contract (privity of 
contract), but exceptionally it may be possible to extend the liability for damages to third 
persons, particularly if the situation is considered contract-like (kontraktsliknande). These 
exceptions are limited and must be evaluated in casu.
171
 The opinions stated on this matter 
are often guarded, but some possible situations for loyalty-based assessment have been 
discussed. One possible situation is when a party tries to circumvent a contract provision. 
Such situation did arise in the case NJA 1993 p.188, where the court saw that a party tried 
to circumvent a prohibition to compete by establishing a new company. Munukka analyzes 
this case and draws the conclusions that the liability of a third party would generally re-
quire an intention to circumvent  the contract, and that the liable party and the third party 
are closely connected to each other (e.g. parent and subsidiary company). Another compa-
rable situation could be a case where the third party coerced or caused a contracting party 
to breach the contract (NJA 2005 p.608). Other possible non-contractual situations men-
tioned are a banks obligation to look after third-party interests, e.g. in cases of pledge (NJA 
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1998 p.520) or a money transfer to a third party. These obligations could be seen as being 
based on the duty of loyalty, although it is disputed.
172
  
  Holm seems to disagree about the idea of the duty of loyalty extending to non-contractual 
obligations. He argues that the concept should be reserved to describe obligations exclu-
sive to the parties of a contract. Otherwise, using the term loyalty in non-contractual situa-
tions would broaden and thus degenerate the meaning of its concept. Still, an act that 
harms a third party could in some cases be viewed as a breach of the duty of loyalty against 
the contracting partner. In broad terms, if A and B are contracting partners, and C is in 
contract with B, then harm caused by A to C could be considered disloyal towards B, if the 
acts also harm B.
173
  
  Although Björkdahl mentions the duty of loyalty as grounds for liability in negotiation 
situations, that is to say, in situations where two parties are intending to establish a con-
tract, she states that in three-party constellations this view does not apply similarly. Her 
description of two-party situations is comparable to the pre-contractual situation (see 3.6.1 
above), and her description of three-party situations could be compared to the contract-
external situation described in this study, although she uses the term utomkontraktuell for 
them both. She describes a three-party situation as an arrangement where A and B are con-
tracting parties, whereas C is in contract with B and not with A. A makes a claim against C 
due to damages caused by actions of C. She states that since A and C are not in contract 
and do not aim to establish a contract, one must use other factors (than loyalty) to assess 
the situation. The prerequisite for liability in this case is that A and C have some sort of 
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closeness/proximity (närhet) or a collusive co-operation with each other.
174
 Thus it could 
be said that also Björkdahl reserves the term duty of loyalty for contracting partners and 
pre-contractual situations, not for situations concerning contract-external three-party con-
stellations. 
 
3.6.2. Obligations stemming from the duty of loyalty 
 
  The duty of loyalty is said to consist of, or link together, a number of different obliga-
tions.
175
 Holm defines these obligations as a subcategory below the principle of loyalty. 
The common feature of these obligations is that they oblige a party to consider his/her 
counterparty’s interests and to act with care.176 Munukka states that aside from supple-
menting and interpreting contracts through the duty of loyalty (lojalitetsplikt) the duty also 
acts as a basis for other obligations and duties (lojalitetsförpliktelser), such as obligations 
to disclose and contribute. In other words, he views such duties and obligations as being 
based on the more general duty of loyalty. These specific duties are more refined in their 
definitions and have more specific applications. The specific duties can also be viewed as 
concrete expressions of the general legal principle of the duty of loyalty which is defined 
in casu through these more specific duties. These obligations are thus an indicative catego-
ry of obligations that are interconnected by the facts that they express an idea that a con-
tract contains more than just the explicit contract terms and that a party must effectuate 
these obligations according to the other party’s interests. He uses the term specific 
(särkilda) duties of loyalty for these individual expressions of loyalty and the general duty 
as a vaguer and broader term. Because of this, some statutorily defined duties (e.g. the duty 
to disclose) can be well defined and clear in some contract types, and in other cases they 
might be derived from the general duty of loyalty with almost no clear definition. Also, the 
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50 
 
divisions between the specific duties are somewhat vague and they themselves constitute 
mostly a loosely cohesive category of duties.
177
 
  Holm discusses the obligations of loyalty under the title of secondary obligations (biför-
pliktelse), although mentioning that the duty may influence the interpretation of the prima-
ry obligations (huvudförpliktelse). He states that the division between primary and second-
ary obligations is not always meaningful and the application of the duty is not dependent 
on such division.
178
 Munukka divides the aforementioned specific duties into: 1.) the duty 
to co-operate, (medverkansplikt) 2.) the duty of confidentiality (tystnadsplikt), 3.) the pro-
hibition to compete (konkurrensförbud) 4.) the duty to disclose (upplysningplikt) 5.) the 
duty to mitigate damages and 6.) the duty of care.
179
  
  These duties may appear as positive obligations, such as the duty to disclose, or negative 
obligations, such as the duty of confidentiality, and sometimes even as both, such as the 
duty of care. Most of these duties require a contractual relationship between the parties, 
except for the duty to prevent damages that is also a general principle of law in itself. 
Munukka states that these individual duties cannot be exclusively defined as secondary 
obligations (biförpliktelse), although they usually appear as such. In other words, e.g. the 
duty of care can be considered as the primary obligation (huvudförpliktelse) in some con-
tracts. According to Munukka, even though one cannot define the specific duties solely as 
secondary or dependent obligations (osjälvständig förpliktelse), they can nevertheless be 
systematically placed into the category of non-constitutive (for the contract type) and sec-
ondary obligations.
180
 Although this definition is not exclusive, it can be considered char-
acteristic: 
Vad som förefaller utmärka lojalitetsförpliktelser är att de översiktligt betraktat kan uppfattas 
som förpliktelser i tillägg till de mera konkreta avtalsutfästelserna. De är alltså vanligen icke-
konstitutiva element eller biförpliktelser. Att denna karakterisering inte håller för alla avtal 
hindrar ju inte att de, i avsaknad av närmare avtal härom, i systematiskt hänseende disposi-
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tivt placeras i facket icke-konstitutiva element/biförpliktelser. Förpliktelsernas lojalitetsprä-
gel framträder alltså mot bakgrund av det dispositiva huvudmönstret.
181
 
 Munukka further categorizes these specific obligations under the above-mentioned five 
definitions of the duty of loyalty (see section 3.3.) as follows: 1.) The guarantee definition 
(tillvaratagandedefinition) contains the duty to warn (avrådningsplikt). It is also related to 
the fiduciary duties, such as commissions’ agents, commercial agents and employees’ (in 
labor law) duty of loyalty.  2.) The diligence definition (aksamthesdefinition) contains the 
duty of confidentiality, the prohibition to compete and the duty to mitigate damages. The 
duty of care could be placed under either of the two aforementioned definitions. 3.) The 
abuse definition (missbruksdefinition) contains the duty to inform of a hindrance. 4.) The 
co-operation (samverkansdefinitionen) definition contains the duty to co-operate (or con-
tribute, medverkansplikt). Pre-contractual loyalty, the obligation to notify of defects and 
the parties’ obligations in the sale of goods and building contracts (e.g. KöpL) could be 
categorized either under the co-operation definition or the diligence definition or both. 5.) 
the control definition contains certain post-contractual obligations.
182
 An obligation to re-
negotiate can also be seen as having its basis on, or being an expression of, the duty of loy-
alty. Holm seems to view it disloyal to abstain from taking measures to adjust a long-term 
contract in accordance with drastically altered circumstances.
183
 
  Votinius discusses the different obligations stemming from the duty of loyalty under the 
titles of obligations: 1.) to position oneself in the other party’s situation (sätta sig in i den 
andres situation), 2.) to give important information to the other party and 3.) to act diligent-
ly in considering the other’s interests. The first aspect sets a requirement for a party to ob-
serve what the other party has understood or misunderstood (for example AvtL 4.2 and 
6.2). Further, no-one is to profit from another’s mistakes or let the other party bear all the 
risks. This constitutes an obligation to clarify (klagörandeplikt). The second aspect consti-
tutes an obligation to disclose (see below in 3.6.2.2.). The third aspect is especially mean-
ingful in fiduciary relationships, but it can also be commonly described as a duty of best 
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efforts in performance. These obligations may gain more emphasis if one of the parties is 
considered to be more skilled or a professional.
184
 
 
3.6.2.1. Specific obligations requiring contribution to contract 
 
  Duty to co-operate or contribute (medverkansplikt) is usually defined as an obligation to 
work towards the fulfillment of the contract’s purpose. This duty contains further-going 
obligations than just the contractual performance. Some of them also aim to protect con-
tracting parties’ business and data, e.g. obligation of confidentiality and prohibition to 
compete. On the other side, passivity that leads to loss of rights may be seen as an in-
fringement of a duty as well.
185
 The co-operation aspect can also be defined more specifi-
cally as an obligation not only to perform according to the contract terms but also to act 
accordingly so that the opposing party can adequately perform his/her obligations and ef-
fectuate the contract. The duty to co-operate is usually present in all contracts, although its 
specific meaning varies between contract types. The KöpL 50§ is mentioned as an example 
of a statutory norm requiring co-operation. As mentioned earlier, the basic form of the duty 
obligates the parties to abstain from harming the counterparty and denies the possibility to 
invoke a self-caused deviation from the contract terms as a breach of contract. It can also 
manifest as a duty to help (bidragsplikt), to do supplementary work (tilläggsarbete, espe-
cially in case of building contracts) or to adjust ones performance in a reasonable ratio so 
that the other party gains the maximal use from the contract. More specifically, it can also 
mean a duty to express oneself in an understandable manner to the other party, if the sub-
ject matter of the contract is complex. A buyer’s obligation to give the seller a chance to 
repair a flawed object of purchase is also mentioned as an expression of co-operation.
186
  
  The duty to prevent and mitigate possible damages is a general principle in the compensa-
tion of damages, but it can also be seen as a form of the duty to co-operate. In accordance 
with the duty of loyalty, contracting parties must take active measures to prevent damages 
and abstain from causing them. The duty to prevent damages does not include all damages 
that are theoretically possible to avoid, but rather the damages that could reasonably be 
avoided and if a party reasonably attempts to prevent such damages, he/she will not be held 
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liable for them, even if the attempt is not successful. The preventive measures have to be 
reasonable in comparison to the possible proportions of damages, since the preventive acts 
may also sometimes conflict with the interests of the preventing party. This can happen, for 
instance, when such acts could reduce the party’s own goodwill-value. If one party ne-
glects the duty, the right to demand performance from the contracting partner may in turn 
be limited.
187
  
  The obligation to mitigate damages may also appear in a situation where one party has 
endured damages due to other party’s breach of contract. In this situation, the former must 
take reasonable efforts to limit the damages that befall him/her or else the liability of the 
breaching party may in turn be limited. The duty may also present itself as a duty of care, 
e.g. in a case of lease where a borrower has an obligation to make sure the object stays in 
condition during the lease. Disloyal actions in a contractual relationship may also affect the 
interpretation and evaluation of the contract in court, e.g. if one party misuses the other 
party’s misunderstanding or disloyally invokes a contact provision.188 
  The duty of confidentiality (tystnadsplikt) is an obligation to abstain from giving infor-
mation about the parties’ relationship or information that could harm the other party. It is 
usually considered as a continuous obligation which may eventually expire after a certain 
time period. It is of course often intentionally written into contracts, and in such cases the 
provision usually carries post-contractual effects. Pre-contracts and other similar instru-
ments (e.g. letter of intent) can act as a basis for certain amount of loyalty duties. The duty 
of confidentiality has a connection with loyalty, and it usually obligates the parties to con-
sider each other interests when giving confidential information about the contract to third 
parties e.g. banks and abstain from abusing such information. There is no general statutori-
ly defined obligation for confidentiality in contracts, but the law concerning trade secrets 
(Lag [1990:409] om skydd för företagshemligheter) 6§ constitutes a liability for damages 
for someone using or disclosing trade secrets. Munukka states that it is difficult to draw the 
line for what is to be considered confidential, but the utmost border for liability must be 
drawn before facts which a party must give due to his/her (public) legal obligations. On the 
other side, the more a disclosure could harm the other party, the more weight is put on con-
fidentiality. One must assess the content, truthfulness and the intention of the disclosure. 
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Criticizing a contracting partner publicly may be seen as a breach of the duty of loyalty and 
lead to cancellation of contract, especially if the intention is to slander the partner.
189
  
 The prohibition to compete (konkurrensförbud) is similar to the duty of confidentiality, in 
that it is mostly a continuous negative obligation for a limited time period. It usually con-
stitutes an obligation to abstain from competing with one’s contracting partner. It may be 
agreed upon in a contract, but both Munukka and Holm point out that the obligation may 
also arise during contractual relationship due to the nature of the contract type in question, 
even though it is not expressly mentioned in contract terms, or it may in some cases be 
included on the basis of supplementing or/and interpreting the contract through the duty of 
loyalty.
190
 Holm states that in situations where a contract is supplemented with a prohibi-
tion to compete, when assessing its duration one must consider what competition laws and 
the Avtalslagen 38§ would normally allow as the limit.
191
 In fiduciary and employment 
contracts, it usually has a significant meaning in post-contractual situations. The premise is 
that the parties are allowed to compete after the contractual relationship has ended. There-
fore, a post-contractual prohibition requires that it has been agreed upon in contracting 
terms.
192
  
  A commercial sales contract does not normally give rise to a prohibition to compete, alt-
hough in corporate acquisitions it might be considered disloyal for the seller to immediate-
ly establish a similar company after the sale if it considerably undermines the buyer’s as-
sumed benefits of the acquisition. Copyright contracts and license contracts may also be 
assessed similarly. Still, Holm states that considering the freedom of trade, supplementing 
the contract with a prohibition to compete should be based on at least an implicit agree-
ment of such provision, in order to justify the parties’ expectations of its existence.193 
  Duty of care (vårdplikt) is defined as a duty to take care of property. Such duty generally 
requires a contractual relationship between the parties to arise, although a prior contract 
may lead to the duty of care extending for some time after the contractual relationship. It 
can apply to property, such as real estates and chattel, but also to rights, like a possible 
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future right of recourse (regressrätt NJA 1998 p.852) or a pledge. The duty applies to en-
trusted property and non-entrusted property. Further requirements for the duty are that the 
obligated party has some degree of control over the property (e.g. KöpL 72§ and 73§, the 
norms of Köplagen may also be apply to other contract types via analogy.) and that the 
other party is entitled to the property. This is also the reason why the duty can be seen as 
part of the loyalty duties, since an owner of property is usually not able to take care of the 
property as long as it is in someone else’s control. Control usually means that the property 
is in possession of an obliged person, and the duty usually expires when the property is 
assigned to the owner. An obligation to insure property and an obligation to sell wares that 
would otherwise lose their value may also be seen as forms of the duty of care. The obliga-
tion to sell otherwise deteriorating wares is also linked to the obligation to prevent and 
mitigate damages.
194
 
 
3.6.2.2. The duty to disclose and inform 
 
  The duty to disclose (upplysningsplikt) contains a wide range of different kinds of obliga-
tions which usually appear as duties to inform another party of facts or one’s own concep-
tions or impressions concerning certain facts. It has various forms in different statutory 
norms, contract types, and situations.
195
 The circumstances that cause the obligation to 
arise vary, but one general description is: a party has certain information which he/she 
knows (or should know) that the counterparty lacks, and knows (or should know) that the 
information is relevant for the other party in establishing the contract. The questions of in 
whose control sphere the information lays and how attainable such information generally is 
also affect the assessment.
196
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  According to Munukka, the duty to disclose could potentially exist in almost all contract 
types. Its purpose is to guarantee that the contracting partner gets the intended performance 
and gains benefit from it. A statutory example of the duty can be found in KöpL 19.1,2, 
which states that a seller may not invoke a “sold as it is” provision, if he/she has neglected 
to inform the buyer of a relevant fact concerning the goods.
197
 Nicander points out that just 
the fact that one of the parties is considered to be weaker than the other does not constitute 
a right to be informed solely due to such position. Nevertheless if a party notices that the 
counterpart does not have the required knowledge or access to relevant information needed 
to guarantee his/her interests, an obligation to inform may arise for the stronger or more 
skilled party.
198
   
  Since the aforementioned definition is vague, Munukka divides the duty more specifically 
into: 1.) an obligation to give notice (neutral reklamationsplikt), 2.) an obligation to warn 
(avrådningspilkt) and 3.) an obligation to inform of performance hindrance (meddelandep-
likt vid prestationshinder). There is no general duty to inform of legal facts, unless a party 
has been misled or seriously mistaken in which cases a neglect to inform could be seen as 
disloyal conduct.
199
  
 A party may be obligated to give notice of defects (reklamation) e.g. damages.
200
 Munuk-
ka speaks of a neutral notification (neutral reklamation) in cases which a party notifies 
another of his/her breach of contract and a consequence notification about the intended 
actions due to a breach of contract. He states that the duty to give a neutral notification is 
seen as a general principle in contract law (although its extent varies). It can also be seen as 
related to the duty of loyalty, since it (at least partially) aims to reduce the damages that 
could befall the other party. Still, he deliberates whether notifying of defects, especially 
when it is a strict statutory obligation, can be viewed as being based on the duty of loyalty 
as certain matters, such as causality between a late notification and its effects on the con-
tracting partner, leave it questionable. A further form of the duty to disclose is the duty to 
answer (svarsplikt) which means that a party must react to a notice or information given by 
the other party. Such duty may arise in pre-contractual situations, when the offeror has a 
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reason to trust that the offerees inactivity means an acceptance (see for instance AvtL 4.2 
and 9§). The notification acts as a preserver of rights, if it is neglected the party may no 
longer invoke an action or certain conduct as a basis for breach of contract.
201
  
  A buyer usually has an obligation to investigate or inspect the object of purchase, (un-
dersökningsplikt) e.g. KöpL 20§. One of its functions is preventing misuse of rights in a 
situation where a buyer tries to invoke a known defect as lack of conformity with the con-
tract. Although Munukka sees the obligation to inspect as being related to the obligation to 
notify of defects, he states that it is not considered as an obligation that is based on loyalty, 
since its function is more related to the caveat emptor-principle.
202
 The obligation to in-
spect balances the sellers’ duty to disclose.203 So even if the obligation is not considered to 
be based on loyalty, it nevertheless affects the interpretation of whether a particular disclo-
sure can be considered disloyal.  
  The duty to warn (avrådningsplikt) calls for a party to inform his/her partner when the 
required performance or the object of purchase does not have the benefits or uses the party 
expects it to possess (e.g. NJA 1991 p.808) or that the expected benefits could be gained in 
a less timely or costly way. An example of this is a repairman informing his customer that 
it would be cheaper to replace an object rather than to repair it. The KöpL 17.2 contains an 
indirectly described demand that an object of purchase must be applicable for the intended 
use. If this is not the case, then the seller must inform the customer or risk that the object of 
purchase will otherwise be considered flawed. As a more specific example, Munukka men-
tions a contractors’ obligation to warn or remark against unfitting plans or decisions in a 
construction contract. The standard form contract of building contracts 04 (allmänna 
bestämmelser för byggnads-, anläggnings- och intstallationsenraprenader) 2:2 could 
through systematic interpretation (systeminriktad tolkningsmetod) be seen as constituting 
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an obligation for a contractor to remark a future proprietor about flaws in building plans. 
These obligations can also extend to the pre-contractual phase.
204
  
  The duty to inform of performance hindrances (meddelandeplikt vid prestationshinder) 
can be considered as being based on the duty of loyalty, and it can be defined as a duty to 
notify the contracting partner if one is not able to perform according to the contract (natu-
raprestation) or receive the performance of the contracting partner. The KöpL contains at 
least three paragraphs for this: 28§, 40.1,2 and 58§.
205
 Lastly, there is a mention of an obli-
gation to explain or clarify (klargörandeplikt) that requires a party of .e.g. a leasing-
contract to explain how the object of purchase is to be used and maintained.
206
 
   Aside from the different types of obligation to disclose, Norlén has sought to define the 
requirements for information that the parties should, or are not required to, disclose. Norlén 
differentiates between destructive, redistributive and productive facts regarding the mean-
ing a particular piece of information has for one’s counterparty. Information about destruc-
tive facts that contain a risk of personal injury or property damage should always be given. 
Withholding such information is disloyal, since the parties must work towards mitigating 
damages. According to Norlén, redistributive facts can be assessed similarly as destructive 
ones, if withholding them might lead to such redistribution of value (and an unbalanced 
contract) that the withholding would have to be considered disloyal, especially if the par-
ticular information is not available to the counterparty. An example of such case could be 
the above mentioned near bankruptcy of a contracting party (3.6.1.1 & footnote 163). Pro-
ductive facts which mainly increase or create value for an item or performance e.g. trade 
secrets, are usually not encompassed by the disclosure, as it would stretch the duty of loy-
alty quite far. Nevertheless, this rule is not necessarily without exceptions, as Norlén dis-
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cusses situations where withholding such information (e.g. a seller is mistaken about the 
value of an object etc.) could be considered disloyal.
207
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4. Norway 
 
4.1. The legal basis of the duty of loyalty 
 
  The duty of loyalty had its breakthrough in the Norwegian legal practice already at the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century, and it was also discussed in the legal doctrine at that time. It 
was said to have been (at least to some extent) inspired by the German rule of True und 
Glauben (242§ BGB). The duty was discussed as early as in the 1920´s by Fredrik Stang 
and sometime later also by other writers, such as Ragnar Knoph. Among others, the norm 
of Avtaleloven 33§ (Contracts Act) was considered to have an important influence on the 
development of the duty. A broader and more emphatic interpretation of 33§ itself gained 
originally a somewhat stronger support in Norway than in the other Nordic countries. 
Stang viewed 33§ as a comprehensive general rule of contract law and as a basis for the 
requirement of loyalty between contracting parties.
208
  
Det er handelssamfundets trang til tryggere omsetningsformer, som har fort inn i retten ikke 
bare forbudet mot illojal konkurrence og reglene om lojalitet og hensynfullhet under 
avviklingen av et kontraksforhold, men også kravet på lojalitet og hensynfullhet under de 
forhandlingen som går forut for kontraktsslutningen.
209
 
  As in the other Nordic countries, there is no general statutory norm for the duty of loyalty 
in Norway, although some specific norms of it exist along with mentions in law-drafting 
documents. There are also several court cases that mention it directly (e.g. Rt.1984 p.28, 
1988 p.1078, 1994 p.1460 Rt.2004 p.1256), and Nazarian states that it has a firm support 
in legal practice and doctrine, although the descriptions of it are usually vague. Hov & 
Høgberg mention it as being one of the institutes that has been mostly developed through 
court practice. It is considered to be a legal principle and standard that is based on the legal 
culture (juridiske kulturarv). Even when there is statutory legislation of the duty, it is not 
viewed as being wholly comprehensive, meaning that the unwritten general duty supple-
ments the more specific norms. Several writers describe the norms of kjøpsloven (Sale of 
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Goods Act) as being based on and as manifestations of the duty of loyalty.
210
 In compari-
son to other Nordic countries, the duty seems to have a strikingly strong support in court 
practice.  
   
4.2. Definitions for the duty of loyalty 
 
  Nazarian defines the duty of loyalty as a secondary obligation (biforpliktelse) that obliges 
the parties to consider each other interests, especially when a party is not him/herself able 
to take care of his/her interests and such consideration can happen without significant costs 
or losses. She states that although the principle of loyalty and the duty of loyalty are usual-
ly synonymous, strictly speaking the former is the legal basis for the duty. She suggests 
that this principle of loyalty can be described as a principle of natural law (naturrettslig 
prinsipp), in a sense that it is a cultural, ethical and society guiding principle. The duty of 
loyalty is considered to be non-discretionary, meaning that the parties may not completely 
rule out the duty. Regardless, it is possible for the contracting parties to define what they 
consider disloyal, thus outlining the extent of the duty.
211
 
Etter min mening vil partene alså aldi kunne få domstolenes hjalp etter å ha “lurt skjorten av 
hverandre”, men den nærmere avgrensningen av lojalitetspliktens innhold vil avhenge av hva 
de har avtalt.
212
 
  Nazarian has sought to define the minimum requirements (minstekrav) for the duty of loy-
alty. Note that the discussed requirements would apply to loyalty in general, that is to say, 
in a broader perspective than just that of commercial contracts. These requirements require 
a total assessment of the contracting situation as a whole (totalvurdering). The require-
ments are used for setting a threshold for the parties’ actions in relation to the duty of loy-
alty. First of the requirements is that the actions of a party are considered to be reprehensi-
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ble (klanderverdig), although some exceptions apply (notification of damages etc.). For an 
act to be reprehensible there must have been an alternate way to act. A party could have 
reasonably acted differently. The assessment of reprehensibility is affected by the parties 
justified expectations and circumstances in general, such as: the type of contract, the rela-
tionship of the parties, the potential for damages caused by the acts and the capabilities of 
the parties. Furthermore, it is a strict culpa-based liability, which requires that a person 
knew or should have known that an action would lead to negative effects for the counter-
party. A mistake (villfarelse) may thus exempt one from the liability. Secondly, disloyal 
actions or neglect must be linked to the contractual relationship of the parties and thirdly, 
it must cause negative effects or a risk of such effects for the contracting partner (adferden 
er egnet til påføre negative effect). Further, the parties must also act to prevent and miti-
gate such negative effects. The negative effects must be of relevance for the counterparty’s 
interests in the contractual relationship in question. Disloyal conduct must come from a 
contracting party (subject of loyalty), but it is also possible for actions or neglect of an as-
sociate of a party (partstilknyttede) to affect the liability of the primary subject of loyalty. 
These situations require a link between the associate and the contracting party, e.g. a prin-
cipal-agent relationship. The said negative effects would not necessarily have to be immi-
nently financial (with the exception of disloyal competition), so they could also include a 
risk of losses and a loss of possibilities or advantages. This means that in co-operation con-
tracts that place a lot of weight on trust, actions that compromise such trust can be consid-
ered disloyal. As Nazarian states:
213
 
“Ettersom det er adferden I seg selv som vurderes etter lojalitetsprinsippet, bør der ikke være 
avgjørende at det har oppstått et umiddelbart økonomisk tap for å kunne gjøre gjeldende 
sanksjoner, med unntak av erstatning. Lojalitetsplikt bør beskytte et videre spekter av 
intresser enn bare de rent økonomiske.” and later: “I enkelte kontraktsforhold vil fravær av 
positiv effekt kunne være tilstrekkelig”.214    
  Nazarian defines the requirements for an alternate way of conduct further with the party’s 
protected expectations (beskyttelsesverdig forventning). An alternate possibility for con-
duct is evaluated according to the justified expectations of one’s counterparty, in that the 
more a party can justifiably rely on his/her contracting partner’s loyal behavior, the stricter 
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the duty. These expectations are of course judged on the premise of what is typical in cer-
tain contracting situations, not on a party’s purely subjective expectations. The assessment 
is relative, in that the degree set on the expectations of loyal conduct depends on how well 
a contracting party can be expected to guard his/her interests. This again depends on the 
contract type, the risk and negative effect potential of the actions and the party’s capabili-
ties. First, if a negative effect is caused solely by the behavior of a single party, it is easy to 
say that the counterparty probably has little chance to prevent the effects of e.g. public 
slander. In these cases a party should always act loyally to prevent the effects of his/her 
conduct. Second, in any case a party must safeguard and see to his/her own interests when 
it would be grossly negligent not to do so. The assessment is made between these two 
boundaries, and the parties’ responsibility to guard their own interests is stricter in com-
mercial contracts.
215
 The typical expectations of contracting parties are also mentioned by 
Simonsen as the basis for loyalty obligations.
216
   
  Despite the aforementioned aspect of commercial relationships, Nazarian considers a no-
table difference in the balance of power as grounds for a stricter demand on loyalty. She 
suggests that the weaker party should be given some amount of protection. Experience in a 
certain field of commerce can also justify a higher demand on loyalty, especially if the 
counterparty is inexperienced. Examples of this are franchising-relationships or when a 
small company does business with a major business-concern. Naturally, it is required that 
the weaker/inexperienced party´s lack of capabilities is known to the stronger party. Fur-
thermore, various commercial branches have different expectations and customs concern-
ing what is expected from a contracting partner, and these business customs and ethics 
adjust the threshold set for a party´s expectations.
217
   
  The aforementioned minimum-requirements are intended to clarify and ease the applica-
bility of the duty. Nazarian gives a summarized description of these requirements as fol-
lows: 1.) the subject of loyalty must abstain from actions that can cause the contracting 
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partner negative effects, if such actions would be considered reprehensible in consideration 
of the protected expectations of the contracting partner. 2.) The subject of loyalty must act 
to prevent and mitigate the negative effects caused to the contracting partner, if it would be 
reprehensible not to do so in consideration of the protected expectations of the contracting 
partner. 3.) The subject of loyalty is to promote the interests of the contracting partner in a 
reasonable manner, if the partner has protected expectations of such actions. 4.) These pro-
tected expectations are assessed by especially considering the parties capabilities, the rela-
tionship of the parties, the degree of co-operation and trust along with the damage potential 
of the act(s).
218
  
  Nazarian’s definition is by far the most detailed description for requirements of the duty. 
Other writers also assess the issue in a similar manner, such as Thorsen who sets two con-
ditions for an action or neglect to be disloyal: 1.) the actions or neglect must cause harm or 
economic loss for the other party and 2.) there must be something subjectively reprehensi-
ble (subjektivt klanderverdig) with the acts that cause the losses. The party is also required 
to have known or should have known about the possibility of an act causing damages.
219
 
Simonsen states that the duty of loyalty is a culpa-based norm. The culpa-liability requires 
that the liable party foresaw the possibility of damages and could have acted in an alterna-
tive manner, in order to prevent the said damages. He considers the evaluation of liability 
to be set on a regular diligence requirement (i.e. not gross negligence etc.).
220
  
 
4.3. The duty of loyalty in relation to other principles and norms 
 
  As in Finland and Sweden, the relationship between the duty of loyalty and the avtale-
loven (Contracts Act, AvtLo) 33§ and 36 § has puzzled authors in Norway. Hov & Høg-
berg note that 33§ has been applied relatively often in Norway in comparison to Sweden 
and Denmark. Courts have also applied 33§ in conjunction with the duty of loyalty, and 
sometimes contracts have been judged void solely by mentioning only the duty even 
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though applying 33 § might have been possible. The impact the demand of loyalty has on 
contractual relationships has recently been highlighted in legal theory and practice.
221
  
  At en har lagt stadig større vekt på dette [lojalitet], kan medføre at eldre rettsavgjørelser om 
avtl. § 33 og særlig de som forkaster en ugyldighetspåstad,  ikke nødvendigvis kan anses 
representative for rettsoppfatning i dag.
222
 
  Nazarian states that both 33§ and 36§ can be seen as expressions of the principle of loyal-
ty and that assessing contracts on the basis of these norms can lead to similar results. She 
states that loyalty is the principal attribute (hovedbegrunnelse) in the assessment of 33§. 
The duty is also closely related to the prohibition of the abuse of rights. The AvtLo 33§ is 
assessed in a similar way as the duty of loyalty (stride mot redelighet eller god tro), but 
Nazarian states that one can interpret the case Rt 1984 p.28, in which both the AvtLo 33§ 
and loyalty were discussed, so that the duty of loyalty sets a stricter demand on meticu-
lousness than 33§, as the latter only requires that a party knew about certain circumstances, 
not that he/she should have known about them (negligence). The duty of loyalty also has a 
broader applicability and “reach” than 33§ and it may constitute other effects than just the 
voidableness of contract.
223
 The relationship between the duty and the prohibition of the 
abuse of rights is also a close one and Dalbak seems to support the idea of considering the 
prohibition as part of the duty of loyalty.
224
 
  Woxholth makes an interesting point about the relationship between 33§ and the duty by 
stating that the duty is easier and simpler to apply than 33§, especially in a commercial 
context. This is based on the fact that being non-statutory, the duty offers more freedom in 
its utilization than the detailed contemplation of honesty (redelighetskrav) required by 33§, 
which has a high threshold in commercial contracts.
225
 This might imply that the duty fills 
a gap that the doctrine of applying 33§ restrictively in commercial context has left.  
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  The AvtLo 36§ is assessed similarly as the duty of loyalty, but Nazarian points out that 
both norms have an individual applicability, since what is encompassed by the applicabil-
ity of 36§ is not identical with the duty of loyalty. This is due to the fact that 36§ is result-
oriented in assessment and the duty of loyalty rather considers the loyalty of the parties 
actions. Infringing the duty does not necessarily lead to the adjustment of contract. The 
central point of loyalty-assessment is to evaluate whether a party’s actions were disloyal, 
whereas 36§ focuses on results and substance (unreasonableness). She also discusses 
whether the duty could be used as independent grounds for revision of contracts. She men-
tions that some cases support such thought and it could be possible, but since it probably 
would not lead to a different resolution than just applying 36§, one may as well consider it 
as a part of the assessment that is done while applying 36§.
226
 Thorsen points out that 36§ 
is usually not viewed as a direct standard for loyalty. Interestingly, he states that one could 
assess unreasonableness in contracts through loyalty by considering it disloyal for a party 
to refrain from adjusting an unfair contract. Unreasonableness in itself would not be dis-
loyal, but rather the refusal to adjust the contract. In such situations, one might then adjust 
the contract on the basis of the duty.
227
 Simonsen states that 36 § contains both the princi-
ple of reasonableness (or fairness) and the principle of loyalty, since wording of the para-
graph makes it applicable to both.
228
 Hov & Høgberg mention that both 33§ and 36§ can 
be applied to dismiss a contract on the basis of disloyal conduct.
229
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4.4. Functions of the duty of loyalty 
 
  Since the duty of loyalty cannot be excluded from contractual relationships, it limits the 
parties’ freedom of contract. Nazarian states that one may either describe it as limiting the 
freedom of contract or the parties’ contracting power. This way, it limits the autonomy of 
parties, although the parties can define what they consider disloyal in their contractual rela-
tionship. In consequence, the defining may increase transaction-costs, but it is nevertheless 
impossible to define all situations to which the duty could be applied, and results are al-
ways uncertain. Against this, the duty might actually reduce contracting costs; since the 
parties do not necessarily have to regulate all obligations explicitly, as according to the 
duty the contract is to be interpreted loyally and by taking the other party into considera-
tion. This might lead to a more efficient protection for parties than an overly elaborate con-
tract. The most notable expression of this could be the duty to disclose, as it is difficult to 
thoroughly define all facts that should be disclosed of. Another function of the duty is to 
preserve value (verdibevarande), through e.g. mitigating damages. Nazarian states that the 
autonomy of the parties is not a heavy argument against the duty as such, but it rather con-
cerns how strict the requirement set for loyalty is.
230
 
   It has also been discussed that the duty might stimulate business people’s readiness to 
establish contracts, in that it increases trust between contracting contracting parties. Naza-
rian states that this view is mostly based on assumptions. One might assume that if there 
was no requirement for loyalty, the parties might abstain from contracting or transaction-
costs might be higher, since the risk of disloyal behavior would be higher. On the other 
hand, a too strict duty might drive away potential business partners, but one cannot say that 
the duty is generally a hindrance for contracting. Because of this, her view is that when 
evaluating the need for the duty of loyalty one should not place much importance on 
whether the duty is thought to stimulate the establishment of contract or not. It can also 
have a function in averting conflicts e.g. through duty to disclose, since thanks to the duty 
both parties have more information and can better asses risks. She states that it would seem 
that the contract types that emphasize loyalty end up in court less frequently. Still, the un-
clearness and vagueness of the duty might just as well be a cause for conflict. In addition to 
aforementioned, other possible functions of the duty are to prevent misuse of power and 
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possibly to stimulate the development of markets.
231
 Simosen suggests that one can assume 
that the existence of the (pre-contractual) duty promotes the effectiveness of the mar-
kets.
232
  
  The aforementioned views are not without criticism, as Dalbak explores the more nega-
tive sides the duty may have. The duty could also be invoked as an escape route from a 
contract that has turned sour. As she notes, such situations could as well be assessed on the 
basis of the doctrine of altered presuppositions (bristende forutseninger), without needing 
to assess loyalty. It is neither certain that the duty will lead to reduced transaction costs or 
reduce the need for detailed contracts.
233
   
   
4.5. Application in contracts and consequences of disloyal conduct 
 
  The duty of loyalty affects contracts through interpretation and supplementing. Loyalty-
assessment may also be a part of the requisites of a statutory norm. The loyalty-aspect may 
also bring an estimation of reasonableness into the interpretation of contract, since the par-
ties are to reasonably consider each other’s interests. It may also act as an independent le-
gal basis; firstly for supplementing the contract e.g. with prohibition to compete, and sec-
ondly for setting aside contract terms. Hov & Høgberg describe the duty as a “background 
norm” (bakgrunnsretten) that supplements contracts the way kjøpsloven supplements sales 
contracts.
234
 Simonsen describes the effects of the duty as constituting, defining and modi-
fying obligations.
235
 
  As stated earlier, the duty’s concrete effects vary between contract types and the duty is to 
be evaluated in casu. One must assess the contract and the contracting situation as a whole. 
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The breach of the duty usually makes the normal remedies for a breach of contract availa-
ble, such as liability for damages and cancellation of contract. The question if the duty can 
act as independent grounds for voidableness has been discussed by several authors, and 
there seems to be support among both the legal writers and the court practice for accepting 
such possibility (for instance see: Rt 1984 p.28 & Rt. 1995 s.1460). A contract may thus be 
considered voidable or a party may be excluded from invoking a certain right on the basis 
of the duty. This way, e.g. in case of a breach of the obligation to inform, it would be pos-
sible to either invoke the rules for non-conformity or flaw in goods of the kjøpsloven 
(KjøpL), or if the buyer would rather void the contract, he/she may base the claim on duty 
of loyalty.
236
 Hov & Høgberg criticize the above-mentioned by stating that there is no real 
need for a norm of voidableness on grounds of disloyalty. The AvtLo 33§ and 36§ are 
themselves enough, and there is neither need for a broader non-statutory rule than the 
aforementioned ones.
237
 
  A contract may also be revised (avtalerevisjon) or considered invalid (bortfall av avtale) 
on the basis of the duty. According to Nazarian, the revision could be seen both as an obli-
gation and a consequence. As an obligation, a party may be obliged to tolerate a revision of 
contract or have an obligation to re-negotiate. As a consequence, it may actualize when the 
contract has become unreasonable due to disloyalty.
238
 Nazarian describes the liability for 
breaching the duty as a strictly assessed culpa liability (see above section 3. about the risk 
assessment).
239
  
  The compensation of a breach of contract requires that damages have arisen due to dis-
loyal conduct. However, Nazarian also discusses whether it should be possible to award 
compensation for non-economic loss, in order to further enhance the duty. It could be ap-
plied in cases where a breach of the duty can arise, but there are no feasible remedies other 
than compensation. She states that it should be discussed whether there is a need for statu-
tory rules about compensation of non-economic loss, in order to guide the conduct of the 
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parties in a preventive sense (prevensjonshensynet). These norms could be imposed for 
specific contract types.
240
 
  Nazarian discusses the question of (un)predictability of the duty by separating the situa-
tions: a.) where the contract has been established, but there is no conflict yet. b.) The situa-
tion after the conflict has arisen. She considers that in the situation a.) the effects of apply-
ing the duty are still foreseeable. In cases where there is a conflict between a contract pro-
vision and the intention of the parties, one could assess the situation by analyzing what the 
aim and the purpose of the said contract are. She suggests that the assessment must be 
based on the parties’ justified/protected expectations (beskyttelsesverdige forventninger) 
and in commercial context one should be more cautious when going against an explicit 
contract provision. In cases where there is no provision concerning a certain problem, the 
duty still retains a certain amount of predictability through its connection with the common 
sense of justice (rettsoppfatning), which gives the parties a possibility to assess and predict 
how the problem would probably be judged in court. She discusses an example case about 
whether a party should be allowed to form a competing company after first agreeing on 
forming a company with someone else.
241
 
I et slikt tilfelle vil de fleste kontraktsparter innrette seg etter sin egen rettsoppfatning som 
trolig innebærer at den konkurrerende virksomheten ikke er tillatt. [..] Fordi 
rettsoppfatningene blir farget av rettskulturen, og rettskulturen er grunnlaget for 
lojalitetsprinsippet, vil lojalitetsprinsippets innhold i stor grad stemme overens med 
rettsoppfatningene. Partene i det nevnte eksemplet vil defor ha god forutberegnelighet.
242
   
She views this applicable also to a commercial context, since the common sense of justice 
applies to commercial operators as well. In this context, the sense of justice is based on the 
same factors as the general sense of justice but with additions from commercial customs 
and ethics. Since the duty of loyalty also affects the commercial customs and practice, it is 
possible to predict and evaluate how it will be, or could, be applied. Nazarian states that 
the applicability of the common sense of justice in situation b.) is somewhat different, 
since after a conflict has arisen the parties mostly tend to assess their chances of winning 
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the conflict. In this situation, the vagueness of the duty leaves more possibilities for the 
parties to “try their luck” than a clearly regulated norm would.243      
  The duty of loyalty gains emphasis in complex, long-term contracts and co-operation con-
tracts, in which the parties are especially dependent on each other and require mutual trust. 
Such trust is heightened if the parties have previously worked together (e.g. Rt.1995 
p.1460). The co-operation can be considered to give rise for a strict duty of loyalty as a 
secondary obligation, due to the nature of co-operation contracts. Joint ventures, franchis-
ing and partnership-contracts are examples of contracts that rely on co-operation. Nazarian 
states that since partnership-contracts require the parties to collaboratively optimize their 
performances, this creates an even higher demand on loyalty than in normal joint-
adventure contracts. In the case of contracts that aim to aid or protect the contracting part-
ner, such as financial advising, the duty of loyalty can be considered as an important sec-
ondary obligation or even as a part of the primary obligations. In contrast, contracts with 
speculative character are considered to have a lower requirement for loyalty, but without 
completely excluding it.
244
 
  Dalbak advocates a more restrictive sentiment, stating that there are also contracts in 
which the parties should be considered as adversaries. She points out that, for instance, a 
contract about financial options hardly has place for loyalty. In these situations, the prem-
ise should be that the contracting parties are allowed to make choices and therefore invoke 
rights that are established in contract provisions, even if their intentions for doing so could 
be considered disloyal. She is against applying the duty to increase or reduce the flexibility 
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forhold som i kontraktsforhold mellom private parter, i tilfellene hvor kontrakten ikke regulerer 
problemstillingen." 
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tent a concept concerning the drilling rig, which was not disclosed of at the time of the transferring of 
shares. Later, when the patent application was revealed to the OTC it decided to void the contract. The 
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in contracts, and on the whole, to use it in order to assess the reasonableness of contracts. 
Therefore, the duty should be reserved for co-operational contracts and assessing the abuse 
of rights.
245
 It is relevant to note that her article focuses on commercial affairs, which gives 
these statements particular relevance in this study. 
 
4.6. Elements of the duty of loyalty 
 
4.6.1. The duty of loyalty in different phases of a contractual relationship 
 
  The duty of loyalty affects the contractual relationship as a whole. It has various effects in 
its pre-contractual phase, of which the duty to disclose is presumably the most prominent. 
Similar assessments as in the other Nordic countries apply: neglecting to inform the coun-
terparty of relevant facts during the negotiations is considered disloyal. Parties must also 
actively contribute towards the establishment of contract. An interesting example of this is 
the case Rt.2004 p.1256. The case was about the sale of shares of a housing company. The 
closing of the sale required an approval from the seller company´s board of directors. The 
board of directors set certain conditions for the sale which the buyer refused to accept. The 
board then refused to approve the sale. The parties continued negotiations, but later the 
buyer cancelled the contract in writing. After this notification from the buyer, the board 
nevertheless approved the contract on the basis of the negotiations and the solutions of-
fered there. The seller contested the cancellation, and the court declared that the negotia-
tions had proceeded to a point where the buyer could not simply withdraw without first 
giving the seller a chance to work out a solution with the board of directors. The fact that 
the board first refused the approval did not make the contract invalid.
246
 The duty sets a 
seemingly high demand for patience in negotiations, since the buyers actions were consid-
ered disloyal even when the board’s approval came a few days after the buyers’ an-
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nouncement of cancellation. Otherwise, the writers seem to discuss the pre-contractual 
duty in a similar manner as mentioned previously in sections concerning Finland and Swe-
den, such as setting a requirement for disclosure about relevant facts.
247
  
  Simonsen has written his doctoral thesis about the pre-contractual liability. He states that 
the pre-contractual liability can be best described as a duty of loyalty that concerns the 
parties during the contract negotiations. Further, the present-day doctrine of culpa in con-
trahendo can be understood as a subcategory or ramification of the duty of loyalty. The 
central element of the pre-contractual duty of loyalty is its interconnection with the parties 
justified expectations and trust towards a conduct which in a reasonable manner reflects 
the intention to establish contract. For instance, if the contract is considered void, a con-
tracting party who has relied on the contract being established may claim damages on the 
basis of the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo. Simonsen considers this as a manifestation 
of the duty of loyalty.
248
  
  Nazarian does not discuss the non-contractual duty of loyalty in detail, as her study only 
concerns the contractual duty of loyalty. Nevertheless, the evaluation of who can be identi-
fied with the contracting partner can lead to persons closely associated to a party being 
considered as associates of the said contracting party. On the other side, actions such as 
criticizing or competing with the contracting partner’s other contacts, partners or the like, 
would not be a breach of the contractual duty of loyalty. In any case, Nazarian states that 
there is demand for loyalty even between non-contractual parties. Illustrations for such 
demand are the good commercial customs. The duty also has influence on situations con-
cerning (non-contractual) rival pledgees or creditors.
249
 As an example, Falkanger discuss-
es the case 1994 p.775; in short, two pledgees argued whether the prior pledgee could ex-
tend the liability of the pledger so that it harmed the other pledgee. The court saw that on 
the basis of the duty of loyalty the prior pledgee was not allowed to extend the liability.
250
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  After the contractual relationship has ended, most of the obligations caused by the duty 
are no longer in effect. An exception to this is the duty of confidentiality which usually 
loses importance gradually as time passes. Nazarian seems to be reluctant to link the duty 
with post-contractual or contract-external situations and rather views it as a contractual 
duty.
251
 Simonsen states that the loyalty-bond between the parties weakens in proportion to 
the time passed after the phasing-out of the contract. Examples of the post-contractual loy-
alty obligations are the duty of confidentiality and the duty to disclose of relevant facts 
post-contractually. Simonsen also considers it possible for an abuse of a power position, 
which a party has gained in the course of the contractual relationship over the other party, 
to be disloyal.
252
 
 
4.6.2. Obligations stemming from the duty of loyalty 
 
  The notion of the duty of loyalty has been described as a common term for different spe-
cific obligations. The duty may also be seen as a basis for other specific obligations. Naza-
rian, among others, describes these specific obligations as obligations to do, allow or ab-
stain from something, similarly as in an action for declaratory judgment or execution. If 
contracting parties have included the duty explicitly as a contract provision into their con-
tract, this may further lead to the provision being interpreted as grounds for specific obliga-
tions. According to her, when interpreting a contractual provision of loyalty, the starting 
point should be that the parties have not intended to limit the duty considerably more than 
what would be the case with the principle of loyalty in general. Thus, the contract provi-
sion should not be seen as excluding the unwritten duty. Similarly, the unwritten “general” 
duty of loyalty is not excluded from areas of law where the duty of loyalty is for some 
parts statutorily defined. The general duty gives rise to additional obligations along with 
the statutory ones. Nazarian suggests that the assessment of such obligations can be done 
according to the above-described (section 4.3.) minimum requirements for loyal con-
duct.
253
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  Concerning various contract types, Nazarian has discussed franchising contracts in detail, 
stating that aside from general provisions about loyalty in franchise-contracts, the loyalty 
obligations imposed on a franchisee include a prohibition to compete, informing the fran-
chisor of the amount of sales and keeping the franchisors knowhow confidential. Since this 
study is not specifically about franchising, only certain interesting points which the author 
believes to illustrate the duty are mentioned in the following discussion. As for sales con-
tracts, Nazarian considers the duty to disclose as the central obligation, with the obligations 
to notify of damages, mitigate damages and the duty of care in a narrower sense (for the 
object of purchase) also actualizing in some cases.
254
  
 
4.6.2.1. Specific obligations requiring contribution to contract 
 
  The parties are to actively contribute towards the fulfillment of contract (e.g. KjøpsL 
50§). As examples for this, Nazarian mentions the obligation to take possession of goods in 
sales contracts and the obligation to acquire necessary permissions for the activities agreed 
upon in a contract. Contracting parties should strive to remove external hindrances (e.g. 
official permissions and financial matters) to the establishment of contract; abstaining from 
doing so could be considered as disloyal passivity. The above-mentioned case Rt.2004 
p.1256 is an example of a situation, where the parties should have more actively sought to 
contribute towards the establishment of contract. As in the other Nordic countries, the ob-
ligations to take care of the counterparty’s property (KjøpsL 72§ and 73§), to mitigate 
damages (e.g. KjøpsL 70§, 76.2) and norms concerning passivity (AvtLo 4.2 & 6.2) are 
mentioned as part of the duty.
255
  
  Contributing to contract may also require parties to abstain from certain behavior. As in 
Sweden, examples mentioned of this are the duty of confidentiality and the prohibition to 
compete, both of which can arise from the duty of loyalty. Thorsen considers it reasonable 
to expect the parties to conserve confidential information during contract negotiations, 
even when it is not specifically agreed upon. Other examples include abstaining from can-
celling a contract and publicly insulting ones counterparty. As mentioned above, since 
Nazarian states that the negative effects must be linked to a contract, criticizing one’s con-
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tracting partner should also be relevantly linked to the contractual relationship to be con-
sidered disloyal. Nazarian states that in sales contracts there is no obligation to completely 
abstain from criticizing the contracting partner, even between professionals. The limits for 
such actions come from good commercial customs. Aside from abstaining from actions, 
parties may have to endure certain actions, such as contract adjustments.
256
 
  Franchising-business requires co-operation, which might limit the contracting parties’ 
actions more than in normal sales contracts. The franchisee may for instance seek to criti-
cize the franchisor. Such critique may be considered disloyal, although in relation to her 
minimum requirements for loyalty Nazarian notes that the required negative effects should 
be prominent. Minor negative effects for the franchisor are not enough to make the conduct 
disloyal. Justified criticism (“whistleblowing”) should not be considered disloyal, and the 
loyalty-requirement should always be balanced against the freedom of speech. Nazarian 
has discussed franchisee-loyalty concerning negative statements against the franchisor in 
great detail, which illustrates the meaning of the problem, but it is not feasible to thorough-
ly describe this analysis here.
257
  
  Concerning other obligations in franchising, Nazarian states that in franchise-agreements 
the franchisor is subjected to a prohibition to give competing franchising rights for third 
parties. This is, in itself, based on the duty of loyalty, so it is not necessary for the franchi-
see to specifically inform the franchisor of this. In general, establishing a competing com-
pany may be disloyal, if the act is done against or at the expense of the contract partner. 
Concerning the requisite of negative effect, Nazarian considers competing with one’s con-
tracting partner during the franchising relationship disloyal, even if it does not harm the 
profits of the partner. This is due to the requirement of trust in franchising. After the con-
tractual relationship has ended, such trust is not required anymore, and thus the competi-
tion will have to cause direct harm for the franchisor’s profits to be considered disloyal. 
Nazarian adds that post-contractual situations should be assessed on the grounds of 
markedsføringsloven, not on the duty of loyalty. Therefore, the duty should not be seen as 
a normative basis (selvstendig rettsgrunnlag) for a prohibition to compete in post-
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contractual situations. Still, the premise should be that the franchisee is not allowed to 
practice competition with the franchisor during the franchise-contract period.
258
 
Det aller viktigeste argumentet mot konkurrerende virksomhet er imidlertid 
franchisekontraktens karakter – at franchisegiver selger sin knowhow og gir franchisetaker 
tilgang til allerede etablert konsept. For at en slik kontraktstype skal kunne fungere, er der 
avgjørende at franchisegivers knowhow ikke blir misbrukt. [..] Franchisegivers interesse i at 
franchisetaker avstår fra konkurrerende virksomhet er dermed mer tungtveiende enn 
franchisetakers behov for handlefrihet. For franchising må det derfor opereres med et 
utgangspunkt om at franchisetaker ikke kan drive konkurrerende virksomhet.
259
 
 
4.6.2.2. The duty to disclose and inform 
 
  According to writers in Norwegian jurisprudence, an obligation to disclose can be based 
on certain individual statutes, the AvtLo 33§ or the (non-statutory) duty of loyalty. There 
are some specific statutory norms of the duty to disclose, and they usually necessitate that 
the required information is essential for the contract. One must assess how much benefit 
certain information would bring for one’s contracting partner, but knowingly giving false 
information is always disloyal. Some norms are also partially based on a loyalty-
assessment, such as those concerning notification of damages (reklamasjon). Nevertheless, 
Nazarian views it somewhat dubious to place the obligation to notify amongst the loyalty 
obligations. Finally, as usual the duty to perform necessary investigations acts as the coun-
terpoint for the duty to disclose.
260
  
Det sentrale ved at informasjon gis, er at lojalitetssubjektet opprettholder tilliten i 
kontraktsforholdet på grunn av åpenheten. Dette gjør seg gjeldende i alle kontraktsforholdet 
hvor tillit er av betydning.
261
 
  Informing promotes openness in contractual relationships. As long as the contracting 
partner has all relevant information, he/she can of course consent to actions that would 
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otherwise be disloyal. Economic investments made before closing a contract increase the 
importance of actually establishing the contract and because of this, the obligation to dis-
close gains significance during contract negotiations in order to prevent unnecessary in-
vestments. Owing to the duty to disclose, the parties have better possibilities to assess risks 
of their investments. As a more specific example of the duty, Nazarian mentions the obli-
gation to warn (frarådningsplikt). She describes it as being mostly applicable in situations 
where a party offers counsel for the other.
262
 Simonsen mentions a relatively similar duty 
to give prior notice (varslingssplikt) for the contracting partner about one’s intended ac-
tions which would affect the contractual relationship drastically (e.g. cancellation of con-
tract, KjøpsL 39.2). Another example of an obligation to give notice could be a situation 
during far-advanced contract negotiations, where one of the parties begins or has begun 
similar negotiations with a third party.
263
 
  As in the other Nordic countries, the paragraphs 19§ (goods sold “as they are”), 17.2 
(quality of goods) and 20§ (buyer’s bad faith) of kjøpsloven are discussed in conjunction 
with the duty of loyalty and used as comparative material for defining the obligation to 
inform that is based on the non-statutory duty of loyalty. Unlike in the Swedish Köplag 
17§, the Norwegian law does not explicitly state that a deviation from the buyer’s justified 
expectations would be considered as a non-conformity, but Nazarian states that such ex-
pectation are relevant for the assessment of conformity.
264
  
  Nazarian summarizes the criteria for disclosing during the establishment of contract 
(avtaleinngåelse) based on the non-statutory duty of loyalty as: a seller is to disclose a 
buyer of a fact concerning the object of purchase that he/she knew or should have known 
and that the buyer could rely to be informed of, in so far as the information can be of rele-
vance to their contract. The information must therefore be linked to the contract, have af-
fected the sale of goods and caused a risk of negative effects. The reprehensibility aspect 
comes into play in that the party must have acted negligently, meaning that he/she knew or 
should have known about the need to inform the other party. Thus, the seller must inform 
the buyer when he/she has a concrete and reasonable doubt that there might be a flaw in 
the object of purchase. The buyer has a duty to investigate the object, but Nazarian states 
that the seller’s duty to disclose takes precedence over the buyer’s duty to investigate in 
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situations where the seller has disloyally neglected to disclose. Similar points of view also 
apply to the disclosing during the contractual relationship, with the exception that the re-
quired negative effects may vary more.
265
   
Selgers opplysningsplikt går imidlertid foran kjøperens undersøkelsesplikt, jf. kjøpsloven § 
20 andre ledd. Dersom det var illojalt å unnlate å gi opplysninger, vil det ikke ha betydning 
at kjøper har mislighold undersøkelsesplikten.
266
 
  A seller may likewise have to disclose legal facts that are relevant for the use of the object 
of purchase; especially, when the object is a target to specific norms that the buyer might 
not be familiar with. In any case, the seller does not have to disclose his/her knowledge of 
the market situation or expectations for the future. The parties should be able to reasonably 
use their information-advantage, and if the contract is by its nature a speculative affair be-
tween professional actors, disclosure is usually not needed. Though in some cases, it is 
possible that the facts that the future expectations are based upon need to be disclosed of, 
even though the expectations themselves need not to be disclosed of. As an example, Naza-
rian mentions the case Rt.1919 p.494, which was about the sale of the shares of a ship 
(skipsaksjer). The seller of shares knew that the company’s only ship had suffered an acci-
dent, which was something that could and would probably affect the value of the shares in 
future.
267
  
  Also a buyer can have the obligation to disclose relevant information. Premise for this 
assessment is the same as with sellers’ obligation. If a buyer has information that the seller 
could expect to be disclosed of, then neglecting the disclosure can be considered disloyal. 
An example of this could be a sale of a piece of art, where the buyer knows that the object 
is remarkably more valuable than the seller thinks. Aside from that, the fact whether a buy-
er should disclose information about his/her financial state has also been discussed in 
Norway. According to Nazarian, in accordance with the minimum requirement the relevant 
question is whether such information could have affected the contract (e.g. Rt.1987 p.1205, 
in which the buyers obligation to disclose information was dismissed, since it had not af-
fected the establishment of the contract). A similar assessment of effects may be eminently 
                                                          
265
 Nazarian 2007 pp.362-366. Nazarian states that there is no need for direct losses; the risk of negative 
effects is enough, ibid. p.366: "Det kreves dermed ikke umiddelbart økonomisk tap eller fare for tap. Det 
følger av  dommen [Rt.1995 p.1460] at det er tilstrekkelig at adferden er egnet til å skape risiko for negative 
effekt." ibid. p.368, 370, 530. 
266
 Nazarian 2007 p.375. 
267
 Nazarian 2007 p.377: "[På denne bagrunn] mener jeg at selger som utgangspunkt har risikoen for 
kjennskap til lover og forskrifter." ibid. pp.378-380 
80 
 
relevant in franchising contracts, since a franchisor would most likely be hindered or una-
ble to perform accordingly if he/she were insolvent.
268
   
  Simonsens has also discussed the topic of disclosing during contract negotiations. First 
and foremost, a party has to inform the other party if he/she has no more intentions of es-
tablishing contract. Letting the negotiating partner rely on a vain expectation of establish-
ing contract is disloyal conduct. On the other side, facts concerning general risk develop-
ments (e.g. market or trade branch developments) are generally not included in the duty to 
disclose. The risks would have to be more specific for the duty to arise. One such case is 
that the risks are unforeseeable for the other party. Other such possible specific risks are 
troubles in getting financing for the contract’s objective and a requirement of an official’s 
permission. Simonsen considers it disloyal not to inform the other party of one’s imminent 
insolvency. In case of misinformation, one must assess whether the information motivated 
the other party to act in a way that caused losses for him/her. Aside from this, the infor-
mation must not have been presented as uncertain or speculation. Therefore, a requirement 
of causality between the misinformation and the actions is requited. An example would be 
a situation, where a party had invested funds based on the thought that the contract will be 
established.
269
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5. Denmark 
 
5.1. The legal basis of the duty of loyalty 
 
  Henry Ussing is mentioned as the first in Denmark to mention of an obligation of the con-
tracting parties to consider each other’s interests. The inspiration for this is said to have 
come from the German doctrine (BGB § 242). It should be reminded that many Danish 
writers refer to Norwegian cases and authors (and vice versa). Jens Evald for instance men-
tions Stang and Knoph in his description concerning the history of the duty. Therefore, the 
facts and opinions that have been stated concerning the Norwegian doctrine can be consid-
ered (at least for some parts) applicable to the Danish doctrine.
270
 However, this section of 
the study will only cover the opinions of Danish writers. 
  The duty of loyalty is defined similarly in the Danish legal doctrine as in the other Nordic 
countries, that is to say, that there are some specific statutory norms which constitute spe-
cific obligations (e.g. norms of Købeloven, Sale of Goods Act, KBL and Handelsagentur-
loven 5§), which are then seen as expressions of a more general duty of loyalty. This gen-
eral duty is an unwritten principle of law. There are also some court cases in which the 
Supreme Court expressly refers to loyalty or applies argumentation which could be consid-
ered as being based on the duty of loyalty. (UfR 1981.300 H, in which there is a mention 
of a requirement for loyal conduct, UfR 1995.366 H: “[..] efter den almindelige kon-
traktsretlige grundsætning om pligt til loyal hensyntagen til den anden parts interesser 
[..]”).271  
 
5.2. Definitions for the duty of loyalty 
 
   Since there is no doctoral thesis written about the duty in Denmark, the descriptions 
about the duty in legal literature are not that detailed. The authors usually describe the in-
dividual aspects of loyalty e.g. disclosure, but then settle for stating that the duty is vague. 
In any case, the general description of the duty is the same as in the other Nordic countries 
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([..] det påhviler hver part at tage rimeligt gensyn til den anden parts interesser). The duty 
is considered to give rise to specific obligations to look after and take care of the counter-
party’s interests, such as to prevent and mitigate damages, when the other party is hindered 
from doing so him/herself. Gomard states that it is not possible to give an exhaustive ex-
planation concerning the existence of individual loyalty obligations and their exact mean-
ing.
272
 
  Further, the duty is described as a secondary obligation (biforpligtelse) which plays a part 
in all contracts as an obligatory obligation (naturalia negotii). Therefore, the parties cannot 
exclude the duty from their contracts. Evald remarks that such terms as “loyal conduct” 
(loyal adfærd) and “loyal interests” (loyal interesse) are used by some authors in the con-
text of the sale of goods. However, he considers that the said terms do not really have an 
independent legal meaning. Even the terms used to describe the duty of loyalty vary from 
author to author.
273
 
Loyalitetspligten er beskrevet som en “tanke”, et “princip”, en “grundsætning", en 
"retningslinie" og en "regel."
274
  
  Evald also evaluates the criteria of the duty of loyalty presented by Thorsen (see Norway 
4.2.). He states that the criterion of reprehensibility is left somewhat unclear, since Thorsen 
does not explicitly define whether it is supposed to be subjective (the contracting party 
should have him/herself understood that his/her conduct is disloyal) or objective (the con-
duct can in general be considered disloyal). Otherwise, he seems to consider the criteria 
adequate for assessing whether a conduct is disloyal and approves of them if the criterion 
of reprehensibility is assessed in accordance with the objective meaning. However, he con-
siders it problematic if the culpa assessment in general becomes too much bound to a loy-
alty-standard.
275
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5.3. The duty of loyalty in relation to other principles and norms 
 
  The relationship between the duty of loyalty and the principle of the prohibition of the 
abuse of rights has been under discussion in Denmark. Gomard discusses this interrelation-
ship, describing the prohibition as a mirrored form of the requirement to consider the con-
tracting partner’s interests. Rights that the contract bestows upon a contracting party are to 
be used in a reasonable fashion.
276
 Evald, who has written his doctoral thesis about the 
doctrine of the abuse of rights, views the doctrine as an institute of law that limits the use 
of subjective rights. By contrast, the duty of loyalty is more about setting certain require-
ments for contracting parties (e.g. to act in a specific i.e. loyal fashion). He points out that 
the duty of loyalty only applies to contract law, whereas the prohibition of the abuse of 
rights influences the whole sphere of private law (formueretten). Even if acts of chicanery 
are considered disloyal, one gains nothing by categorizing it or the other elements of the 
doctrine of the abuse of rights under the duty of loyalty. Evald suggests that it would be 
better to detach such elements of the abuse of rights that were earlier discussed under the 
concept of loyalty, and to place these elements under the independent concept of the rule of 
the abuse of rights.
277
  
  As one might expect, the closeness of the principle of reasonableness (and the Contracts 
Act, AftL, 36§) with the duty is mentioned in Danish texts. Andersen & Madsen state, 
however, that 36§ should not be seen as a direct codification for the duty.
278
 It should ra-
ther be considered as an “expression” or a “manifestation” (udtryk) of the duty.279 The 
AftL 36§ has at times been applied alongside the duty in order to justify resolutions in 
court practice. In the reasoning of the case UfR 1981.300 H, the Supreme Court referred to 
“loyalty” as well as to 36§. The reasoning of the court was said to be based on a broader 
assessment of the norms of contract law, court practice and 36§. This means that the reso-
lution is not directly or solely based on 36§ and that the duty also played a role in the as-
sessment of the case. Evald states, in concerning the influence of the duty (and referring 
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also to Jo Hovs assessment), that it is uncertain whether the duty could be invoked as a sole 
reason for voidableness of contract or if the assessment of voidableness is based on the 
statutory norms of the AftL and the duty only affects the interpretation of the aforemen-
tioned norms.
280
  
 
5.4. Functions of the duty of loyalty 
 
  Several writers consider the duty of loyalty as a sign of a social-oriented view of law. As 
in the other Nordic countries, the functions of preventing the abuse of rights and strength-
ening co-operation between contracting parties are mentioned as important purposes of the 
duty. The requirement of loyalty is said to bring more nuances and flexibility to contract-
ing, especially in partnering contracts in which the contract can be described as more of a 
guideline for striving towards a common goal.
281
 Similarly as in Finland and particularly in 
the works of Taxell, Madsen describes the recent development the duty as a sign that the 
contract is being viewed more as co-operation of the parties. The duty also upholds and 
promotes trust between the contracting parties.
282
 Evald mentions the duty as an example 
of reasonableness and bona fides-type of thinking: 
I det retvidenskabelige litteratur er der bred neighed om, at kontraktparternes pligt til at vise 
hinanden hensyn hviler på bona fides, rimeliged of billighed.
283
 
  Aside from these mentions, the author has not come across more specific descriptions 
about the functions of the duty. The general descriptions of the functions seem to be quite 
similar as in the other countries, especially concerning the trust aspect. Evald’s description 
mostly compares and defines it in relation to the prohibition of abuse of rights. Since the 
duty of loyalty supplements contracts and is considered as a naturalia negotii, it is also 
delimits the contracting freedom of the parties and functions in supplementing and com-
plementing the contract when the parties have neglected to agree about something or inten-
tionally left it incomplete.
284
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5.5. Application in contracts and consequences of disloyal conduct 
 
  The duty gives rise to obligations that were not explicitly agreed upon in the contract. The 
influence of the duty and consequences for violating it are described in a similar fashion as 
in the other Nordic countries (liability for damages, cancellation of contract, interpretation, 
and supplementing of contract: UfR 1982.4 H, see below 5.6.2.1, etc.).
285
 Andersen & 
Madsen state that a neglect in disclosing during contract negotiations may lead to the con-
tract being considered void, most probably on the basis of AftL 36§. The duty may also 
directly cause an alteration in the obligations of contracting parties and the legal effects of 
their contract. An example of this is the case UfR 1981.300 H, where a lessee had taken a 
loan from a lessor and given a promissory note secured by a pledge (skadesløsbrev) as a 
guarantee. This note later hampered the use of the property for the lessee, so the lessee 
asked to swap the note for a bank guarantee. The lessor refused this. The Supreme Court 
then later decreed that the lessor must accept the offered bank guarantee, since there was 
no loyal reason (loyal grund) to refuse the swap. The conduct of the lessor was described 
as chicanery. The decision was said not to be directly based on 36§, but rather on a more 
“broader” assessment of the rules of contract law. Andersen & Madsen state that this illus-
trates how the duty affects the validity of contracts. A party must have “loyal” grounds for 
refusing a reasonable alteration of the contract. The assessment of contract is not solely 
based on what a party has promised to do or abstain from doing in the contract terms.
286
  
Konsekvensen af dommen [..] synes imidlertid at være, at loyalitetskravet i kontraksretten 
kan rumme en egentlig modification til reglen i aftalelovens § 1, jf. DL 5-1-1, om, at man er 
bundet af, hvad man har lovet.
287
 
  Aside from a possible obligation to tolerate reasonable changes to contract, an obligation 
to clearly notify one’s contracting partner of a refusal to change the contract according to 
the other party´s wishes has been described as part of loyal conduct. This exemplifies again 
the relation of the duty with passivity sanctions. Another possible application of the duty 
due to changed circumstances is that it could be considered disloyal to invoke a certain 
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contract provision (UfR 1981.295 H). In broad terms, the aforementioned cases concern 
the question of abusing contract obligations. 
288
 
 
5.6. Elements of the duty of loyalty 
 
5.6.1. The duty of loyalty in different phases of a contractual relationship 
 
   The influence of the duty makes its way into contracts gradually. It affects contractual 
relationships from negotiations to the time after the contractual relationship. As one would 
expect, the Danish contract law acknowledges the concept of culpa in contrahendo. Ander-
sen describes its application as strict with the emphasis on the norms nature as an excep-
tion to the general rule. The premise for applying culpa in contrahendo should be that acts 
constituting culpa in contrahendo require an evident breach of right, such as chicanery or 
clear infringement of the rules of contract negotiations.
289
 As in the other Nordic countries, 
during the contract negotiations the parties may have duties to disclose information and 
abstain from disloyal competition that could harm the negotiating partner.
290
  
  Like in the other Nordic countries, there are mentions of loyalty obligation that might still 
be in effect after the contractual relationship has ended. Especially the previous co-
operation of the parties might generate loyalty obligations which stay in effect for some 
time after the contractual relationship. As one might expect from the previous chapters of 
this study, the prohibition to compete and the duty of confidentiality are mentioned as such 
obligations.
291
 The contract-external duty does not appear to have been discussed much in 
the literature. There are mentions of situations where the duty does not apply. Andersen 
states that there is no loyalty requirement for creditors who seek to realize their monetary 
claim. A creditor is allowed to seek the best possible means to realize his/her claim over 
other creditors.
292
 This seems to be contrary to what has been described in the section 6.1 
concerning Norway (see case Rt. 1994 p.775). 
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5.6.2. Obligations stemming from the duty of loyalty 
 
  As in most other Nordic countries, the duty of loyalty is considered to give rise to more 
specific obligations. The individual statutory obligations are described as expressing and/or 
embodying the duty of loyalty.
293
 Evald seems to consider the non-codified duty of loyalty 
as being at least somewhat separate from statutory loyalty-norms. He states that as the duty 
becomes more codified into the legislation, the sphere of the non-statutory duty becomes 
more limited. As for example in the context of the sale of goods, the statutory norms of 
Købeloven have been defined during the law-drafting process by assessing the interests of 
contracting parties in general. Because the definitions of these norms are mostly clear and 
firmly established, it is not strictly necessary to refer to them as loyalty obligations. Evald 
considers it on the whole better to have a certain fixed group of loyalty obligations which 
are statutorily defined (mainly in Købeloven). This would be more in accordance with the 
interests of trade and legal security (predictableness) than a vague and broad duty of loyal-
ty. Evald considers (at the time the doctoral thesis was written) that there is at least some 
amount of unwillingness in legal doctrine to apply the duty of loyalty in the context of the 
sale of goods and commercial law. He also point out that there might be an inconsistency 
between the opinions of legal doctrine and the court practice. With the case UfR 1997.974 
H the Supreme Court might have sharpened the loyalty requirements set to contracting 
parties in the sphere of the sale of goods and commercial law. Evald points out, however, 
that this interpretation of the case is uncertain.
294
 
  Evald is generally skeptic towards the use of loyalty-based terminology. He considers the 
formulation of the general duty of loyalty as circular reasoning, since it is based on induc-
tive reasoning that conceives individual (loyalty) obligations as being derived from the 
general duty of loyalty. He thinks that the meaning and the extent of these individual obli-
gations can be more adequately described without the concept of loyalty. The use of loyal-
ty-terminology also indicates a tendency among authors to confuse certain obligations’ 
content with the justification of their content.
295
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5.6.2.1. Specific obligations requiring contribution to contract 
 
  As usual, the duty to mitigate damages is considered to be a loyalty obligation (KBL 33§ 
and 35§ are mentioned as examples for this). The parties must reasonably consider each 
other’s interests which gives rise to an obligation to prevent and mitigate damages that 
would fall on the contracting partner when the partner is unable to prevent such damages 
him/herself. The passivity norms of AftL 4.2 and 6.2 are mentioned in conjunction to the 
duty of loyalty, as are the duty of confidentiality and the sellers’ duty to care for goods 
during a delay caused by a buyer. If a party has a certain right to make a choice (e.g. which 
debt to pay off), the choice should be done by taking the other party’s interests into consid-
eration.
296
  
  Disloyal competition is also mentioned, e.g. in case a party confidentially gains infor-
mation of counterparty’s customers or products. An example of disloyal competition is 
presented in the case 1982.4 H which was about a publishing contract. An author had made 
a deal with a publisher for publishing books about health and diet(s). Later, the author 
wrote several articles about the same topics to a weekly magazine. The articles were later 
published by the magazine in a book-form. The publisher then successfully sued the author 
as well as the magazine. The court held that the publishing contract, even without an ex-
plicit provision, contained a prohibition for the author to publish books which would cause 
unfair competition with the previous publisher’s books. The contract was therefore sup-
plemented with the prohibition to compete that was considered as being implicitly agreed 
upon in the contract.
297
 
 
5.6.2.2. The duty to disclose and inform 
 
  The norms requiring disclosure about the object of purchase have been described as a part 
of the more general doctrine of loyal disclosure. As mentioned already in chapters concern-
ing the other countries, sellers are to inform buyers about relevant facts concerning the 
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object of purchase, which the seller knew or should have known. The liability for absent 
disclosure is described as being either culpa or dereliction. Unless the seller fulfills his/her 
duty to loyally disclose information, the object of purchase is viewed as flawed. Gomard 
uses the term “loyale oplysningspligt” for this obligation.298 At this point of the study the 
existence of this obligation does not come as a surprise, but there are also other definitions 
for the duty to disclose. Andersen speaks of a duty of diligence (diligenspligt) in the con-
text of commercial contracts. As one would expect, it sets a requirement for the contracting 
parties to disclose of relevant facts. He also mentions the notification of damages (reclama-
tion) as one of loyalty obligations. Disclosing estimations about the future of a trade 
branch is not required (UfR 2001.1293 H).
299
 Madsen mentions the notification of damages 
and unforeseen events, the loyal disclosure, and pointing out surprising and harsh terms of 
a standard contract as loyalty obligations.
300
 Since all of the aforementioned obligations 
have already been discussed in the previous chapters, there is no need to repeat their defini-
tions. 
  David Moalem has analyzed the duty of loyal disclosure (loyale oplysningsplikt) in more 
detail. He views the norms concerning disclosure and withholding information as having a 
common legal foundation that is the duty of loyal disclosure. He describes this duty as 
comprising of the following: the doctrine of voidableness (aftaleretlige ugyldighedslære), 
parts of the doctrine of default (misligholdelseslære) and restitution due to culpa in contra-
hendo. It is also a common frame of reference for assessing the meaning of a contracting 
party’s neglect of disclosure in accordance with the AftL 30§, 33§ and 36§, the doctrine of 
presuppositions (forudsætningslære) and sellers’ duty to disclose. All of the aforemen-
tioned norms, which aim to prevent the abuse of informational asymmetry, can be seen as 
codifications of the general duty of (loyal) disclosure. Moalem further states that the re-
quirements for liability due to a breach of the duty are that: 1.) the information that was 
withheld must have been decisive (bestemmende) for the other party and 2.) the party 
withholding information must have acted negligently. In case of unsure information (e.g. 
risks) one must objectively assess how probable it is for some events to occur, and what 
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kind of influence they would have on the contractual relationship. This means that a con-
tracting party must disclose of highly probable and decisive events. Furthermore, if an 
event is not that probable, but it would be highly influential on the contractual relationship, 
then it must be disclosed of.
301
 
  In discussing the more specific elements of disclosure, Moalem states that for withhold-
ing information to be disloyal, one must also assess the type of the information in question. 
Information about the performance required by the contract is usually encompassed by the 
duty of loyalty. Of course, there are some exceptions to this. As a rule, contracting parties 
do not need to disclose information that is generally available for everyone. If the infor-
mation is considered internal, so that it is available only to one of the parties, then the party 
in question should share this information. Naturally, trade secrets are not encompassed by 
the duty, although there might be some exceptions to this, especially if the holder of the 
information would gain an unreasonable advantage (see Moalem pp.138-139 for more de-
tails). The contracting parties are not required to give information about their motives for 
taking part in the contract, (e.g. purchasing an item). Neither is there an obligation to dis-
close information about the market situation or conditions, which means that e.g. the seller 
does not have to inform the buyer that an item can be purchased cheaper elsewhere. Parties 
are also allowed to benefit from their commercial skills and experience. Aside from the 
aforementioned facts, Moalem states that an express violation of the duty of loyalty can 
cause the duty to disclose to arise even when such obligation would not normally exist.
302
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6. The comparative analysis 
 
 This chapter is dedicated for comparing the various aspects of the duty of loyalty in Nor-
dic law. The structure of this analysis will be the same as with the individual countries be-
fore, and the author seeks to fit all relevant material under the same topics as they were 
discussed in the earlier chapters. This, however, is not always possible, since the different 
aspects overlap and blur at some points. Because of this, there are some references that 
point to different chapters than the one being discussed. To prevent repetition, the ideas 
presented by various authors will only be referred to by their names and sometimes with a 
short description. References to the individual chapters, where one can find the whole de-
scriptions, will be given in brackets.  
  The idea of this chapter is to compare the various definitions and discussions concerning 
the duty of loyalty. First and foremost, the author will analyze definitions and elements of 
the duty and discuss whether individual authors agree or disagree about them. Besides this, 
the author will also deliberate if it is possible to find differences on national levels. It is 
interesting to see if one can discover national differences in the interpretation of the duty, 
but such generalizations should always be treated with caution. The author reminds that 
such generalizations are more or less the authors’ estimations, and they are done on the 
basis of the source material used in this study.  
 
6.1. The legal basis of the duty of loyalty 
 
  The (general) duty of loyalty is a non-statutory legal principle and norm in all Nordic 
countries. Nevertheless, all these countries have one or more statutory norms which in 
some way explicitly constitute an obligation of loyal conduct towards the contracting part-
ner, usually in laws concerning commercial agents. There are also mentions of the duty in 
certain law-drafting documents.
303
 One could therefore state that a general idea of loyalty is 
accepted and acknowledged by legislators as a part of contract law in all of the countries, 
even though there is no general statutory norm for it, unlike in case of the principle of rea-
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sonableness/fairness (i.e. 36§ of the Contract Acts). This is not to say, however, that the 
duty of loyalty would be statutorily acknowledged. Some authors in jurisprudence consider 
certain norms as “manifestations” or “expressions” of the duty of loyalty, especially par-
ticular norms of the Trade Act(s). These will be discussed in detail below. In any case, the 
most relevant matter for the subject of this study is of course the attention which the duty 
has gained in jurisprudence and court practice.  
  There is no doubt that authors in jurisprudence nowadays acknowledge the duty of loyal-
ty as one of the rules of contract law. There are some differences as to when the acknowl-
edgment is said to have taken place. Naturally, it is impossible to give exact answers, as 
the duty is considered to have existed in some form already in Roman law. In Finland, 
most authors refer to Taxell’s writings from the 1970´s as the first ones to give the duty a 
detailed description and an important place in the law of contract. Also, many writers in 
the other Nordic countries refer to Taxell’s works as well, so one could say that they have 
retained their relevance to this day (see footnote 11). Interestingly, Taxell’s views still 
seem to represent a broader conception of the duty than the views of some more recent 
authors. This will be discussed in more detail below.  
  There are some mentions of the duty already around the 1930´s in Norway and Denmark, 
e.g. in the work of Stang and Ussing. In these countries the German rule of Treu und Glau-
ben (BGB 242§) is often mentioned as a source for inspiration for the duty. The duty was 
acknowledged especially early in Norway, and it probably has the broadest acceptance in 
Norwegian doctrine.
304
 An indicium for this is the fact that the (Norwegian) doctoral thesis 
by Lasse Simonsen from 1997 puts a rather heavy emphasis on loyalty argumentation. In 
addition, Nazarian describes the duty as having a strong support in legal literature.  
  In case of Sweden, the duty seems to have been adopted later into the doctrine of contract 
law than in the other Nordic countries. As Munukka and Holm have stated, the duty did not 
become widely accepted until towards the end of 20
th
 century. The publication dates of the 
source material used in this study indicate that this was the time when the duty became 
somewhat broadly discussed in all of the Nordic countries. Nowadays, one can say that the 
situation has changed as there are several doctoral theses written about the duty in Sweden. 
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At the moment, it would seem that the Swedish writers are heading the discussion about 
the duty. 
  The Supreme Court practices in the Nordic countries seem to acknowledge the duty of 
loyalty. All of the countries court practices feature resolutions which refer to the duty, alt-
hough their context and subject matter varies (e.g. KKO 1993:130, NJA 1990 p.264, 
Rt.2004 p.1256, UfR 1995.366 H). There are some court resolutions which do not explicit-
ly mention the duty, but they contain argumentation which some authors have interpreted 
as being based on the duty (e.g. 3.1 Munukka, see also footnote 112, 4.5 Rt.1995 p.1460). 
It seems to the author that the Supreme Court practice concerning the duty is especially 
pronounced in Norway. In contrast, the Supreme Court of Sweden has been described as 
being reluctant to apply the duty of loyalty and mention it in its reasoning. Aside from this, 
there are also some dissenting views in Swedish jurisprudence (also in Finland) as to 
whether the duty can be used as an independent principle to justify resolutions. This will be 
discussed in more detail below (6.5).   
  It would seem that the court practice in Finland is somewhere in between these two oppo-
sites. The duty is generally considered as being acknowledged by the Supreme Court, alt-
hough it would seem that the Court has begun to apply the duty later than in Norway. As 
there is no Danish doctoral thesis about the duty, the author has some difficulties in decid-
ing where to place Denmark regarding the court practices. Since the case UfR 1981.300 H 
is often mentioned in conjunction with the duty of loyalty, one might consider it as a start-
ing point for its usage in court practice, although one might also be assuming too much. All 
in all, it is not that relevant in which country the duty was applied first. In summary, as a 
general principle of law the duty of loyalty has mostly been developed through jurispru-
dence and court practice in all of the Nordic countries. As Nazarian states, it could be also 
be seen as a part of the Nordic legal culture (kulturarv, see 4.1). 
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6.2. Definitions for the duty of loyalty 
 
6.2.1. Superordinate concepts above the duty of loyalty 
 
  The nucleus of this study is to analyze how the duty of loyalty is defined and how it can 
be applied to commercial contracts. As stated above, the standard definition of the duty is 
generally the same in all of the countries (see part 6.2.2). Nevertheless, many authors criti-
cize and disparage the duty for its vagueness. This is understandable, since the general def-
inition leaves the concrete meaning of the duty rather impalpable and challenging to fath-
om. Therefore, the following discussion will mostly concern the more detailed descriptions 
of this general notion. The portrayal of the discussion (and the debate) concerning the defi-
nition(s) of the duty will proceed as follows: the author will start from the broadest sphere 
of definition(s) and narrow the scope of the analysis towards the end. This means that the 
approach is to start systematically from the “top layer-definitions” and work towards the 
narrowest definition available.  
  First of all, the topmost level the duty has been discussed on, by the authors mentioned in 
this study, is the one concerning the major developments and trends of the law of contracts. 
An example of this discussion is the doctoral thesis of Votinius concerning the (philosoph-
ical) relationship between the friendship-paradigm and the opponent-paradigm (3.1). The 
friendship-paradigm concerns roughly speaking a similar idea mentioned by Taxell (2.1, 
among others) that contracts are to be seen as co-operation of the contracting parties. The 
question is to what extent the contracting parties should be seen as adversaries and to what 
extent as partners in co-operation.
305
 The concept of loyalty is a central element in this dis-
cussion.
306
 Since this study is about legal dogmatics and not about philosophy, the said 
discussion will not be described in detail. The second broadest definitions would probably 
be the two mentioned by Björne (2.2). The distinction between the general level and the 
concrete level of loyalty divides the duty into a philosophy of law perspective and a legal 
dogmatic perspective. The general level is similar to the friendship-paradigm. The con-
crete, legal dogmatic level of the duty inspects the obligations that the duty bestows upon 
the contracting parties. Therefore, the following study inspects this concrete aspect of the 
duty and seeks to define it further.  
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  The second broadest level of definition would most likely be the notion of the require-
ment of loyalty (lojalitetskrav) devised by Munukka (3.3.). It is defined as a superordinate 
term that is above the notions of the prohibition of the abuse of rights, the duty of loyalty 
and the norms of reasonableness/fairness. Due to the difficulties in defining the duty in 
relation to the aforementioned legal aspects (which will be discussed further in 6.3), the 
requirement of loyalty seems to be an attempt to solve this issue by giving the individual 
norms a common “background-concept.” The requirement would make it less necessary to 
define the abuse of rights as either part of the duty of loyalty or the other way around etc. 
As such, it might make it possible to keep the said concepts separate and defined, without 
losing the element of loyalty that links these concepts. The material used in this study does 
not present any other attempts to construct a similar superordinate term, which means there 
are no other concepts to compare it to. 
  It can be noted, however, that Karhu considers the duty as having less influence in the 
system of contract law than the principle of reasonableness and the protection of the weak-
er party, which might be considered problematic if one seeks to superimpose loyalty in 
relation to reasonableness (2.2). In his own analysis concerning the system of the law of 
contract, Karhu mentions loyalty under the topic of acts contrary to good morals (contra 
bonos mores) and bona fides, which implies it having a less pronounced place in the sys-
tem.
307
 Not regarding this, in itself the requirement of loyalty seems to be a feasible way to 
approach the problem of defining interrelationship between the above-mentioned concepts. 
Nevertheless, as the study will also later point out, it is disputed whether loyalty should 
have such a broad interpretation.  
 
6.2.2. The definitions for the concrete duty of loyalty  
 
  The third level is the actual definition of the duty of loyalty: the contracting parties must 
consider each other’s reasonable interests and expectations, (without unreasonably risking 
their own). On a general level, most authors define the duty as: 1.) a principle of law and/or 
2.) a legal standard 3.) an unwritten rule 4.) a reciprocal obligation 5.) a secondary obliga-
tion 6.) an obligatory obligation which the parties may not exclude from their contract 
(naturalia negotii) 7.) an editable obligation, meaning that the parties may further define 
                                                          
307
 Pöyhönen 2000 p.99, 117 
96 
 
what they consider disloyal in their contractual relationship. The aforementioned aspects 
appear in virtually all of the countries inspected in this study (see the chapters concerning 
the definitions) and it would seem that most authors, who approve of the duty, accept them. 
Other individual descriptions of the duty are: a norm of exception (Munukka 3.2), a princi-
ple of natural law (Nazarian 4.1), and a complex principle (Karhu 2.4). Further, some au-
thors emphasize the duty as an ethic principle (i.a. Holm 3.1, Taxell 2.1) Lehtinen has di-
vided the duty’s general definition into a passive form (a party must refrain from disloyal 
conduct) and an active form (a party has to actively co-operate), which illustrate the obli-
gations that the duty may constitute (2.2, see also Nazarians definition in 4.6.2). 
  Munukka has compiled and analyzed some possible formal criteria for the duty (see 3.2). 
The first criterion of the duty being a legal obligation is probably generally accepted, un-
less one dismisses the existence of the duty altogether. None of the more recent writers 
uphold such view.
308
 As this study will later point out, the second criterion of the duty be-
ing a (solely) contractual obligation is generally controversial. The duty has been applied 
to liability in contract negotiations and some authors have even discussed about a non-
contractual duty (see 6.6.1). The third definition of indivisibility has not really come across 
in the texts of the other authors and it would seem to be a too narrow definition. The fourth 
criterion (reserve-rule) has been a topic of debate especially in Finland (2.6.2). The con-
flicting views about whether the duty should be understood as comprehending individual 
statutory rules will be discussed in part 6.6.1. It is sufficient to say at this point that this 
criterion seems to be dismissed in the Swedish and Norwegian literature, whereas in Fin-
land it has some supporters. Jens Evald seems also to support the criterion (5.6.2.). In 
short, the criterion is therefore disputable. The fifth criterion of vagueness is somewhat 
open to interpretation. Munukka does not consider it as a criterion but rather as a descrip-
tion. Most authors agree that the duty is vague, but whether they consider it as its criterion 
is questionable. It is often stated that the duty cannot be exhaustively defined, which sug-
gests that vagueness is considered as a characteristic of the duty. Nevertheless, it must be 
said that authors (Munukka, Nazarian, Holm etc.) often promote a more detailed definition 
of the duty. Therefore, it seems that only the first criterion is generally accepted, whereas 
the second and third are commonly considered too narrow. The fourth criterion has its sup-
porters and opponents, and the meaning of the fifth is somewhat open to debate. 
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  The aforementioned definitions give some idea of the overall portrayal of the duty, but 
they do not describe the concrete applications the duty might have. Munukka’s five-part 
dissection of the duty (3.2) gives more insight into this aspect. In the context of commer-
cial contracts, the first definition (tillvaratagandedefinition) is usually excluded, since the 
parties are not (without an explicit contract provision) required to set the contracting part-
ners interests before their own (3.1). To what extend the second one (kontrolldefinition) 
applies is debatable, since contracting parties are generally expected to look after their own 
interests in commercial contracts. The last three definitions (aktsamhetsdefinitionen, 
samverkansdefinitionen and missbruksdefinitionen) will probably apply to most commer-
cial contracts, although the requirement for co-operation varies between different contract 
types. The last two (missbruk & aksamthet) are the most narrow ones, and they probably 
apply to almost all contracts. One could therefore summarize that the co-operation defini-
tion (samverkan) applies to commercial contracts depending on the contracts type, and the 
abuse (missbruk) and diligence (aktsamhet) definitions usually apply to all contracts.
309
   
  The Norwegian authors Nazarian and Thorsen have sought to define the minimum re-
quirements for applying the duty (4.2). To avoid repetition, only a short summary of them 
will be given. Both authors mention the requirements: a.) reprehensible conduct and b.) 
economic losses for the contracting partner, which are caused by such conduct. However, 
Nazarian’s definitions of the requirements are broader. She suggests that negative effects 
or risks of such effects are enough to constitute liability, which means that economic losses 
are not necessarily required. According to Nazarian, the parties are to: 1.) abstain from 
causing negative effects 2.) prevent and mitigate negative effects and 3.) promote the inter-
ests of the contracting partner. She states that the conduct of the parties is evaluated by 
assessing the protected expectations of the contracting partner. If a contracting party’s pro-
tected expectations call for any of the acts in 1.-3, then the contracting partner must act 
accordingly. One can notice certain similarities between Nazarian’s and Munukka’s defini-
tions. The items 1.-2. correspond to Munukkas diligence (aktsamhet) and abuse (missbruk) 
definitions and the third one is comparable to the guarantee (tillvarata), control (kontroll) 
and co-operation (samverkan), depending on how broad the third definition one is consid-
ered to be. Preventing negative effects may also be considered parallel to the co-operation 
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(samverkan) definition. In addition, all of these aspects exemplify the division of the duty 
into passive and active aspects.  
  Nazarian’s definition of the minimum requirements constitutes a somewhat broad liability 
for damages that a violation of the duty could lead into (4.2, 4.5). Since only negative ef-
fects are required and the effects do not necessarily even have to be financial, the liability 
seems to be far-reaching. As a reminder, Nazarian’s definition is intended for the duty of 
loyalty in general. Here one might ask if such a broad definition for damages is applicable 
in commercial context, as it probably would make the application of the duty unpredicta-
ble, as stated by Dalbak (4.3 & footnote 233). Of course, a disloyal act causing a complete 
loss of trust for one’s contracting partner is such non-economic negative effect which one 
must take into account. In any case, Nazarian seems to set an above-average demand for 
the consideration the contracting partners should show for each other in commercial con-
tracts (e.g. due to difference in power balance and experience, see 4.2). In any case, these 
minimum requirements give a sensible basis for the assessment of the duty or at least they 
can be used to remove some of the vagueness in loyalty-assessment. 
 
6.2.3. Restrictions to the concept of the duty of loyalty 
 
  Some writers have suggested definitions which are narrower than the above-mentioned 
ones. Lehtinen has defined the duty of loyalty as a neutral duty. This means that during 
contract negotiations the duty focuses on the contracting partner, whereas during the actual 
performance phase the duty is fixed on the contract itself. This means that during the con-
tractual relationship the duty of loyalty means loyalty to the contract, as opposed to the 
contracting partner (2.6.1). Also Korhonen has stated that loyalty is to be assessed by 
weighing up the contracts purpose, balance and risk-distribution, which might be interpret-
ed as an approval of the said idea (2.6.1). Munukka explicitly rejects this restriction by 
stating that the duty also protects the interests of the contracting partner (3.2). Nazarian 
does not seem to explicitly comment this, but judging by her views concerning the need to 
protect a weaker party also in commercial contracts, the fact that the minimum requirement 
protects the expectations of the parties, and other statements that imply a party-oriented 
perspective, one could assume that the concept of neutral duty is not in accordance with 
her views (see e.g. 4.2).  
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  In general, authors who emphasize loyalty as being assessed according to the counterpar-
ty’s expectations probably would reject the idea of neutrality. Similarly, authors who em-
phasize contracts as co-operation of the contracting parties might consider the definition as 
narrow, although the concepts of neutrality and co-operation may not be mutually exclu-
sive. Nevertheless, in the field of commercial contracts it might be recommendable to take 
a neutral and goal-oriented view, since it could give the assessment a more accurate focus. 
This is also in line with the predictability argument, since it is typically easier to orient 
ones actions in accordance with a mutually agreed and (hopefully) clearly defined contract 
purpose than the other party’s expectations. In any case, the concept of a neutral duty 
seems to be disputed. 
   The Finnish writers have dissenting opinions concerning the independent nature of the 
principle of loyalty. Mononen defines it solely as a principle for systematizing norms, 
which cannot be used to justify resolutions (2.2). Aurejärvi has criticized the broad use of 
the term loyalty, especially in cases where a legal concept or notion (e.g. mitigating dam-
ages) is already an established independent norm (2.2). As mentioned, Karhu considers the 
duty as having less influence inside the system of contract law than certain other princi-
ples, such as reasonableness and the freedom of contract (although he considers it to be 
growing towards becoming one of the fundamental principles of contract law, 2.2.). 
Lehtinen describes it as a “support-instrument” or an auxiliary principle of the bona fides-
principle (2.3). As his attitude towards the protection of a weaker party in commercial con-
tracts is generally negative
310
, it can be assumed that he would reject the more permissive 
interpretations in this regard (e.g. Nazarian’s). Similar attitudes have also come across in 
the other Nordic countries. Dalbak has also spoken for a more restrictive interpretation of 
the duty (4.5), stating that it should be restricted to assessing the abuse of rights and co-
operation contracts. Evald has also been somewhat skeptical towards loyalty based termi-
nology (5.6.2.).   
  However, other Finnish writers (Taxell, Häyhä, Tolonen, Ämmälä) give the principle 
(and the duty) a greater significance and emphasis as an independent principle (2.2.). All of 
the authors who have written their doctoral theses about the duty (Munukka, Holm, Naza-
rian) consider (unsurprisingly) the duty an independent principle. Generally speaking, the 
majority of the authors mentioned in this study seem to consider the duty an independent 
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principle (and duty). The restrictive view seems to be mostly represented by (some) Finn-
ish writers, although it should be noted that, as mentioned above, the attitudes towards the 
duty were earlier generally unfavorable in Sweden
311
. Aside from Dalbak, the opinions 
towards the duty seem to be mostly favorable in Norway.
312
 Concerning Denmark, with the 
exception of Evald, the author of this study has not found specific mentions about the du-
ty’s independence or the lack of thereof. Karhu states that of the Nordic countries loyalty-
based argumentation is probably used the least in Denmark. He suggests that the reason for 
this is the tendency of the Danish courts to apply the 36 of AftL. Therefore the courts up-
hold validity of contracts by merely adjusting them, and they refrain from solely applying 
33§.
313
      
 
6.3. The duty of loyalty in relation to other principles and norms 
 
  The duty of loyalty has a nebulous interrelationship with certain principles and statutory 
norms. It is clear that no legal entity exists in a void, and abstract definitions such as loyal-
ty can hardly have a crystalline definition in relation to other norms. Various authors have 
suggested linking the duty of loyalty with certain statutory norms, and they sometimes cite 
the latter ones as codification(s) of the duty. Also, some suggestions aim to merge the duty 
with certain principles and doctrines, such as the prohibition of the abuse of rights. To 
begin with, one can state that there is no consensus on this matter, and some authors dis-
miss the linking of the duty with specific norms as unnecessary (e.g. Lehtinen, Muukkonen 
2.1.). In the following part, the duty will be discussed in relation to: the Contracts Act 33§, 
36§ (and the principle of reasonableness), the prohibition of the abuse of rights and bona 
fides. 
    The most often suggested (usually indirect) legal basis for the duty of loyalty seems to 
be the Contracts Act 33§. In Finland, the authors seem to be divided by this question into 
the ones that are in favor of accepting it as a legal basis (Ämmälä, Von Hertzen, 
Huhtamäki) and the ones that oppose it (Muukkonen, Mähönen, Nystén-Haarala, see 2.3, 
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also footnote 33). The main argument against the former view appears to be that 33§ is 
formulated too narrowly to act as a basis for the duty. The material concerning Sweden 
shows that 33§, although usually mentioned, is not seen as its legal basis as often as in Fin-
land. Munukka has stated that 33§ has been applied restrictively in Sweden and since ap-
plying the norm requires subjective evaluation, it is not suited for being a basis for the ob-
jectively evaluated duty (3.1, also footnote 114). It would seem that the Swedish doctrine 
has been more interested in inspecting the duty in relation to 36§.  
  In Norway, 33§ is described as having attained a greater prominence than in Finland and 
Sweden (4.1, 4.3).
314
 There the duty has been applied in conjunction with 33§, but some-
times even independently. The duty is described as having a broader applicability and 
higher emphasis on the meticulousness than 33§ (4.3, 4.5). The duty has also been treated 
as an independent basis for voidableness of contract, although Hov & Høgberg expressed 
reservations concerning this (4.5). In any case, it would seem that the Norwegian doctrine 
emphasizes the 33§ the most in relation to the duty, but the writers still consider the duty 
being a much broader notion. The Danish texts mentioned in this study seem to have cov-
ered this aspect very scarcely.  
  The Contracts Act 36§ (and the principle of reasonableness) is usually separated from the 
duty by defining 36§ as a norm concerning and adjusting the contractual balance (equiva-
lence-orientation). The duty, on the other hand, is a norm that constitutes obligations to act 
and consider the interests of the contracting partner (action-orientation). As mentioned, 
Karhu stresses the importance of the principle of reasonableness over loyalty and considers 
the duty more as a background norm for the application of 36§. Most of the Finnish writers 
in jurisprudence seem to consider the duty and 36§ as fairly intertwined, but do not view 
36§ as a legal basis for the duty. (2.3, 2.4) 
  In Sweden, 36§ is accentuated more. Munukka’s description of the requirement of loyalty 
has been discussed above. The requirement highlights the closeness of these principles, but 
its name would imply that loyalty is the dominating aspect behind the subcategories. 
Munukka separates these categories by their function (correcting/complementing) and ap-
plicability. It might be interesting to point out Munukka’s statement that the high threshold 
for applying the 36§ to commercial contracts should not be transferred to assessing disloy-
al conduct, since the duty can have milder consequences than the adjustment of contract. 
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Holm has defined 36§ as being part of the duty and a “codified legitimation basis” for it. 
Norlén spoke of the principle of loyalty as one of the fundamental values behind 36§. Be-
cause of this, disloyal actions are generally considered as reasons for adjusting contracts by 
applying 36§. (3.4) 
  Of the Norwegian authors, Nazarian, Thorsen, Hov and Høgberg seem to view disloyal 
conduct as a basis for adjusting contracts, but they still separate the duty from 36§. Simon-
sen is an exception, as he considers 36§ to contain both the duty as well as the principle of 
reasonableness and that the duty can be applied through 36§ (4.3, footnote 228). Danish 
writers also regard the duty as being close to 36§, but they do not seem to consider 36§ as a 
basis for the duty, and in the case UfR 1981.300 H the duty was applied without directly 
referring to the 36§. (5.3) 
  To summarize, it would seem that all authors agree that the duty and 36§ have a similar 
value background. Finnish authors seem to emphasize 36§ over the duty and separate the 
principles, whereas the opinions of Swedish and Norwegian authors vary more. Most of 
them seem to consider the duty as a separate, parallel or background norm in relation to 
36§. However, Simonsen and Holm speak of 36§ as a statutory codification of the duty 
(3.3 footnote 128, 4.3). It would seem that the duty is generally accepted as being inter-
twined with 36§, but usually they are separated by their orientation (equivalence – activi-
ty). However, opinions on their exact interrelation diverge. 
  The prohibition of the abuse of rights is a doctrine that can more or less be considered 
either as a part of the duty of loyalty or as a norm parallel to it. Generally, it is agreed that 
abusing rights to harm ones contracting partner is disloyal conduct. Some Finnish authors 
have considered the prohibition of chicanery a form of the duty and the prohibition as con-
ceptually close to it (2.6.2.1). Munukka places both under the requirement of loyalty, but 
keeps them separate resulting from his view of loyalty having a broader definition and ap-
plicability. Still, he considers it possible to view either of them as a part of the other. Also 
Holm and Thorsen view the concepts as being very closely tied together, and Dalbak has 
supported Munukka’s idea of viewing the duty and the prohibition under the same notion 
(4.3). The clearest opponent against this idea is Evald who suggests removing all elements 
of the abuse of rights from notion of the duty of loyalty and transferring them into the sole 
concept of the prohibition. In contrast to Munukka who views the duty as having the 
broader definition and applicability in contract law, Evald states that the prohibition of the 
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abuse of rights has the broader applicability in general civil law. Evald separates these 
concepts by defining the prohibition as limiting the use of subjective rights and the duty as 
creating obligations to act (5.3). In the end, it seems that also the relationship of these con-
cepts is disputable. However, since many authors seem to agree that the definition of the 
duty is closely related to the prohibition, Munukka’s solution of viewing them under a su-
perordinate term seems to be a functional way to explain their relationship.  
  There seems to be some kind of a consensus about the distinction between the duty and 
the concept of bona fides. Bona fides seems to be mostly defined as a technical norm 
which means an evaluation about the fact if a person knew or should have known some-
thing. Both concepts aim to protect the justified expectations of the contracting parties. As 
mentioned above, Lehtinen emphasizes the bona fides considering the duty merely as sup-
porting it. In commercial context this aspect might gain more importance (2.3, footnote 
24).  
  Finnish authors have also discussed the duty in relation to the protection of the weaker 
party. Karhu’s opinion about this has been already mentioned. The opinions differ, but it 
seems that many authors (e.g. Ämmälä, Tolonen 2.3, Munukka 3.1, Nazarian and Hov & 
Høgberg, 4.2) agree that the power balance between the contracting parties may affect the 
loyalty assessment. But it should be noted that Lehtinen and Dalbak, who both focus espe-
cially on commercial contracts, have both strongly opposed this view.      
  To summarize this part of the comparison, the author of this study suggest that to explain 
the duty the Finnish authors refer either to 33§ or consider it as a wholly unwritten norm. 
Swedish authors seem to emphasize 36§ more, although the way it is referred to varies. In 
Norway, 33§ seems to have the spotlight, and in case of Denmark the question cannot be 
answered with certainty. The relationship between the prohibition of the abuse of rights 
and the duty is disputed, whereas the definition between the duty and the bona fides-term 
seems to be mostly clear. The relationship between the duty and the aspects of protecting a 
weaker party also divide opinions. Concerning the subject of this study, the more wary 
opinions might be highlighted, since the assessment of commercial contracts usually places 
less weight on a contracting party’s person and assumes that professional actors are capa-
ble of looking after their own interests. The predictability aspect can also be underlined.    
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6.4. Functions of the duty of loyalty 
 
   The most commonly mentioned function of the duty is creating and upholding trust and 
co-operation between the contracting partners. There are also some reservations concern-
ing this view (see Nazarian in 4.4). Most authors seem to consider the duty’s supplement-
ing function important, since it could decrease the need for overelaborate and lengthy con-
tracts (Karhu, Häyhä, Lehtinen 2.2 Munukka, 3.2 Nazarian, 4.2). Aside from these two 
functions, there are a number of individual functions that are more or less often mentioned. 
Munukka’s categorization (see 3.4) of such functions seems to be the most detailed one. 
Many authors probably approve of the title and linking function. These functions help to 
group together various norms and therefore focus on the system of the law of contracts. 
This idea is mentioned among others by Karhu, Mononen, Häyhä and Nazarian. Prevention 
of opportunism and damages is also probably widely accepted, since in itself it is a part of 
the trust aspect. Although, since Evald has spoken for detaching some of these elements 
from the duty in favor of the doctrine of the prohibition of the abuse of rights, the emphasis 
given to this aspect may vary. Nevertheless, the aforementioned aspects are the largely 
accepted ones. In the context of commercial contracts the trust function is probably the 
most vital. 
  The opinions concerning the flexibility function seem to be mostly favorable, although 
Dalbak has criticized this aspect (4.5). The main issue here is probably the extent of this 
function and to what extent it can be applied in conflict with the parties’ freedom of con-
tract. The same can be said of the correcting function. Many authors also approve of the 
materialization function that links statutory norms to the duty. Although as discussed earli-
er, (6.2.2) some authors, especially in Finland, oppose such linking. Certain authors also 
maintain that the duty promotes the functionality of markets and exchange (Munukka, 
Nazarian, Simonsen). A counterargument against this is that the duty increases unpredicta-
bility in contracts, which then increases transaction costs. Since the definitions and opin-
ions about the duty vary, authors emphasize different aspects of the duty. One could as-
sume that the authors who stress the importance of predictability in commercial contracts 
probably would oppose the emphasizing of the flexibility and correcting functions. 
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  The primary source for debate seems to be about how far one can highlight the duty at the 
cost of the contracting parties’ freedom of contract. Munukka has described the duty as 
“avtalsfrihetens antagonist.” He considers it possible to apply the duty even contrary to the 
explicit terms of contract, although this statement concerns the duty in general (3.4, foot-
note 138, see also Mäenpää’s opinion, footnote 20). Whether he views the same applying 
to commercial contracts is questionable, although the statement implies an overall attitude 
towards the issue. Nazarian has also placed a rather considerable weight on the duty in 
relation to the freedom of contract (see e.g. 4.2, 4.4, 4.6.2). In general, since most authors 
suggest that the duty should be applied according to the justified expectations of the par-
ties, going against explicit contract terms is most likely disapproved of. Some authors have 
also placed the freedom of contract above loyalty (see for instance Karhu, Dalbak, 
Lehtinen). Giving a pellucid answer to this question is not possible, but one could say that 
the more recent studies and doctoral theses seem to put an increasing amount of emphasis 
on the duty. One can also assume that sentiments towards restricting the freedom of con-
tract in commercial context are normally more negative than in other fields of contract law.       
 
6.5 Application in contracts and consequences of disloyal conduct 
 
6.5.1. The applications of the duty 
 
  As has been said, perhaps ad nauseam, there is no certain consequence for (a breach of) 
the duty and its applicability is to be assessed in casu. It is undisputed that the duty may: 
1.) be applied to contract interpretation and 2.) to supplement a contract. The duty is con-
sidered to constitute an obligation to interpret contract provisions loyally and not too one-
sidedly. Loyalty-based interpretation fulfills the above-mentioned functions of the duty. 
Many authors name the parties’ expectations as a basis for loyalty interpretation (see be-
low). Therefore, the extent of the interpretation which the authors attribute to the duty also 
varies depending on which functions they wish to underline. Some writers, who are sceptic 
towards individual loyalty obligations, place more emphasis on the interpretation aspect 
(e.g. Mähönen 2.5, Ramberg 3.5). Holm has also pointed out that the loyalty aspect might 
add a goal- or purpose-oriented view into the interpretation. (3.5, footnote 147)  
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  The supplementing of contract brings new or previously “hidden” obligations into a con-
tractual relationship. Some authors emphasize the supplementing feature of the duty 
(Munukka 3.5). In Munukka’s view, the supplementing of contract can be based on dispos-
itive norms, the type of contract in question or in casu assessment. The first part of this 
view is likely opposed by the authors who speak for the separation of statutory norm from 
the notion of the duty. One interesting question is the relation between the norms of the 
Trade Act and the duty. As this study will later point out, certain norms of the Trade Act 
are often associated with the duty. This might speak for supplementing a contract with the 
norms of the Trade Act, even when the contract does not refer to the Trade Act. Still, the 
Trade Act is dispositive law, but the duty is considered a non-discretionary background 
norm, and therefore it cannot be completely excluded from contracts. Concerning contracts 
in which the Trade Act has been explicitly excluded, one might ask if it is possible to sup-
plement the contract with the duty of loyalty, even if such supplementing would, in fact, 
lead to the norms of Trade Act being incorporated into the contract. It might be problemat-
ic if such obligations seep into a contractual relationship even when the parties consider 
them excluded. Lehtinen and Dalbak have stressed that the provisions added to a commer-
cial contract through supplementing should not be conflicting against the explicitly stated 
provisions (2.5 & 4.5).  
 
6.5.2. The consequences of disloyal conduct 
 
   Regarding the consequences of breaching the duty, the following ones are fairly 
acknowledged possibilities: 1.) the liability for damages 2.) the voidableness of contract 
3.) the cancellation of contract and 4.) the passivity sanctions. The liability for damages is 
almost always mentioned, and the type of liability is usually described as culpa-liability. 
Nazarian has spoken for a somewhat stricter liability (4.5) and also pondered whether it 
would be possible to award damages for non-economic loss, which would serve as a pre-
ventive warning. It might be doubtful that such loss would be compensated in a commer-
cial context. The possibility for price reduction has also been mentioned (2.5, 3.5). The 
voidableness of contract is often mentioned in conjunction with the Contracts Act 33§. 
There has also been some discussion, especially in Norway, over possibility to void a con-
tract solely by applying the duty of loyalty (4.5). In Finnish and Swedish texts, such possi-
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bility is not usually discussed in detail, since the voidableness is usually tied to 33§ or 36§, 
with loyalty influencing their interpretation (see Mähönen 2.5). Although this issue seems 
to be disputed in Norway (see Hov & Høgberg 4.5), it seems to have gained support in 
jurisprudence and court practice. This would imply that the duty has a stronger influence 
over the consequences of disloyal conduct in Norwegian doctrine than in Sweden and Fin-
land. This issue has also been discussed in the Danish doctrine, although the author of this 
study has not found any definitive statements. Andersen & Madsen define 36§ as a basis 
for the voidableness of contracts in case of disloyal conduct (5.5). 
  Concerning the cancellation of contract, the main issue is often the trust required for the 
co-operation of contracting parties. If such trust is (materially) violated it is usually seen as 
a justification for cancelling the contract. On the other side, one must consider the interests 
of the contracting partner when measuring whether or not to cancel the contract. Lastly, 
certain passivity sanctions are seen as being part of the duty. These include the possibility 
for a party to lose his/her right to invoke certain contract terms. The writers have also dis-
cussed a possibility to revise contracts on the basis of the duty. The Danish case UfR 
1981.300 H is an example of a situation where the refusal to adjust the contract was be 
considered disloyal. Further, an obligation to renegotiate is mentioned as a milder variant 
of such co-operation. Nazarian, (4.5) Holm (3.6, 3.6.2), Thorsen (4.3) and Andersen & 
Madsen (4.5, footnote 286) seem to consider it possible to adjust a (usually long-term) con-
tract in situations where a party has no loyal justification to refuse it. 
  It would seem that the Norwegian jurisprudence considers the duty as having a greater 
influence in relation to the consequences of disloyal conduct than the legal doctrines of the 
other Nordic countries. Nazarian seems to take this view to the furthest. This influence is 
illustrated by the fact that some Norwegian authors consider it possible to void and revise 
contracts solely on the basis of disloyalty. The authors in other Nordic countries seem to 
consider the duty more as being applied through other statutory norms, although the writers 
disagree on the independent nature of the duty. One can assume that authors who see the 
duty solely as a background principle rate its influence low. As mentioned before, the 
Finnish writers have stated dissenting opinions on this matter. (2.2). The Swedish authors 
Munukka and Ramberg disagree whether the duty can be used to constitute a claim in a 
legal dispute. This disagreement is focused on the interpretation of the case NJA 2009 
p.672 (3.5). It would seem that the applicability of the duty as an independent principle is 
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(at least to a degree) disputed in Sweden and Finland, whereas Norwegian and perhaps also 
Danish writers see it as a more independent legal entity. 
 
6.5.3. Possible criteria for the duty of loyalty and contract types with particular em-
phasis on loyalty 
 
  Whether the problem of unpredictability in applying the duty can be cured has been a 
source for debate. Writers have discussed various criteria on how to assess (dis)loyalty. 
Naturally, these criteria overlap each other and do not exclude the others. The assessment 
of contracts is to be done on a holistic basis. These criteria are accentuations which focus 
on a certain aspect of the contractual relationship that is considered pivotal for the loyalty-
evaluation. Suggestions for such criteria are: 1.) reasonableness (Muukkonen, 2.5) 2.) the 
expectations of the parties (of what is normal or what is typical for the contract type in 
question) (Häyhä 2.5, Munukka, Holm 3.5, Björkdahl 3.6.1, Nazarian 4.5, Simonsen 
4.6.1.) 3.) the contracts purpose/goal (Korhonen, Lehtinen 2.5) and 4.) the common sense 
of justice (Nazarian 4.5).  
  The principle of reasonableness and its interrelationship with the duty has been discussed 
above (6.3). Muukkonen has mentioned reasonableness as the main criterion of loyalty. 
The contracting parties are to reasonably consider each other’s interests. Reasonableness is 
of course always an aspect to consider, but the subsequent authors have rather emphasized 
the parties’ expectations as the main criterion. It seems that the (2.) aspect has gained the 
most support in the recent legal literature. The reasonableness aspect in itself might be fair-
ly vague and easily mix 36§ with the duty. The perspective of contracts purpose or goal 
(3.) can perhaps be defined as a narrower part of the parties’ expectations. It could also be 
described as the more objective perspective which focuses on the contract, and thus the 
parties expectations are perceived through the contracts goal. The perspective of the par-
ties’ expectations (2.) might be a bit more subjective, even though this assessment is done 
by evaluating what a party normally or commonly would expect in the situation in ques-
tion. Therefore, as stressed by i.a. Lehtinen, the third aspect might be best suited for as-
sessing commercial contracts. 
  Nazarian has analyzed the unpredictability problem in two situations (see 4.5). If there is 
a contract provision to be interpreted, one is to follow the parties’ expectations. If there is 
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no provision, one can reduce the unpredictability by assessing the expectations on the basis 
of the common sense of justice. As this might appear as somewhat credulous, it must be 
reminded that Nazarian discusses these situations as predictability before a conflict has 
arisen between the parties. The validity of the common sense of justice argument is dimin-
ished after the parties are in conflict. Finally, both Munukka and Votinius argue that the 
duty does not make courts evaluation of a contracts wording necessarily more unpredicta-
ble, especially if the wording in itself is unclear. In these situations, the duty of loyalty 
might even promote predictableness. (3.5) 
   The duty of loyalty gains more emphasis and significance in certain contract types, first 
and foremost in long-term contracts. Its importance for such contracts is undisputed, and 
for instance Nystén-Haarala mentions it as being possibly the most important principle in 
them (2.5). Individual evaluations still vary, as Munukka has accentuated the meaning of a 
contracts complexity over its duration (3.5). Examples of loyalty-dependent contracts are: 
franchising contracts, joint-venture contracts and partnership-contracts. As mentioned, 
Holm considers it possible to adjust long-term contracts on the basis of the duty loyalty. 
This due to the fact that it is not possible to prepare for all possible future changes in a con-
tract (3.6). On the other side, it is understandable that simple sales contracts do not require 
much consideration for the other party’s interests. Even more so, contract types that have a 
speculative character are cited as having the lowest requirement of consideration for the 
other party’s interests (4.6.2.2). 
 
6.6. Elements of the duty of loyalty 
 
6.6.1. The duty of loyalty in different phases of a contractual relationship 
   
  The duty of loyalty influences contracting relationships from beginning to end. The con-
cept of pre-contractual liability caused by a breach of the duty during negotiations seems to 
be generally accepted in jurisprudence. The relationship between the doctrine of culpa in 
contrahendo which itself is not a clearly defined doctrine and the duty of loyalty has had 
various definitions in jurisprudence. Generally, authors seem to use the term culpa in con-
trahendo for pre-contractual liability and the duty as a factor in the assessment of this lia-
bility. There are some exceptions. Huhtamäki has described the duty as a continuation of 
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the culpa in contrahendo and suggested that both terms are used in conjunction with each 
other (2.6.1). Simonsen seems to merge the culpa in contrahendo with the duty, so that the 
former is considered part of the duty (4.6.1). Björkdahl has defined the duty as a “threshold 
factor” of the pre-contractual liability. If the negotiations have advanced to a stage in 
which the parties can rely on the fact that the contract will be concluded, then they must act 
in accordance with the duty of loyalty. Before this, the negotiations are non-binding. 
(3.6.1.1) 
  It would seem that the interrelationship between the duty of loyalty and the doctrine of 
culpa in contrahendo is hard to unambiguously define. Of the above-mentioned definitions 
the one mentioned by Björkdahl seems to be the most concrete, unless one plainly merges 
both terms into (either) one.
315
 Merging the terms does not, however, make the concept of 
the duty much clearer. Lehtinen’s definition of the neural duty which focuses the duty on 
the contracting parties during negotiations has been mentioned above. The evaluation of 
the duty is generally based on the parties’ justified expectations of establishing contact.  
  Aside from its relation to culpa in contrahendo, the influence the duty has during the ne-
gotiations-phase varies. Since the pre-contractual liability is an exception to the rule, it is 
usually applied restrictively. One might see some variations on how strictly this restric-
tiveness is applied (see for instance Norway Rt. 2004 p.1256), and Nystén-Haarala has 
spoken for a somewhat broader interpretation of loyalty during negotiations (2.6.1 footnote 
67). Beside these examples, it is not possible to describe the influence of the duty without 
delving deeper into the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo, which is not possible in the 
bounds of this study.  
  An even clearer deviation from the norm, the non-contractual or contract-external duty 
has been discussed the most by the Swedish authors. Holm and Björkdahl refrain from 
using the term duty of loyalty in non-contractual situations (3.6.1.2). Munukka has evalu-
ated the possibility of applying the duty in situations that are contract-like (kontrakts-
liknande) and Kleineman (3.6.1.2 footnote 166) contemplates the possibility of using loyal-
ty-based assessment in certain third-party situations. Usually authors leave the non-
contractual duty outside the scope of their texts, which implies it being considered more or 
less excluded. Nazarian has delimited the subject of her doctoral thesis to exclude contract-
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 See also Heidbrink JT 4/2007-08 p.971. In his review of Björkdahl’s book, Heidbrink states that Björk-
dalh’s thoughts about the duty of loyalty in pre-contractual situations are fit for use (användbar) and at 
least so convincing that they cannot be ignored. 
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external loyalty, although she mentions the possibility of its existence in some cases. Espe-
cially the Norwegian case Rt.1994 p.775 was about loyalty between two rival pledgees, 
which is mentioned as an example of loyalty between rivals (4.6.1). A more specific ac-
count of the non-contractual duty would go past the subject of this study, since it would be 
more about property law than contract law. To summarize, there seems to be some interests 
in applying the duty to non-contractual cases, especially in Sweden and Norway. This 
view, however, is disputed. The main issue is the problem with expanding the concept of 
loyalty which means co-operation and consideration for the contracting partner, to a third 
party who is not bound by the contract. This causes not only a conceptual problem but also 
increases the practical problem of unpredictability.  
  There are also some mentions of post-contractual loyalty obligations of which the most 
notable ones are the duty of confidentiality and the prohibition to compete (Tieva 2.6.1, 
Munukka 2.6.2.1, Nazarian, Simonsen 4.6.1). The authors describe post-contractual obliga-
tions as being based on the protected trust between contacting parties. Such obligations 
then may extend to the time after the contractual relationship. It is questionable to what 
extent it would be possible to supplement a commercial contract with a post-contractual 
obligation. In these contracts it would be quite unpredictable to supplement the contracts 
with an extended prohibition to compete, without such contract provision having previous-
ly been, at least in some form, an explicit part of the contract.  
 
6.6.2. Obligations stemming from the duty of loyalty 
 
  The questions whether the duty of loyalty can act as a basis or a source for more specific 
obligations (such as the duty to disclose) and whether statutory obligations can be viewed 
as loyalty obligations are disputed. The two opposing views in the Finnish discussion have 
been mentioned (3.6.2). The more restrictive view which sees the duty purely as a non-
statutory norm has also been supported by Evald (5.6.2). In contrast, the author of this 
study has not come across similar opinions in the material concerning Sweden and Nor-
way. The narrowest view suggested by Muukkonen and Mähönen demarcates all other 
obligations which can be reasonably well defined (e.g. duty to disclose, duty to co-
operate), outside the general duty of loyalty (2.6.2). The specific statutory norms are con-
sidered as specific loyalty obligations, which are considered as being apart from the gen-
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eral duty. Also the negotiations loyalty is separated from the general duty. A degree less 
restrictive view, suggested by Hemmo and Evald, considers statutory norms separate from 
the duty and the notion of the duty as the foundation only for obligations which have an 
ambiguous normative basis in contract law (2.6.2, 5.6.2). Evald has also criticizes the in-
ductive reasoning behind deriving individual obligations from the general duty of loyalty. 
These views by Hemmo and Evald could be described as formal, since the statutory nature 
of the norm defines whether it is a loyalty obligation. These two views generally seem to 
strive for a more precise use of terms, without the need for linking individual obligations to 
the duty. 
  Aside from the above-mentioned views, it would seem that most authors mentioned in 
this study speak for a broader definition of the general duty of loyalty. The author of this 
study has not come across similar restrictive definitions in the Swedish or Norwegian ma-
terial used in this study. A moderate amount of Finnish and some Danish authors consider 
the duty as a basis for more specific obligations. It would seem that Nystén-Haarala’s idea 
that the broader version(s) of loyalty has in the last years become more favored than the 
narrow one hits the mark (2.6.2 footnote 75). The upholders of the broader definition(s) 
generally speak for a more “holistic” outlook, in that the individual (statutory) obligations 
(e.g. the Trade Act) are to be assessed by taking into account their loyalty-background 
which guides their interpretation. They also use the term specific duties, but it usually indi-
cates specific duties that are derived from the general duty. Therefore, as mentioned by 
Munukka (3.1, 3.4, materialization function), it is possible that if certain norms become 
seen as loyalty obligations, their interpretation may change accordingly. The division be-
tween the specific and the general duty does not exclude or totally separate the latter from 
the former, but rather considers the specific duties a subcategory or a derivation of the gen-
eral duty. The definitions mentioned by Votinius are worth reminding of, although they are 
somewhat broader and overlap the other above-mentioned definitions, which is why they 
are not discussed here in detail (3.6.2). 
  The specific duties can be described as secondary obligations that have a loyalty-based 
assessment. As Munukka (3.6.2) and Nazarian (4.6.2) have stated, their type varies be-
tween passive and active obligations. Nazarian seems to give the general duty of loyalty 
the broadest definition, since in her view contract provisions and statutory norms of loyalty 
do not exclude the general duty. This means that the general duty is not to be seen as being 
excluded or diminished, even if there are contract provisions or statutory norms that define 
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or alter the duty, as long as they do not explicitly demarcate it. How one defines the more 
specific duties differs, but the categorizations drafted by Munukka seem to be quite ade-
quate. As mentioned before, in this study the author has chosen to discuss the duty to dis-
close under its own headline, since most authors tend to focus on it in their texts. Some 
authors see the duty to co-operate as being identical to the duty of loyalty or claim that the 
duty to disclose is the same as the co-operation (2.6.2). Still, it would seem to be possible 
to, at least somewhat, distinguish these duties and this is why they are discussed separately 
in the following chapter. Of course, one must bear in mind that the authors who separate 
the notion of the duty of loyalty from other specific obligations would probably disagree 
with the following categorizations. 
 
6.6.2.1. Specific obligations requiring contribution to contract 
 
  The following specific obligations attributed to the duty of loyalty seem to be almost al-
ways mentioned in the legal literature of all the Nordic countries: 1.) The duty to co-
operate (or contribute) which is defined as an obligation to work towards fulfilling the con-
tracts goal. The Contracts Act 50§ has often been mentioned as a statutory example of this 
duty (2.6.2.1, 3.6.2.1, 4.6.2.1). Commonly, co-operation is defined as an obligation to re-
move obstacles and seek means to adequately effectuate the contract and its purpose, 
which means e.g. applying for official permissions and seeking financial support. Passivity 
in this respect can be regarded as disloyal. Interestingly, the norms 4.2 and 6.2 of the Con-
tracts Act are often mentioned as such passivity sanctions. (3.6.1, 4.6.2.1)  2.) The duty to 
mitigate (and prevent) damages, which is often linked to the Trade Act 70§ in Sweden
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and Norway and 33§ or 35§ in Denmark. The Vahingonkorvauslaki 6:1 is mentioned in the 
Finnish literature, although it actually concerns delicts rather than contracts. As mentioned 
(by, amongst others, Aurejärvi, 2.6.2.1) the duty to mitigate damages applies, in fact, to 
broader contexts in civil law than the duty of loyalty, which makes linking it to loyalty, or 
especially regarding it as its subcategory, somewhat troublesome. On the other side, ab-
staining from mitigating damages is probably commonly considered disloyal. 3.) The duty 
of care, which is linked to Trade Act 72§ and 73§ in Sweden and Norway. For its defini-
tion, see 3.6.2.1. 
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  Aside from the aforementioned obligations (and the duty to disclose) there are some obli-
gations which are only mentioned in certain countries in the material used in this study. 
The prohibition of chicanery has been mentioned by Finnish writers, but this aspect was 
discussed above in part 6.3. 4.) the prohibition to compete, which is mentioned in all the 
other countries except in Finland. What makes this duty interesting is that some authors 
(Holm, Munukka, Nazarian, Andersen & Madsen) consider it possible for such an obliga-
tion to be supplemented into the contract on basis of the duty of loyalty. Munukka and 
Holm suggested that supplementing a contract with this obligation should be based on at 
least an implicit agreement of its existence in the contract (3.5, 3.6.2.1). Nazarian considers 
the prohibition to be less relevant in sales contracts, but sees it possible to consider it as a 
part of franchising contracts, even when it is not agreed upon in the contract (4.6.2.1). In 
any case, supplementing a commercial contract with a prohibition to compete would be a 
far-reaching alteration of the contract. 5.) The duty of confidentiality, which is mentioned 
in Swedish (3.6.2.1), Norwegian (4.6.2.1) and Finnish (2.6.2.2) texts, can be especially 
relevant in close co-operation contracts where parties share information. The author of this 
study has not found mentions of it in conjunction with the duty of loyalty in Danish texts. 
The description given for it in 3.6.2.1 probably illustrates its relevant aspects.  
  One can notice that the duty is perceived the most far-reaching by the recent Swedish and 
Norwegian authors. It would seem that in relation to the specific obligations, the Finnish 
authors uphold the most restrictive outlook. This could be explained by the fact that there 
is no doctoral thesis about the duty, unlike in Sweden and Norway. One can also under-
stand why there have been no mentions of the prohibition to compete, since it is probably 
one of the most potent ways to alter a contract. The author of this study has not encoun-
tered mentions of the duty of confidentiality in the Danish literature, but otherwise it seems 
that the all other aforesaid obligations are mentioned at least by one author. 
 
6.6.2.2. The duty to disclose and inform 
 
  The duty to disclose is mentioned together with the duty of loyalty in all of the Nordic 
countries in question. It is usually defined as an obligation to adequately inform ones con-
tracting partner in situations where one party has information that is of importance for the 
common goal of the parties. The duty to inspect or investigate is usually mentioned as its 
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counterpart. The level of diligence required from the inspection varies. Nazarian places the 
duty to disclose before the duty to investigate in general (4.6.2.2), although it is unclear 
whether this statement concerns commercial contracts. Also, the skill and expertise pos-
sessed by a contracting party may require him/her to disclose information that the other 
party is not able to gain him/herself. As Lehtinen points out, commercial actors are usually 
expected to have and seek expertise on their own. Munukka delimits the duty to inspect 
outside the duty of loyalty (3.6.2.2 and footnote 198).  
  Some individual aspects of disclosing have been discussed in more detail. 1.) an obliga-
tion to notify (reklamation), has often been mentioned in conjunction to the duty in all of 
the countries (Taxell, Madsen, Andersen, Munukka, Nazarian), although Munukka 
(3.6.2.2) and Nazarian (4.6.2.2, footnote 256) have expressed some doubts whether notify-
ing should be considered as a loyalty obligation. 2.) obligation to warn (Munukka 3.6.2.2, 
Nazarian 4.6.2.2), although Nazarian discusses it in conjunction with advising, whereas 
Munukka uses a broader definition. The duty to give notice mentioned by Simonsen is 
quite similar to the duty to warn, but the latter focuses rather on a contracting party intend-
ing to exercise certain rights (4.6.2.2). Also the Trade Act 17.2 is mentioned as conveying 
an obligation to warn. Although the duty to warn is not explicitly mentioned by Finnish 
authors, one may still argue that the general definition of the duty to disclose usually in-
cludes the duty to warn. 3.) an obligation to inform of performance hindrances. (Rudanko 
2.6.2.2, Munukka 3.6.2.2, Madsen 5.6.2.2.). 4.) An obligation to clarify, which actually 
means explaining or correcting the others false impressions (Votinius 3.6.2, Nicander 
3.6.2.2). These two aspects could also be included in the general definition of the duty, but 
it is difficult to say if the authors in general would accept them as such. 5.) The duty to 
answer (Munukka 3.6.2.2.), and 6.) the duty to point out harsh terms in standard contracts 
(2.6.2.2, 5.6.2.2.). In addition, it can also be mentioned that Moalem gives the duty to dis-
close a broad scope of applicability and definition, linking it to several legal doctrines (see 
5.6.2.2). 
  Aside from categorizing numerous types of obligations, some authors have sought to 
form more intricate criteria for assessing the duty to disclose. Such authors mentioned in 
this study are: Norlén, Nazarian, Simonsen and Moalem. The following aspects are usually 
same: 1.) a party knows (or should know) certain information 2.) The information must be 
relevant or decisive 3.) The party possessing the information knows (or should know) of its 
relevance to the contracting partner. Nazarian has also added a condition that a party (e.g. 
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buyer) relies on the fact that he/she will be disclosed about the facts in question (4.6.2.2). 
Generally, parties are not required to give information about their economic status. How-
ever, the opinions concerning this are more nuanced. Norlén (footnote 163) and Simonsen 
(3.6.2.2) consider an imminent bankruptcy as something that needs to be disclosed of. Also 
Nazarian seems to hold it necessary, if the minimum requirements for disclosing are ful-
filled (3.6.2.2). Björkdahl generally opposes such view (footnote 163). Norlén seems to 
take the need to disclose quite far by stating that even if information is by its nature uncer-
tain, it is not excluded from the duty to disclose (footnote 192). Simonsen seems demarcate 
uncertain information outside the required disclosure (4.6.2.2). 
  Certain classifications for the types of information included in the scope of the duty have 
been mentioned. Norlén mentions the destructive, retributive and productive facts 
(3.6.2.2.) and Moalem facts relevant to the effectuation of contract, motives for contracting 
and information about market situations. Moalem further mentions the probability and 
influence of relevant events as additional factors of the assessment (5.6.2.2.). The first cat-
egories mentioned by both authors are probably generally considered to be part of the duty 
to disclose. It is clear that withholding destructive facts is disloyal. The destructive facts 
are also related to the effectuation of contract, since they usually directly hamper it. Aside 
from these facts, one can understand why withholding facts important to the effectuation of 
contract is considered disloyal. The redistributive facts focus on the balance of contract, 
which means facts that would drastically chance such balance are to be disclosed of. This 
is probably something that authors disagree on and especially in the context of commercial 
contracts. Usually it is agreed that the parties are allowed to use their expertise and 
knowledge to gain advantages and profits. Moalem delimits information about the markets 
and parties motives for taking part in contracts outside the scope of the duty. Lastly, as is 
understandable, Norlén leaves the productive facts outside the duty, although he perceives 
it possible for them to be included into the duty in exceptional circumstances.  
    The general rule is that legal facts are not included in the duty. Exceptions are still 
possibile, as Lehtinen considers such obligation imaginable in the context of international 
trade (2.6.2.2). Nazarian considers it possible as well, when the object of purchase requires 
especial legal expertise e.g. in tax law (4.6.2.2.). Munukka considers a gross mistake or 
misleading of a party as grounds for considering a neglect of disclosure disloyal (3.6.2.2).  
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 7. Conclusions  
 
7.1. The Nordic duty of loyalty – a broad definition 
 
  At first sight, the duty of loyalty seems to be intangible and almost ethereal. The general 
definition does not seem to give one much to build on, but as one looks deeper into the 
ideas presented in jurisprudence, one notices that eventually the duty seems to branch into 
numerous offshoots which are entangled with other entities of the legal system. Since the 
duty is an unwritten rule, principle, standard, guideline, idea and whatnot, it is also rich soil 
for authors in jurisprudence to plant and develop their ideas. Most definitions and categori-
zations given for the duty are developed by authors, and these definitions are then later 
developed further by others. If one would try to present an illustration of the most exten-
sive form that has been given to the duty in accordance to the notions presented in the 
chapter 6.2, one could present something like the figure 1. on the page 119. The graph 
starts from the general and abstract definitions and descends into the concrete and explicit 
ones. 
  The top level of the figure holds the definitions of Björne, Votinius and Norlén, and most 
of its latter parts are based on the categorizations presented by Munukka, especially in the 
case of the requirement of loyalty. Whether one places the concrete duty above or next to 
the requirement of loyalty is a matter of taste. It could also perhaps just be merged with the 
(principle) notion of the duty of loyalty, but here it is used to describe the difference be-
tween the views of legal dogmatics and philosophy of law, which admittedly might not 
match Björne’s original definition. Nevertheless, the figure also contains categorizations 
made by other authors. One could of course include the ban of chicanery into the duty of 
loyalty or the prohibition of the abuse of rights but, as mentioned, this is debatable (but 
then so are all of the categorizations) and it was therefore left out. It would also be possible 
to place Munukka’s five definitions for the duty of loyalty and the three models (3.2) 
somewhere between the duty of loyalty and the individual obligations. The contract type 
dictates which ones of the obligations present themselves in a contractual relationship. Of 
course, in commercial contracts the duty might mostly influence contracts through inter-
pretation and by supplementing them with the duty to disclose, but none of the above-
mentioned duties and obligations seems to be completely excluded from such contracts. 
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  In addition to these categorizations, Thorsen and Nazarian have sought to find suitable 
minimum criteria for evaluating contracting parties conduct. Since these criteria are by 
their nature quite universal, they can be considered fairly suitable for measuring the con-
duct of contracting parties, although in commercial contracts one might want to specify the 
definition of negative effects and the level of diligence the parties must maintain for each 
other. It might be better to set a stricter requirement for negative effects and less for dili-
gence, since the parties are expected to see to their own interests. One might also ask if it 
would be better to take the criterion for assessing loyalty more to the direction of the con-
tracts goal and purpose, since it might be the most objective and possibly predictable as-
pect of the contract. Of course, the criteria merge together more or less but the contracts 
goal might be a valid focus point.  
  Further, one could use the categories mentioned by Norlén in a broader fashion to assess 
the parties conduct, meaning that actions are divided between destructive, redistributive 
and productive in relation to the contracts goal. Destructive actions are always disloyal and 
so are redistributive, if they change the contract balance so that the contract (goal) loses its 
meaning or value for one of the parties. The definition of productive actions might have to 
be adjusted so that it refers to actions, such as competing activity in the markets or deals 
with third parties, which generally are allowed, unless they significantly harm the contracts 
purpose. 
    Is it possible to speak of a common Nordic duty of loyalty? The general definition of the 
duty is the same in all of the countries. Most of the individual elements are also acknowl-
edged, such as the duties to disclose and co-operate. The consequences for breaching the 
duty are agreed upon on a general level, although specific descriptions vary. The more re-
cent articles and doctoral theses give the duty all the more broader definitions. The figure 2 
seeks to illustrate the various aspects and applications the duty can have. The figure does 
not include all of the aspects mentioned in this study; especially some of the specific func-
tions are left out. Lastly, it is also interesting to note that Taxell’s definition of duty, which 
was published in the 70´s, still seems to be among the broader perspectives of the duty. 
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7.2. The Nordic duty of loyalty – a critical approach 
 
  As one has seen when studying the opinions stated about the duty of loyalty, not all au-
thors wish to see it in such a broad scope. Mostly the authors who have written their doc-
toral thesis about the subject seem to be the most willing to give it an all-encompassing 
definition. The arguments against the duty are: 1.) that it is too vague and therefore creates 
uncertainty, 2.) it is unnecessary to view individual and well defined norms as loyalty obli-
gations and that 3.) most of these obligations (e.g. mitigating damages) are already in 
themselves established doctrines of contract law, which do not need a loyalty based evalua-
tion. Considering, for instance, the norms of the Trade Act as loyalty obligations might 
also make their applicability more unpredictable, since the duty cannot be excluded from 
contracts. 
  Especially concerning the interpretation of commercial contracts, one can ask if it is justi-
fied to place much emphasis on loyalty and this way limit the parties’ freedom of contract. 
Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that complex long-term contracts and partnership-
contracts always require loyalty from both contracting parties. Whether this loyalty should 
be applied in a form of contract interpretation or supplementing depends on the contract 
type and commercial customs of the branch of trade in question. Still, relying on one’s 
contracting partner and the friendship-paradigm might be somewhat naïve.
317
 Perhaps the 
friendship-paradigm does not have to be so emphasized in commercial contracts, and may-
be it would be possible to assess the duty with a more goal-oriented and functional per-
spective. 
  So is there a consensus on the duty outside the general definition? It would seem that, 
aside from this general notion, one can find more or less restrictive perspectives which 
seek to give the duty narrower and stricter definitions. The categorizations mentioned in 
the figure 1 are by no means undisputed. Some wish to use the duty mainly for the system-
atization function, which might then give tools for interpreting different legal entities. In 
any case, the author of this study perceives most of the recent authors giving the duty a 
broader definition than just the systematization function would allow. Wheter this is neces-
                                                          
317
 See for instance Karhu’s review of Munukka’s thesis in JT 3/2007-08  p.756-757: ”Betoningen av lojalitet 
kan i några ekonomiska kontexter vara litet orealistisk och ge intrycket av en snäll och naiv juridik. [..] 
(M)ånga ekonomiska aktörer strävar hellre efter förutsebarheten med långa och tämligen formella avtal 
som tolkas och används strikt i anda av rigor commercialis (jfr s. 52) än efter vad de ser som allmänna och 
vaga principer.” and Dalbak LoR 10/2007. 
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sary and if it will solve the problems of flexibility attributed to e.g. long-term contracts, is 
left for future discussion to decide. 
